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Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: 
we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in 
command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex 
relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by 
events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.  
The end of the Cold War is one such moment of crisis and transformation. How did the ideological 
victory of the West impact the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking and knowing the 
international? How did the major geopolitical shifts of the time reshape what is considered ‘truth’, 
‘science’ or ‘knowledge’ in international relations, and what is considered ‘political’, ‘ideological’ 
or ‘biased’? Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of these questions, 
and their fate is the symbol of the shifting limits of speech and thought’s acceptability.  
Drawing on interviews and archival research, this PhD thesis focuses on the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and examines the making and breaking of its international relations 
experts during and after the Cold War. It shows how states make experts and what happens to 
meaning-making elites once they no longer fit with new political structures: How did the GDR 
produce international relations academics, scholars and intellectuals, and what role did they play 
within the global Cold War confrontation? What happened to those same experts once the Cold 
War ended and the GDR went through both a democratic revolution and a (re)unification with 
West Germany? Tracing in particular the various mechanisms at play in the post-89 
marginalization of the ‘fallen’ GDR experts, elites of a no-longer-existing order, the thesis aims at 
linking their individual fates to the wider geopolitical forces at play in shaping the possibilities and 
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Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: 
we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in 
command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex 
relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by 
events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.1  
The end of the Cold War is one such moment of crisis and transformation. How did the ideological 
victory of the West impact the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking and knowing the 
international? How did the major geopolitical shifts of the time reshape what is considered ‘truth’, 
‘science’ or ‘knowledge’ in international relations, and what is considered ‘political’, ‘ideological’ 
or ‘biased’? Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of these questions, 
and their fate is the symbol of the shifting limits of speech and thought’s acceptability.  
Drawing on interviews and archival research, this PhD thesis focuses on the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and examines the making and breaking of its international relations 
experts during and after the Cold War. It shows how states make experts and what happens to 
meaning-making elites once they no longer fit with new political structures:2 How did the GDR 
produce international relations academics, scholars and intellectuals and what role did they play 
within the global Cold War confrontation? What happened to those same experts once the Cold 
War ended and the GDR went through both a democratic revolution and a (re)unification with 
West Germany? Tracing in particular the various mechanisms at play in the post-89 
marginalization of the ‘fallen’ GDR experts, elites of a no-longer existing order, the thesis aims at 
linking their individual fates to the wider geopolitical forces at play in shaping the possibilities and 
impossibilities of researching and knowing ‘the international’.   
Knowledge: a relational approach 
Let’s start by looking at the following two scenes. In the early 1980s, Raimund Krämer was a young 
researcher at the IIB, the GDR’s elite diplomatic training institution. A product of the IIB, he had 
completed his five-year studies in International Relations there, and was about to be awarded a 
PhD in 1981 on Peru’s foreign policy and a Habil later in 1985 on the topic of peace and security 
in Central America. As a young researcher, he was carrying some of the institute’s teaching 
workload, working on his own research projects and participating in the IIB’s publication activities. 
His first journal article was published in 1981 on the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. 
It had occurred to his department that it would be good for the institute to have a publication 
covering that topic, and so the task fell onto Raimund Krämer. The Soviet Union was not involved 
                                               
1 I have adapted some of the language from Tarak Barkawi, "War and History in World Politics," in The Oxford Handbook of 
History and International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit et al (forthcoming), 8. 
2 I have adapted some of the language from Andrew Bickford, Fallen elites. The military other in post-unification Germany 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
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in the conflict and the GDR had no stakes in it either. Raimund Krämer was free to write his 
article in whichever way seemed appropriate. Proud of his achievement, the article was published 
in AALA (Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika), the GDR’s area studies journal. But as a frustrated 
Raimund Krämer soon discovered, the publication of his article was also the end of the story. The 
article provoked no-one’s interest and triggered no reactions, neither good nor bad.3 Around the 
same time, he received the chance to publish a piece on Reagan’s foreign policy in Latin America. 
This time, the journal was DA, Deutsche Außenpolitik (German foreign policy), the GDR’s top 
publication venue for international relations. Landing an article in there was a feat, an achievement, 
something to be proud of; it conferred prestige and interest. But as Raimund Krämer would soon 
find out, the prestige came at a price: the journal’s editors demanded far-reaching revisions and 
changed, cut and rewrote the piece beyond recognition of the original. Publishing in DA, Deutsche 
Außenpolitik, meant entering the political sphere. and it required the adoption of and adaption to 
its written and unwritten rules.4 And so Raimund Krämer learned an important lesson: the greater 
your freedom as an academic, the lesser your impact and prestige.  
Fast-forwarding twenty years to the early 2000s, Raimund Krämer had become a figure of 
exception: not only had he made the transition from GDR to united Germany as an academic and 
now worked as an honorary professor at the University of Potsdam, but even more impressively, 
he was one of only a handful who had been able to both remain in academia and continue working 
in their original field of expertise, international relations. The unification with West Germany had 
been a blessing and a curse. A blessing because of the newly found freedom to write and speak as 
one pleased, and a curse because most East German academics were crowded out of academia 
and kept out of the dominant circuits of international relations knowledge production. Also, as 
Raimund Krämer soon found out, Western academia turned out to have dynamics of its own. Yes, 
one could think and write and publish as one pleased. But thinking and writing and publishing on 
certain topics was more rewarding than others. The Zeitgeist, particular fashions in topics of interest 
and manners of thinking, as well as the neoliberal focus on money along with the power of funding 
bodies did set limiting parameters to one’s possibilities and options as a researcher. If one wanted 
to be accepted or invited to conferences, carry out large research projects, hire multiple researchers 
to help carry out these projects, publish in popular publication venues, receive additional funding, 
be seen as competent or even recognized as an important name in the discipline, get the accolades 
of the university’s director and all the material and immaterial benefits that came with it – then 
one had to adapt and adjust one’s research interest and manner of writing and framing written 
work. Studying the militaries in Latin America made you look old-fashioned and redundant at a 
time when projects on queer subjects of resistance were ‘in’. Ignoring ‘climate’ as an area of enquiry 
in funding applications was a sure way to get rejected. Political dynamics and interests shaped the 
provision of research funds, and funding in turn structured and impacted the possibilities and 
impossibilities of research.5 And so, Raimund Krämer re-learned an important lesson: the greater 
your desire as an academic for impact, prestige, status and reputation, the higher the pressures to 
adapt and adjust.  
                                               
3 Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2-3.  
4 Interview Krämer, 2019b: 11. 
5 Interview Krämer, 2019b: 7-8. 
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These two scenes highlight something important. When looking at the relation between power 
and knowledge, when looking at the relation between politics and academia, it does not suffice to 
say that dictatorships restrict knowledge production and that democracies allow freedom of 
thought. Regime type certainly makes an impact, but it is only one part of the picture. Crucially, it 
obscures more than it illuminates. As we have seen in the two scenes above, being a researcher in 
the former GDR and being a researcher in the post-1990 united Germany presented some 
important similarities, despite the obvious differences. First, the researchers’ very capacity for 
action and their ability to do ‘academic things’ was created and enabled by their position in an 
‘academic’ space, a network of relations tying together different processes of knowledge 
production, consumption and dissemination. In the GDR, as in the post-1990 united Germany, 
this meant acquiring the correct education along with all the social and cultural capital necessary 
to actually access the ‘academic’ network and carry out the actions and activities associated with 
‘academic’ behaviour. The researchers’ very agency and capacity to act ‘academically’ was thus 
enabled by the networks of relation that they were forming part of. This does not mean, however, 
that their capacity for action was entirely determined by the networks of relations they were 
embedded in. It was created, enabled and shaped by them, but not overdetermined. There was 
room to manoeuvre within the space created by the networks. In the GDR, this meant that if the 
Soviet Union was not implied in a specific geopolitical event, the room for interpretation widened. 
In post-1990 united Germany, it meant that if research could be carried out without the need for 
a large team or additional funding, the choice of topic and method of enquiry widened.  
The core of the above can be summarized in the following thesis statement: knowledge systems 
must be thought of in relational rather than essentialist terms. We gain little understanding from 
thinking about them as simply ‘democratic’ or ‘dictatorial’. Instead, knowledge systems ought to 
be thought of as relational configurations enabling and structuring knowledge production, 
consumption and dissemination. If we think about knowledge systems in relational terms, it also 
follows that we cannot confine our analysis to the limits of nation-states boundaries. A relational 
analysis must necessarily, by its very nature, be ‘intersocietal’, ‘global’ or ‘international’. But, what 
does such an ‘international’ perspective on knowledge systems look like?  
Contribution 
In this thesis, I propose to develop a global geopolitics of knowledge production that allows us to think 
about power/knowledge from an international perspective. This global geopolitics of knowledge 
is based on the assumption that knowledge is highly contextual and can therefore only be 
understood as meaningful in relation to context. It is also based on the assumption that the 
boundaries of this context are not static or eternal but are made and remade throughout time, and 
that the ‘international’ is the force that remakes and reshapes these relations most fundamentally. 
I propose to understand the role of the international onto power/knowledge relations through the 
three nexuses of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. These put 
forward three different ideal-typical depictions of the manner in which knowledge spaces can be 
structured and organized. In short, they detail how war, revolution and colonization shape and 
impact the parameters within which knowledge production takes place, and thus, ultimately, 
knowledge production itself.  
 12 
Next to this theoretical contribution, I also offer a study of the transformation of the GDR’s 
international relations knowledge system throughout war, revolution, and an asymmetrical 
unification with West Germany. Drawing on interviews and archival research, I examine the 
functioning of international relations knowledge production in the GDR and use the ideal-typical 
lenses of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge, and colonization/knowledge to organize and 
make sense of these dynamics. During the Cold War, the GDR system of international relations 
expertise was organized through a system of antagonistic exchange. Knowledge about 
international relations had to fit a strict pattern of friend/enemy distinction, yet researchers needed 
to simultaneously be able to transcend these distinctions and question them in order to perform 
their roles well. During the times of revolutionary upheaval in the GDR, knowledge production 
about international relations became strongly polarized and oscillated between the various 
contending poles of authority. Researchers had to straddle a divided country and multiple loyalties 
in order to be able to continue working and stay relevant. Finally, during the asymmetrical 
unification with West Germany, the GDR’s whole system of knowledge production was 
dismantled and replaced with the West German one. In a process of hierarchical orientation, GDR 
experts had to fully adapt to a new system that treated them as second-class citizens in order to 
stand a chance. In short, the war, revolution and colonization-like events that the GDR went 
through all shaped and formed its configurations of international relations knowledge production 
in different ways, impacting the type and form of scholarship produced as well as the possibilities 
and impossibilities of international relations research.  
In putting forward this theoretical and empirical analysis, my thesis makes a number of 
contributions. Theoretically, it contributes to the bodies of scholarship on power/knowledge, 
sociology of knowledge and relational theory, as well as to international relations disciplinary 
history, international relations disciplinary sociology and Global IR literature. Empirically, it 
contributes in particular to literature on the GDR, Cold War history, and the global 1989.  
On a theoretical level, the contributions can be organized into two types: those that contribute to 
the existing literature on the basis of a focus on relational dynamics, and those that contribute to 
the existing literature on the basis of a focus on their international aspect. The current sociology of 
IR and global IR literature are characterized and limited by their substantialist approach. Broadly 
speaking, they operate on the basis of two contradictory spatial models: American universalism 
and nation-state centrism. American universalism describes how the discipline’s alleged 
international scope in fact covers “American parochialism”.6 That IR is an “American social 
science” has been most famously coined by Hoffmann,7 and still constitutes a reference point for 
discussion.8 That the US “has acted as the centre of gravity for the social sciences”9 is the now 
                                               
6 Brian C. Schmidt, "Epilogue," in International Relations in Europe. Traditions, perspectives and destinations, ed. Knud Erik 
Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (London: Routledge, 2006), 254. 
7 Hoffmann (1977). 
8 See for instance Miles Kahler, "International Relations: Still an American Science?," in Ideas and Ideals: Essays in Honor of 
Stanley Hoffmann, ed. Linda B. Miller and Michael J Smith (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Steve Smith, "The Discipline of 
International Relations: Still An American Social Science," British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000); 
Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, eds., International Relations - Still an American Science? Toward Diversity in 
International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Peter Marcus Kristensen, "Revisiting the "American 
Social Science" - mapping the geography of International Relations," International Studies Perspectives 16 (2015). 
9 Duncan Bell, "Writing the world: disciplinary history and beyond," International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009): 20. 
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unquestioned standard for IR, a disciplinary “truism”.10 Indeed, surveys show that top-ranked 
journals and scholars are based in the US, and that most textbooks in use throughout the world 
tend to be American.11 The second spatial model for IR is that of nationally differentiated IRs. A 
trend starting in the past two decades, this literature has come to question the American dominance 
of the field by retrieving national histories under the assumption that  “IR is quite different in 
different places”.12 Following Kristensen,13 the literature can be divided into a body of work that 
intends to retrieve ‘European’ histories from the supposed ‘American’ dominance14 and a body of 
work that intends to retrieve ‘non-Western’ histories from the supposed Euro-American 
dominance of the field.15 In a similar way there is abundant and growing literature on Chinese IR, 
Japanese IR, Indian IR etc.16 This is where we can also locate the Global IR literature.17 The main 
problem with these bodies of literature is the way in which they reify knowledge by attaching it to 
essentialized constructions of space, culture or race.18 This is problematic, as it replicates imperial 
techniques of division and domination,19 but also because it offers a truncated understanding of 
knowledge’s actual entanglement with various overlapping networks of power relations. This is 
where the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ approach developed in this thesis comes into play. It 
contributes to these debates by presenting an alternative model based on a relational instead of 
substantialist approach and thereby avoids the truncations and simplifications of the ‘Global IR’ 
                                               
10 Felix Rösch, ed. Emigré scholars and the genesis of international relations. A European discipline in America? (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1. 
11 Kristensen,  246-47. See also Kjell Goldmann, "Im Westen Nichts Neues: Seven International Relations Journals in 1972 and 
1992," European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995); Ole Waever, "The sociology of a not so international discipline: 
American and European developments in International Relations," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998); Ersel Aydinli 
and Julie Mathews, "Are the Core and periphery irreconcilable? The curious world of publishing in contemporary 
international relations," International Studies Perspectives 1 (2000); Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft, and Eugene 
Walton, "Promise and performance: an evaluation of journals in International Relations," International Studies Perspectives 
6 (2005). 
12 Waever,  723. 
13 Kristensen,  249. 
14 Waever; Knud Erik Jørgensen, "Continental IR Theory: The best kept secret," European Journal of International Relations 6 
(2000); Jörg Friedrichs, European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A house with many mansions (London: 
Routledge, 2004); Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, eds., International Relations in Europe. Traditions, 
perspectives and destinations (London: Routledge, 2006). 
15 Aydinli and Mathews; Arlene Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World," Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003); Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever, International Relations Scholarship around the World: 
Worlding Beyond the West (New York: Routledge, 2009); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-Western International 
Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
16 See for instance Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tian-xia)," Social Identities 
12, no. 1 (2006); Yaqing Qin, "Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory," International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007 ); Navnita Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 
(2007); Navnita Chadha Behera, "International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradim,"  (Tousand Oaks: 
Sage, 2008); Takashi Inoguchi, "Are there any theories of International Relations in Japan?," International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007). 
17 Amitav Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," International Studies Review 18 
(2016); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, The making of Global International Relations. Origins and evolution of IR at its 
centenary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of 
International Relations Theories Beyond the West," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011); Acharya 
and Buzan; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An 
Introduction," in Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and 
Barry Buzan (Abingdon: 2010). 
18 Tarak Barkawi and Ayse Zarakol, Global IR: Should it be anti-Western?, Millennium Conference (London: 2018); Christopher 
Murray, "Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping: From decolonisation to anti-Eurocentric IR," European Journal of 
International Relations 26, no. 2 (2020). 
19 Murray. 
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and ‘sociology of IR’ models. The scholarship on power/knowledge, sociology of knowledge and 
relational theory, as well as international relations’ disciplinary history, on the other hand, largely 
converges around a different problem: a tendency towards methodological nationalism. 
Methodological nationalism describes the “all-pervasive assumption that the nation-state is the 
natural and necessary form of society in modernity.”20 A bias of enquiry whereby the nation-state 
is seen as the natural container of research, it is problematic because it “analytically separates 
relations that might not have been separate at all” and thereby distorts analysis.21 This is where the 
‘geopolitics of knowledge’ approach developed in this thesis comes into play. It contributes to 
these debates by presenting an alternative model based on an international instead of a national 
approach and thereby avoids the truncations and simplifications inherent to scholarship operating 
with a nation-state framework. 
On an empirical level, the main contributions of this thesis are to offer a revisionist history of the 
GDR and to write the ‘East’ back in to the histories of knowledge production. As such it aligns with 
recent historical scholarship aiming at retrieving the history of Eastern Europe from the 
triumphalist post-1989 narratives of liberal superiority and ‘end of history’.22 As the further 
chapters will expand on, the writing of GDR history is a contentious field, still polarized between 
East and West. Writing with regards to human rights conceptions, Ned Richardson-Little puts it 
this way: “Public discourse in the media in reunified Germany also depicted West German 
conceptions of human rights as objectively correct, with any deviations from these norms 
understood as politically suspect.”23 To generalize his point, Western representations of GDR 
history still count as objectively correct and any deviation from them as politically (and morally) 
suspect. With regard to knowledge production this translates into an orthodox history presenting 
GDR knowledge production as ideological and any deviant representation claiming the contrary 
as suspect. Chapter 4 on ‘Colonization/Knowledge’ in particular will further explore the 
ideology/science dichotomy underwriting this. In practice, though, this translates into a polarized 
publication field. Most accounts of academia in the GDR are either rendered by Western actors, 
often those who had been involved in the unification process and were offering orthodox 
accounts24 or by marginalized Eastern academics offering alternative accounts of their 
experiences.25 These latter accounts range from full counter-expositions to part-revisionist 
                                               
20 Daniel Chernilo, "Social Theory's Methodological Nationalism. Myth and reality," European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 
1 (2016): 6-7. 
21 Julian Go, "For a postcolonial sociology," Theory and Society 42, no. 1 (2013): 36. 
22 See in particular James Mark et al., 1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2019); Ned Richardson-Little, The human rights dictatorship. Socialism, Global Soliarity and Revolution in East Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 
23 Richardson-Little, 258. 
24 See for example Michael Greven and Dieter Koop, eds., War der Wissenschaftliche Kommunismus eine Wissenschaft? Vom 
Wissenschaftlichen Kommunismus zur Politikwissenschaft (Opladen, 1993); Hermann Wentker, Aussenpolitik in engen 
Grenzen: die DDR im internationalen System, 1949-1989 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007); Wilhelm Bleek, Geschichte 
der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (Muenchen: C.H. Beck, 2001). 
25 See for example Ulrich van der Heyden, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Historiker in der DDR in (Selbst)-Zeugnissen," 
Monatshefte 107, no. 2 (2015); Stefan Bollinger, Ulrich van der Heyden, and Mario Kessler, Ausgrenzung oder Integration? 
Ostdeutsche Sozialwissenschaftler zwischen Isolierung und Selbstbehauptung (Berlin: Trafo, 2004); Ulrich van der Heyden, 
"Die Afrika-Geschichtsschreibung in der ehemaligen DDR: Versuch einer kritischen Aufarbeitung," Africa Spectrum 27, no. 2 
(1992); Heyden, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Historiker in der DDR in (Selbst)-Zeugnissen."; Werner Röhr, Abwicklung: das 
Ende der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR (Berlin: Edition Organon, 2011-2012); Erhard Crome, ed. Die Babelsberger 
Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009); Erhard Crome and 
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narratives that accept the basic orthodox premise of ‘ideology’ but try to carve out some spaces 
within that narrative and recover pockets of ‘science’. With this PhD thesis, I aim to offer a 
revisionist account of GDR history in that I depart from the classic Western orthodox interpretation, 
and in particular its underlying East/West dichotomy of ideology vs science. Instead, I aim to offer 
a narrative that takes both sides of the picture seriously and investigates academic knowledge 
production in the GDR as a practice, with a focus on the way in which research and expertise were 
generated, circulated, and used. In addition to offering a revisionist account of GDR history, an 
important contribution lies in writing the ‘East’ back in to the history of knowledge production, and 
into the disciplinary history of international relations in particular. Many histories of the 
international have ignored the role of the Soviet Union and of the socialist ‘second world’ in 
general in fashioning the global institutions in existence today.26 Virtually all accounts of 
international relations disciplinary history ignore, or rather forget, the Soviet Union under the 
explicit or implicit assumption that scholarship was not free and that all they had on offer was 
communist ideology.27 When focusing on the GDR, we can say that it definitely had a functioning 
system of international relations knowledge production, responsible both for the formation of 
functional international relations elites and for the generation of various ‘knowledge items,’ such 
as books, journals, conferences and so forth, meant to both satisfy a domestic and international 
demand for information and an expectation to perform  ‘science.’ Additionally, the exchange with 
the West, and with West Germany in particular, was crucially important for example in the 
development of  peace research on both sides of the Cold War division. It also played a role 
abroad, as the GDR trained diplomats from various socialist countries across the world, using the 
various products of its international relations research expertise to do so.  
Sources 
The empirical parts of this thesis are based on the analysis of archival sources, interviews, and 
other primary documents such as legal documents, reports, books, newspapers, and journal 
publications.  
Visited archives include the Potsdam University archives which hold the materials of the IIB, the 
HRV and the University of Potsdam; the archives of the German ministry of foreign affairs; the 
Chicago University archives for the Quincy Wright papers on post-WWII political science; and 
the private collection of Prof. Gerhard Göhler, former board member of the German political 
science association DVPW (1985-1991).  
                                               
Jochen Franzke, Die Osteuropaforschung der DDR in den achtziger Jahren. Strukturen und Schwerpunkte, vol. 5, Berichte des 
Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (Köln: 1991). 
26 With regards to human rights and to the international economic architecture, see respectively: Richardson-Little; Johanna 
Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International 
Economic Order," Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 6, no. 1 (2015); 
Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2011). 
27 See for instance the note in Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," Daedalus 106, no. 3 
(1977): 48.: “I leave aside countries like the Soviet Union and China, in which it would be hard to speak of free social science 
scholarship!” 
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As listed in Appendix A, interviews have been carried out with 25 different interlocutors, 14 of 
which socialized in East Germany and 11 of which socialized in West Germany. With the 
exception of two politicians, and two diplomats, all of them were academics. Interview lengths 
varied between 1h07 and 4h16. All translations from German to English are by the author, except 
where otherwise stated. Initial interviewees were found by contacting the editor and some authors 
of “Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule,”28 an edited volume on the IIB composed of short informative 
chapters and reflection pieces by former students and academics of the institute. Further contacts 
snowballed either as direct recommendations from the interviews, or through inspiration as where 
to search further. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, with a similar set of 
initial questions covering the interviewees experiences pre-1989, during the period of change of 
1989–1991, and post-1991. Given the polarized nature of the debate surrounding the GDR, 
mixing East and West interview partners and interview perspectives has been an important and 
conscious element in the choice of interviewees. With regards in particular to the dynamics 
described in chapter 4 ‘Colonization/knowledge’, I have made sure to interview actors from all 
sides of the equation. I interviewed, amongst others, the only two East German academics who 
made it to a permanent post at the University of Potsdam post-1990, the two West German 
academics who became the chairholders in International Relations at the University of Potsdam 
post-1990 and the Brandenburg minister of science, research and culture responsible for closing 
down the IIB.  
Much of the empirical research in this PhD is focused around the IIB, the GDR’s former elite 
diplomatic training facility. This focus is due to the multivalent nature of the IIB: it was both a 
teaching and a research facility. It was connected to political institutions, but also remained 
relatively independent. All topics relevant to international relations were covered there, and 
specialized researchers had contacts with colleagues from other institutions through various 
working groups. The IIB had external contacts to similar institutions abroad, yet was not primarily 
focused on those. During the times of the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval it went through a full 
transformation and partly spilled over into the new University of Potsdam post-unification. As 
such, almost all the important processes and dynamics under study in this PhD thesis played out 
at the IIB and can thus be studied in one location. However, it is important not to make the 
mistake of overemphasizing the role or the importance of the IIB. As Erhard Crome notes, two 
equally restrictive interpretations of the IIB are regularly put forward: either that the IIB was the 
GDR’s only institution of importance with regards to foreign policy analysis, or that the IIB was 
irrelevant in the first place because it worked for a foreign affairs ministry with no real decision-
making power.29 Both of these interpretations are incorrect: the IIB was only one of multiple 
players in the field of international relations expertise, and the IIB did have influence, despite the 
ministry of foreign affairs’ limited decision-making power. The empirical chapters in this thesis 
aim at balancing the analysis between a focus on the IIB and an incorporation of the other relevant 
institutions.  
Because of the various changes and transformations that the GDR’s elite diplomatic training 
facility, the IIB, went through during its time of revolution and unification with West Germany, 
                                               
28 Crome. 
29 Interview Crome, 2019: 2.  
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its denomination also changed twice, as depicted in the table below. Pre-1989 it was called IIB 
(Institut für Internationale Beziehungen/Institute for International Relations), and it was formally 
attached to the DASR, the GDR’s Academy for Statecraft and Law, where bureaucrats were 
trained for the local political administration. Formally, the IIB ceased to exist in early 1990 when 
the DASR was reformed and transformed into the HRV, a College of Law and Administration. At 
that time, the old “IIB” ceased to exist and was transformed into the ‘Political Science and 
International Relations’ section of the HRV. After the unification with West Germany this 
‘Political Science and International Relations’ section of the HRV was de jure closed down, but de 
facto continued to exist initially as the political science division of the Potsdam University’s faculty 








(the GDR’s elite diplomatic 
training facility) 
‘Political Science and 
International Relations’ section 
Faculty of economic and social 
sciences, division of political 
science 
DASR 
(Academy for Statecraft and Law) 
HRV 
(College of Law and 
Administration) 
UP 
(University of Potsdam) 
 
For the purpose of clarity, I have chosen to keep the denomination IIB throughout this thesis. I 
use it in particular in chapter 3 ‘Revolution/knowledge’ and chapter 4 ‘Colonization/knowledge’, 
despite the fact that it had ceased to exist as “IIB” at that point in time. This is problematic, as it 
reifies an entity of which I am precisely trying to expose the change and evolution. Yet using the 
correct denomination at the various points in time would probably confuse the reader and burden 
the text with additional explanations. Hence the choice for keeping the denomination IIB 
throughout this text.  
Chapter Overview 
The remainder of the thesis is organized into five chapters: a theory chapter and four historical 
chapters examining international relations knowledge production in the GDR during the times of 
the Cold War, revolution and unification with West Germany respectively.  
Chapter 1, ‘Geopolitics and Knowledge: Rethinking power/knowledge from an international perspective’ lays out 
the theoretical contribution of this thesis. It proposes a model of what an international perspective 
on power/knowledge could look like by putting forward a ‘global geopolitics of knowledge 
production’. This model regroups the three ideal-typical relations of war/knowledge, 
revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. Each of these images describes three 
different constellations of knowledge orders and three different manners in which IR expertise 
networks can be structured and configured. War/knowledge describes a situation in which a 
knowledge space is tightly bounded, yet antagonistically oriented towards an enemy space. 
Revolution/knowledge describes a situation in which a knowledge space experiences a severe 
polarization from within and a split into various poles of authority. Colonization/knowledge, 
finally, describes a situation in which a knowledge space is taken over by another and experiences 
a process of disaggregation and hierarchical orientation.  
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Chapter 2, ‘War/Knowledge: The Global Cold War and International Relations Expertise in the GDR pre-
1989’, uses the war/knowledge framework to analyse the GDR’s system of international relations 
expertise during the global Cold War. It shows the system’s bounded yet multifaceted organization 
of International Relations knowledge production pre-1989. By looking at the three different 
functions of knowledge as constitutive, instrumental and performative, it also demonstrates how 
the Cold War system of international relations knowledge production was based on a simultaneous 
reproduction and transcendence of a friend/enemy distinction deeply engrained into research and 
teaching activities.  
Chapter 3, ‘Revolution/Knowledge: Revolutionary Upheaval and International Relations Expertise in the GDR 
1989-1990’, uses the revolution/knowledge framework to analyze the GDR’s system of 
international relations expertise during its phase of revolutionary upheaval in 1989/90. It shows 
how the GDR’s international relations knowledge production became deeply polarized in the wake 
of its revolution and subsequently had to navigate an unstable split space in which it had become 
an unwanted, yet somewhat still needed representatives of the old order. With the revolutionary 
forces’ final takeover, all the previous networks and relations of knowledge production were 
thoroughly reconfigured and re-organized, with the surviving units reorientating around Western 
standards as a way to legitimize their existence in the new GDR. 
Chapter 4, “Colonization/Knowledge: Asymmetrical unification with the West and International Relations 
Expertise in the ex-GDR in 1990, Part 1: Winding down the old”, uses the colonization/knowledge 
framework to analyze the ex-GDR’s system of international relations expertise during its 
asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It shows how the GDR’s system of international 
relations knowledge production was almost entirely dismantled and how the GDR’s former 
international relations experts and expertise were crowded out of academic circuits of knowledge 
production and excluded from dominant discourses, networks and decision-making spaces.  
Chapter 5, “Colonization/Knowledge: Asymmetrical unification with the West and International Relations 
Expertise in the ex-GDR after 1990, Part 2: Building the new”, uses the colonization/knowledge 
framework to analyze the ex-GDR’s system of international relations expertise during its 
asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It shows how the West German infrastructure of 
international relations expertise was transferred onto the formerly East German territories and 
examines the processes of individualization and disaggregation as well as the principle of tabula 
rasa underwriting this hierarchical transfer of structures from West to East.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Geopolitics and Knowledge:  
Rethinking power/knowledge from an international 
perspective 
 
Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: 
we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in 
command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex 
relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by 
events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.  
Scholarship in the discipline of international relations has paid increased attention to this relation, 
putting forward various readings of disciplinary development in relation to its social and political 
context. While providing important and long overdue accounts, this scholarship also remains 
strangely nation-state-centric, offering readings of disciplinary development largely in relation to 
domestic social and political context.30 In other words, international relations offers a reading of its 
own development that lacks an international perspective. This is somewhat ironic: where, if not in 
the discipline of international relations, would one expect a reading of disciplinary history offered 
from an ‘international’ perspective?  
Accordingly, the questions raised in this chapter are: how can we think about the relation between 
international relations and the discipline of international relations without falling back to the 
familiar container of domestic politics and already formed nation-state boundaries? What does an 
international perspective on power/knowledge entail? The analysis in this chapter is divided into 
two parts. First, I examine the current accounts of disciplinary development in international 
relations with regards to their treatment of ‘the international’. As lined out above, I suggest that 
they have remained limited in their use of the ‘international’ as a perspective of analysis. 
Accordingly, the second part of this chapter puts forward a model of how to think through the 
relation between ir and IR, between geopolitics and knowledge. In what I call a ‘global geopolitics 
of knowledge production’, I propose to rethink the development of international relations 
scholarship through the three ideal-typical images of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and 
colonization/knowledge.   
   
                                               
30 With the notable example of Isaac Kamola’s work, which is primarily concerned with the emergence of the ‘global’ 
imaginary currently underpinning International Relations. See Isaac Kamola, Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and 
the Production of the Global Imaginary (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Isaac Kamola, "Why Global? Diagnosing the 
Globalization literature within a political economy of higher education," International Political Sociology 7 (2013). 
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Power/knowledge in recent IR scholarship  
Scholarship in international relations has started paying increased attention to the complex relation 
between knowledge and power,31 thereby following a wider trend in the social sciences to re-read 
the genesis and further life of social thinking in its wider social and political context.32  
Underwriting this trend in the social sciences is a turn in the sociology of knowledge itself to 
understand knowledge as neither pure and disinterested nor as mere reflection of society and 
politics. Instead, power and knowledge are seen as co-produced and entangled.33 This “new” 
sociology of knowledge can be characterized by four principles.34 First, by a principle of symmetry 
which commits to studying all knowledge claims, successful and marginalized ones alike. Second, 
by a rejection of the internal/external distinction which means that an analysis of the production 
of knowledge will not be based on the separation between a ‘true’ reality and a separately 
constituted and well-bounded area of ‘science’ or ‘knowledge’. Any distinction between the two is 
considered constructed; factors from both spaces are taken seriously and included in the analysis. 
Third, by a principle of situatedness which foregrounds localism through close attention to the 
local conditions that shape the genesis of knowledge claims. Finally, by a principle of contextualism 
which acknowledges the fact that a specific piece of knowledge acquires meaning only in relation 
to other knowledge claims.   
This focus on the co-production and entanglement of power and knowledge stands in contrast to 
earlier conceptions, which drew on a strong demarcation between reality and its representation in 
knowledge. To appropriate Ricoeur’s terms, these earlier representations approached the relation 
between the two either through a hermeneutics of faith or a hermeneutics of suspicion35, assuming 
it to either be a pure and truthful representation or a distorted depiction of the reality it claims to 
represent.   
In this section my concern is with the scholarship that studies IR disciplinary development in 
relation to its social and political context. I focus here in particular on Stanley Hoffman’s account 
of IR as an American social science,36 Robert Vitalis’ and Patricia Owen’s work on the role of race 
                                               
31 Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Nicolas Guilhot, ed. The 
Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Patricia Owens, Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the 
Social (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kamola, Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production 
of the Global Imaginary; Patricia Owens, "Women and the History of International Thought," International Studies Quarterly 
62, no. 3 (2018). 
32 Ido Oren, Our Enemies and US. America's Rivalries and the making of political science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003); S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing capitalist democracy. The Cold war origins of rational choice liberalism (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the future. Modernization theory in cold war 
America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopins University Press, 2003). 
33 Charles Camic and Neil Gross, "The New Sociology of Ideas," in The Blackwell Companion to Sociology, ed. Judith Blau 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2001); Charles Camic, Neil Gross, and Michele Lamont, eds., Social Knowledge in the Making (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Kristoffer Kropp, "A Sociology of 
Knowledge Approach to European Integration: Four Analytical Principles," Journal of European Integration 37, no. 2 (2015). 
34 Adler-Nissen and Kropp. 
35 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the human sciences (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1981); Paul Ricoeur, Freud 
and philosophy: An essay on interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970). See also Ruthellen Josselson, "The 
hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion," Narrative Inquiry 14, no. 1 (2004). 
36 Hoffmann. 
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and gender in the development of international relations, 37 as well as on Nicolas Guilhot’s 
historical reading of the origins of political realism in IR38 and Isaac Kamola’s analysis of the 
emergence of the global imaginary underwriting current IR.39 All these accounts share a focus on 
‘the international’ as the object of analysis, or rather as a ‘once-removed’ object of analysis: the focus 
of analysis is not international relations but the discipline that studies international relations. Uses 
of the ‘international’ as the framework of analysis have remained largely implicit, but I suggest that 
we can nonetheless understand and classify them along the categories of ‘scale of analysis’, ‘global 
power structure’ or ‘imagined horizon’. 
 
Scale of analysis 
Work that draws on ‘the international’ as a scale of analysis frequently does so to explicitly counter 
issues of methodological nationalism,40 and its corollaries of metrocentrism and analytical 
bifurcation.41 This can take two different forms: a focus on interaction and entanglement or a 
widening of the unit of analysis itself. Comparative history and transnational history for instance 
expand the ‘scale of analysis’ by focusing on interaction and connection. Their object is to correct 
the single focus on one unit alone, and they do so by looking beyond its borders and putting it in 
conversation with other units of analysis. Comparative history puts two or more units into a 
conversation, comparing and evaluating developments in each unit in relation to the other units. 
Transnational history, in turn, tends to focus on one unit of analysis alone and put it into 
conversation with all relevant extra-unit context. One the other hand, we find approaches such as 
world-system theory or the ‘multiple modernities’ scholarship that widen the ‘scale of analysis’, not 
by looking beyond the border of the unit in question, but by enlarging the unit under consideration. 
The multiple modernities approach enlarges the unit in question to the scale of civilizations, while 
world-system theory enlarges it to the scale of ‘world-economies’ and ‘world-empires’.42  
From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I argue that we can understand 
Guilhot’s recourse to ‘the international’ as a weak form of expanding the scale of analysis. His 
work focuses on the tradition of political realism,43 arguing against reading it as eternal wisdom 
                                               
37 Vitalis; Robert Vitalis, "The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and its Laws of Race Development," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 52, no. 4 (2010); Robert Vitalis, "The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism 
Invisible in American International Relations," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2000); Owens, "Women 
and the History of International Thought." 
38 Nicolas Guilhot, After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Guilhot, The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory. 
39 Kamola, Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary; Kamola, "Why Global? 
Diagnosing the Globalization literature within a political economy of higher education." 
40 For issues of methodological nationalism, see the classic essay by Chernilo. 
41 For issues of analytical bifurcation and metrocentrism, see Go; Julian Go, "Beyond metrocentrism: From empire to 
globalism in early US sociology.," Journal of Classical Sociology 14, no. 2 (2014). 
42 For a depiction of comparative history, transnational history, world-system theory and multiple modernities in relation to 
their ‘global’ outlook, see Sebastian Conrad, What is global history? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 
37-61. 
43 Guilhot, After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century; Guilhot, The 
Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory. 
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and proposing instead to see it as a historical phenomenon. It does so by tracing the emergence 
of the political realism we know to post-WWII America. The emergence of political realism was a 
conscious intellectual move drawing on counter-enlightenment themes to counter America’s Cold 
War liberalism and its concomitant cult of science in the post-war year. In what Guilhot terms the 
‘realist gambit’ he shows that in order for this attack to be successful, it had to incorporate some 
elements of both political liberalism and scientific culture, thereby ironically and dialectically 
emptying itself of some of its core content and thus transforming its proposed realist counter-
theory of international relations into a “component of liberal modernity,”44 a hybrid realist-liberal 
construction.  
‘The international’ does not play any major role in Guilhot’s story. The centre of his story is post-
WWII America. Its main actors are US based and they form networks around American 
institutions such as the Centre for the Study of American Policy in Chicago, the Institute of War 
and Peace Studies at Columbia, the Rockefeller Foundation, and US-based journals such as the 
Journal of Conflict Resolution. But Guilhot’s narrative does not essentialize the boundaries of 
America, connecting post-WWII America to interwar Europe through his centring of the narrative 
on émigré scholars and their previous experiences in continental Europe. Guilhot’s story might 
therefore be evaluated as a weak form of incorporating ‘the international’ as a scale of analysis.  
Global power structure 
Understanding ‘the international’ as a global power structure leads to different scholarship than 
understanding ‘the international’ as a different scale or framework. This literature focuses on the 
workings of structural or discursive power,45 while understanding each of these forms of power as 
global, for instance, the world-spanning structures or discourses of Marxism, dependency theory 
or feminism. From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I place Hoffman’s 
argument in this category as well as the work by Vitalis and Owens.  
Stanley Hoffman’s classic essay argues that international relations is predominantly “An American 
Social Science,” as the title states. This is not an essentializing argument about ‘American IR’ as it 
has since been interpreted to be, but rather an argument about the connections between the 
institutions of a specific academic discipline with a specific society at a specific point in time, which 
acknowledges the global interconnections between ideas and people that constituted that specific 
society.46 Underwriting this argument is an assumption about the connection between the 
international status of the US and the production and dissemination of American forms of 
knowledge about international relations. Hoffman’s connection is essentially a one-way connection 
from power to knowledge. The US occupies a pre-eminent position in the international system 
with no significant constraints to its use of global power, and its political elites have adopted a 
global outlook. This structures knowledge production in that it gives scholars the “motivation” 
and the “impulse necessary” to “turn individual efforts into a genuine scientific enterprise.”47 The 
                                               
44 Guilhot, After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century, 17. 
45 For a typology of different understandings of power, see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International 
Politics " International Organization 59 (2005). 
46 Tarak Barkawi and Ayse Zarakol, Working paper (2018). 
47 Hoffmann,  49. 
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reverse is happening in other countries with no geopolitical prominence: “[w]hen political elites 
are obsessed only with what is happening to their country, because it lacks the power to shape 
what is happening elsewhere, or because this lack of power has bred habits of dependence on 
another state (such as the United States) or because (as in the case of Japan and West Germany) 
there are severe constraints on the global use of the nation’s power, the chances are that the 
scholars will not have the motivation or receive the impulse necessary to turn individual efforts 
into a genuine scientific enterprise, and will either turn to other fields with more solid traditions 
and outlets (such as, say, electoral behaviour in France and Britain) or merely reflect, more or less 
slavishly, and with some delays, American fashions; or else there will be often brilliant individual 
contributions, but unconnected and unsupported.”48 In short, Hoffman makes an argument about 
the “intellectual dependence” of scholars on “the status of their country and on the ambitions of 
its political elite.”49 I classify this as a power/knowledge analysis that utilizes ‘the international’ in 
the sense of a global power structure. Hoffmann’s analysis is informed by a view of world politics 
structured by powerful and less powerful states, with the US at the top. It is the position in the 
structure that determines the content and the rise to prominence of scholarly enquiry on 
international relations.  
Another type of scholarship drawing on ‘the international’ as a global power structure is the kind 
produced by Vitalis and Owens. Instead of relating knowledge to positionality in a global power 
structure, this type of scholarship focuses on structures of oppression, such as the ones defined 
by race or gender. While these are examined within predominantly national contexts (the US for 
Vitalis, the UK for Owens), the structures of oppression at work are implicitly or explicitly 
assumed to be global, which leads to the classification of this literature in the category 
conceptualizing ‘the international’ as a global power structure.  
Vitalis’ work focuses on the role of race in the history of the discipline of international relations, 
focusing both on the role of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’ as a factor or unit of analysis in scholarship 
and on the role of race as a disabling structure that first marginalized black scholars in the discipline 
of international relations and then entirely wrote them out of its history. For the purpose of this 
classification, the latter one is of importance. Here Vitalis traces the active role played by black 
scholars and intellectuals in the US-American pre-WWII debates in international relations. His 
work features scholars such as W.E.B. Dubois, Alain Locke, Franklin Frazier, Ralph Bunche, 
Rayford Logan Harold Isaac and Merze Tate, whom Vitalis partly terms the Howard School of 
international relations because of their professional affiliations with Howard University. They 
stand out by their critique of “the supposed truths of racial science” as well as by their critique of 
“the role racism played in sustaining imperialism.”50 While these scholars had access to prestigious 
higher education, with PhDs from Harvard, MIT and so forth, the professional system of 
international relations remained a segregated white space. Their work and ideas were often ignored 
or subsumed under the category “work of a Negro,”51 a marginalization leading to their ultimate 
erasure from the history of international relations.  
                                               
48 Ibid., 48-49. 
49 Ibid., 49. 
50 Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics, 12. 
51 John Hope Franklin, as cited in ibid., 10. 
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Owens’ work on historical women in international relations focuses on recuperating the ideas and 
writings of women writing about international relations. They did not form a homogenous 
category, and their thought is not reducible to one position, though their work often dovetailed 
the discipline’s main concern until the post-WWII area: colonial administration. One example is 
the scholarship of LSE-based Lucy Mair, whose world-leading expertise on colonial administration 
was retrospectively written out of the history of international relations just as colonial 
administration was erased from IR’s past. Owens’ work is concerned with writing the contribution 
of historical women back into the discipline of International and in doing so also traces their 
erasure and writing out of it. As with Vitalis’ work, I argue that we can understand these efforts as 
drawing on an understanding of ‘the international’ as operating through globally reaching 
structures leading to the inclusion of some and exclusion of others into the space of academic 
knowledge production about international relations.  
Imagined horizon 
Finally, understanding ‘the international’ as an imagined horizon is another distinct angle of 
approach in conceptualizing its workings and effects. The international in this conception does 
not have truth value nor does it accurately represent world reality; it is seen instead as an ideological 
construction that serves specific purposes. Postcolonial theory is an example here that points to 
the construction of the ‘global’ as a tool of domination. Because the world is effectively constituted 
by ‘difference’ between people, cultures and regions, but ‘the international’ or ‘global’ narrative 
erases this difference and instead constructs it as homogenous, this legitimizes forms of Western 
domination.52 
From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I argue that we can understand 
Kamola’s work53 as conceptualizing ‘the international’ in this way. Kamola argues that, during the 
Cold War, international relations understood ‘the international’ through the building blocks of 
states, areas and regions. This led to a research agenda focused on development and modernization 
‘of’ these building blocks. Nowadays, however, the dominant understanding of ‘the international’ 
is ‘the global’. This translates into research agendas focused on globalization. Kamola asks how 
this shift came about and traces its origins to American business schools in the 1980s concerned 
with turning the world into a global single market, in which higher education amongst others could 
be a commodity internationally accessible to purchase and offer. As the material foundation of 
higher education itself became reorganized along the lines of global commodification, the 
imagination of the world as ‘global’ rose to prominence. Kamola’s story moves between the World 
Bank, Harvard Business School, African higher education, New York University, the Social 
Science Research Council, as well as private and philanthropic funders amongst others. As such it 
is a very American story, but with some connections to African higher education and to institutions 
of global governance. Given these aspects, Kamola could have also featured as a weak example of 
an extension of the scale of analysis. Through his emphasis on the material relations within which 
knowledge production takes place, he may also feature as a weak example of ‘the international’ as 
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a global power structure – at least given the fact that these material relations exceed nation-state 
boundaries and single locations.  
Understanding the ‘international’ from a relational perspective 
Power/knowledge readings of international relations have conceptualized ‘the international’ as 
either a scale of analysis, a global power structure or an imagined horizon. By assuming the units 
that make up world politics, all three of them lean towards a substantialist approach to 
conceptualizing ‘the international’. The focus is on questions such as: which units and forms of 
interactions should one include in analysis (the scale of analysis understanding)? Which dynamics 
are not reducible to the units themselves but exceed them (global power structure understanding)? 
Which narratives structure the relations between units (the imagined horizon understanding)? 
In opposition to this, the recent turns to global history54 and global historical sociology55 have 
understood and utilized ‘the international’ in a different way. By focusing on “the transnational and 
global dynamics that enable the emergence, reproduction, and breakdown of social orders whether 
these orders are situated at the subnational, national, or global scales,”56 these approaches have 
adopted a relational understanding to ‘the international’. Relational thinking is a line of thought 
that puts relations and social interactions at the centre of analysis, instead of the traditional ‘units,’ 
‘entities’ or ‘things’ such as social systems, societies or individuals.57 Going against both 
methodological and phenomenological individualism, it assumes that social systems, societies or 
individuals are made by social interaction, not pre-given units. Following Emirbayer,58 we can 
understand this division between ‘relationalism’ and ‘substantialism’ as the key distinction line in 
sociological theory, and as I argue here, approaches to understanding ‘the international’. In the 
next section I develop a reading of power/knowledge based on such a relational understanding of 
‘the international’. This involves putting forward an ideal-typical model of three different ways in 
which knowledge spaces can be formed.  
 
Towards a global geopolitics of knowledge production in international 
relations 
As argued above, histories of international relations that put the discipline into its socio-political 
context have remained limited in their analytical treatment of the ‘international’. In response to 
this, I propose to develop a global geopolitics of knowledge production that allows us to rethink 
power/knowledge from an international perspective.  
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This global geopolitics of knowledge is based on the assumption that knowledge is highly 
contextual and can therefore only be understood as meaningful in relation to context. It is also 
based on the assumption that the boundaries of this context are not static or eternal but are made 
and remade throughout time and that the ‘international’ is the “hammer”59, the force, that remakes 
and reshapes these relations most fundamentally. I propose to understand the role of the 
international onto power/knowledge relations through the three nexuses of war/knowledge, 
revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. These put forward three different ideal-
typical depictions of the manner in which knowledge spaces can be re-spatialized. In short, they 
detail how war, revolution and colonization reshape the parameters within which knowledge 
production takes place, and thus, ultimately, knowledge production itself.  
War, revolution and colonization have arguably been some of the most powerful historical forces 
in bringing about change. They go beyond the established boundaries of what is known and 
accepted, and tear the fabric of world order apart only to build it anew, on their own terms. As 
such one could understand them as concrete instantiations of an abstract ‘international’. However, 
the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge nexuses described by a 
global geopolitics of knowledge production are meant to be heuristic devices, not historically 
accurate depictions. They each describe how a specific type of context – determined by war, 
revolution and colonization respectively – configures and sets the parameters for knowledge 
production. In that sense, I understand them to work in the fashion of ideal-types, meaning that 
they feature elements which are found in concrete historical situations. However, a concrete 
historical situation will always exceed the ideal-type; the ideal-type will never be found in its true 
form in reality.60 The war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are 
meant as conceptual frameworks through which concrete historical situations can be interpreted 
and compared. As such the global geopolitics of knowledge I put forward is a collection of three 
different ideal-typical situations through which to understand the way in which ‘the international’ 
impacts knowledge production by setting and reshaping its parameters and orientation. War, 
revolution and colonization are of course not the only transnational forces shaping knowledge 
production: other events such as plagues, technology changes, or economic crises may have a 
similarly important impact on knowledge production. But my concern here is with the three 
configurations that have most purchase in untangling and illuminating the GDR 
power/knowledge relations explored in the following chapters. 
The term “geopolitics of knowledge” has been used by decolonial thinkers and is in particular 
associated with Walter Mignolo’s work.61 It speaks to the notion that knowledge is not neutral but 
reflective of a specific position within a highly stratified and hierarchical world order. In that sense, 
this ‘decolonial’ concept of a geopolitics of knowledge can be ordered into a wider family of 
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structurally determined theories of knowledge where thought is a function of one’s location within 
a particular type of structure.62 The ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge assumes that the 
‘modern’ world we live in is a deeply hierarchical world formed by centuries of European colonial 
expansion. It is formed by the hierarchy between North and South and within states between 
nationalist and subaltern spaces. This “colonial difference” structures knowledge production by 
putting every individual onto an axis of difference: one is either situated in a position of power or 
in a position of subalternity. The knowledge that is formulated from either one of these spaces is 
different in content and in design. The knowledge claims formulated from the positions of power 
support the existing hierarchies and subordinations, while the knowledge claims articulated from 
the positions of subalternity are necessarily critical of hegemonic perspectives.63 The key question 
for the ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge thus becomes: “From which location in the colonial 
divide are knowledges produced? Nationalist and colonialist discourses are thinking from a power 
position in the colonial divide of the modern/colonial world, while subaltern subjects are thinking 
from the subordinate side of the colonial difference. Colonialist discourses reproduce the 
North/South global colonial divide, while nationalist discourses reproduce an internal colonial 
divide within national formations.”64 
I agree with and share a number of assumptions made by this ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge 
whose term I adopt: that knowledge is not formulated from a ‘neutral’ position, that location and 
context matter, that power structures play a role and that the difference between subaltern and 
hegemonic spaces is relevant. However, I also differ on a number of points: I disagree with an 
over-deterministic reading of structure, as well as with a reading of power limited to its structural 
aspects. I would argue that the difference between hegemonic spaces and subaltern spaces is not 
as clear-cut as it is made out in the ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge. I also question the 
assumption that being in a subaltern position means that one is automatically and only ‘critical’, or 
that being in a ‘hegemonic’ position means that one is automatically and solely reinforcing the 
structure of domination over subaltern spaces. Most importantly, though, I argue that colonial 
dynamics are not the only determinant of knowledge production. To work out a truly global 
geopolitics of knowledge, we need to go beyond a sole focus on coloniality. As such the global 
geopolitics of knowledge I put forward here differs from the ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge 
sketched out in that it also encompasses the relation between war/knowledge and 
revolution/knowledge. My concept, though, is not only a quantitative expansion of the term to 
more spheres of power/knowledge relations, it is also substantively different in that it puts forward 
a relational, not a structural, argument. In my reading, the ‘decolonial’ geopolitics of knowledge is 
based on a substantialist argument that reifies the structure of ‘colonial difference’ and makes 
everything, including knowledge production, secondary to it. In contrast to this, I base my concept 
of a global geopolitics of knowledge production on relational thinking. 
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Relational thinking and the sketching of a global geopolitics of knowledge production 
How do the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge nexuses 
function? In short, war, revolution and colonization reset, remake, and reshape the context within 
which knowledge production takes place. This gives a structure and orientation to knowledge 
activities, thereby impacting all aspects of knowledge production. The longer and more complex 
answer draws on relational theory. Following relational theory, war, revolution and colonization 
are sets of events and occurrences, which we can also term processes. As we know from relational 
theory, sets of events and occurrences affect change by recasting entities and by recasting the 
configurations these are embedded in.65 Accordingly, war, revolution and colonization, as 
understood in the nexuses above, reshape knowledge formation by generating or re-casting the 
entities involved in it and by setting the initial configurations and networks that these entities are 
embedded in. Both aspects of the process are detailed below. 
How exactly do processes, i.e. sets of events and occurrences, generate entities? For Abbott,66 this 
encompasses multiple steps: first, social interaction between various actors creates points of 
difference between unconnected sites, then these points of difference are hooked up together into 
boundaries or proto-boundaries. Only when a rationalizing story emerges to justify why the in-
group situated within the boundary necessarily must be a unit, does the social entity fully come 
into being. Let’s illustrate this with Abbott’s example of ‘social work’, an entity that did not exist 
in the 1870s, but developed rapidly in the decades thereafter. Following Abbott, processes, events, 
social interactions and so forth first generated points of difference within the different sites that 
existed at the time and which we can now in hindsight connect with social work: psychiatric work, 
kindergartens, friendly visiting and probation. In psychiatric work, differences emerged between 
men and women exercising the profession; in kindergartens, between the scientifically trained staff 
and the volunteers; in friendly visiting, between church-affiliated groups and non-church-affiliated 
groups and in probation, between those working with adults and those working with children. The 
second step in the emergence of ‘social work’ took place when actors started combining these 
points of difference into a boundary or proto-boundary. In the case of ‘social work’, this happened 
when actors linked the women practising psychiatric work with the scientifically trained members 
of staff in kindergartens, the non-church actors involved in friendly visiting and the child workers 
active in the field of probation. A boundary was thus drawn between an ‘in’ and an ‘out’ group. 
Following Abbott, the social entity of ‘social work’ however only emerged fully once the in-group 
started developing justifications and rationalizations for why it is that these people belonged 
together naturally in this field. So, following Abbott, boundaries precede entity formation. The 
steps are: process, i.e. sets of events and occurrences generate difference, difference is linked up 
into boundary, and boundary is rationalized to become entity. As we can see with the example of 
‘social work’, whenever this process happens in a social space that is already structured and filled 
with social entities, changes of structure will happen through the delegitimization of previous 
differences and through the emphasizing and highlighting of other differences. Previously 
separated entities, such as psychiatry, kindergartens, friendly visiting and probation, will become 
connected into new entities (‘social work’), and existing entities, such as the unity between female 
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and male workers in psychology etc., will become divided through the emphasis of a previously 
unimportant difference.67 I propose to follow Abbott in suggesting that war, revolution and 
colonization are sets of events that either generate or emphasize/delegitimize existing differences 
within multiple sites and then draw these differences-made-prominent together into a bounded 
space while rationalizing this boundary as natural and important.  
War, revolution and colonization do not only create the ‘things’, ‘entities’ or ‘substances’ involved 
in knowledge activities; they also set the initial configurations and networks that these entities are 
part of. Tilly details this process with regards to international communities.68 Social processes 
consist of ties that actors create and use as they interact. These sets of ties, he suggests, can be 
broken down to the following essential ones: chains, hierarchies, triads, paired categories and 
organisations. Once these ties multiply and compound to form larger network structures we get 
configurations. War, revolution and colonization, I argue, multiply and reconfigure social ties 
between actors, linking them to one another in new ways. They lay down an initial set of tie 
configurations within which subsequent knowledge activities circulate and take place. Studying, 
teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising become formed in specific ways by the 
networks they are embedded in.  
War, revolution and colonization all generate the entities and configurations giving shape and 
meaning to knowledge activities but they all do so differently. The war/knowledge nexus, I argue, 
pitches two antagonistic and sharply bounded spaces against each other in diametrically defined 
ways. The colonization/knowledge nexus describes the almost opposite situation where one space 
takes over the other. The revolution/knowledge nexus, finally, is a combination of the previous 
two dynamics within the same bounded space: a previously bounded but polarized entity splits 
into two with one of the new entities subsequently taking over the other. The following figure 
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Figure 1 The three ideal-typical constellations of geopolitics/knowledge 
 
War/Knowledge 
The war/knowledge nexus describes how wars shape the way in which we think about 
international relations. They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-
making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising take 
place. A war situation means that these knowledge-making activities will take place within an 
antagonistic space where each of the contenders will be defined in relation to the respective other. 
Like a negative mirror image, activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing 
and advising will be characterized by their orientation towards and against the enemy and these 
same activities in the enemy space. Its core logic is enemy formation and that dynamic will inform 
both the ‘social entities’ involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.  
Underwriting this conceptualization of the war/knowledge nexus is an assumption about the 
ontology of war as antagonistic exchange and the expectation that the resulting process of 
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differentiation inherent to that antagonistic exchange is deeply generative for political life.69 In so 
conceptualizing power/knowledge, I draw on the work by Barkawi and Brighton, in terms of their 
ontological assumptions about war as well as in terms of their conceptualization of the relation 
between war and the production of truth claims, termed war/truth.70 
Following Barkawi and Brighton the main element defining the ontology of war is fighting. It is 
the focus on fighting that turns analysis wherein war only plays a “secondary effect” to a form of 
analysis fully centred on war.71 Fighting generates two different types of relation to truth and 
knowledge. The first one can be characterized as “instrumentalized strategic thought.” It describes 
the way in which war, as an immediate, concrete experience of life and death, canalizes thought 
towards survival. War forces analysis to either “getting it right or facing ruin on the battle field.”72 
Political leaders, strategists and soldiers who engage in war produce truth and knowledge claims 
about war that serve the purpose of prevailing, the purpose of emerging from the war situation 
alive and victorious.73 This type of knowledge production is characterized by the fact that it is part 
of conducting war, that it is instrumental to war and as such “never fully exterior to an order war 
itself creates.”74 This is problematic because it generates an “order of knowing and being” that 
occludes other such orders.75 
The other relation between war and knowledge goes beyond the questions of death and survival 
generated by battle. It exceeds the direct instrumentality of war in that it triggers change in those 
involved in it. It is human beings who are touched by warfare, and it is their previously fixed and 
set identities inscribed in a stable social order that become profoundly shaken and disrupted. They 
emerge from war with new identities and new views about the order of society. Previous identities, 
roles and social forms of order lose meaning. This is how war changes and remakes both the 
human beings and the social and political order they are part of, thereby thus remaking “truth and 
knowledge order[s].”76 For Barkawi and Brighton the first relation between war and truth is 
problematic, while the second is productive.77 This is what they propose to call war/truth, a 
conceptual pairing that “enables the tracing of the intimacy between the battlefield and the wider 
social, political, and cultural field war helps constitute.”78 Its premise is that war disorders and then 
reorders knowledge: “like a societal centrifuge, [it] has the power to draw in resources - intellectual, 
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scientific, social, economic, cultural, and political - and unmake and re-work them in ways that 
cannot be foreseen.”79  
In conceptualizing the core logic of war/knowledge as enemy formation, I also take inspiration 
from Ido Oren’s analysis of the development of political science in the US around WWI, WWII 
and the Cold War.80 In his work, Oren links a moment of enemy formation to a subsequent 
delegitimization of theories, ideas or branches of enquiry that are seen to stand in connection with 
that new enemy. State-theory and administration science, for instance, were a key component of 
early political science in the US and their genealogy was clearly linked to Germany. This became a 
problem once the US and Germany faced each other as enemies during WWI and WWII, leading 
to the disappearance of state-theory from the core of political science after WWI and to the 
disappearance of public administration from the core of political science after WWII. Similarly, 
before the Cold War, concepts of democracy in the US encompassed both ‘social’ and 
‘behavioural’ components. Once the US declared the Soviet Union to be an enemy, its concept of 
democracy lost the ‘thick’ social dimension to retain only the ‘thin’ behavioural element. Crucially, 
Oren does not link change on the content level to actual warfare, or for that matter to regime 
change in the respective country, but to enemy formation. Content changes in knowledge 
production happened once Germany or the Soviet Union started to be perceived as and 
understand them as enemies. 
Following the idea of war as antagonistic and generative, the war/knowledge nexus describes the 
process whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is reshaped and restructured into 
an antagonistic pattern. The borders of that knowledge formation become sharply bounded, and 
it becomes firmly oriented towards and against its contending enemy knowledge formation. In 
short: it inscribes a logic of antagonistic exchange to knowledge production based on a process of 
enemy formation.  










Chapter 2 illustrates the war/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge production in 
the GDR in relation to the Cold War setting. This raises the question: can the situation of the 
GDR until 1989 be considered to be inscribed in a war setting? This question of course hinges on 
whether to consider the Cold War confrontation a war, despite there not having been any direct 
physical battle or blood shedding between Soviet and US troops – or in the case of the GDR, 
despite the GDR army not being involved in active battle. The general agreement leans towards 
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understanding the Cold War as “an East-West antagonism rooted in irreconcilable ideologies, 
structured on geographical partition and strategic deterrence, and fought in a variety of spheres 
(from alliance diplomacy and political manipulation to development projects, from cultural and 
intellectual confrontations all the way to bloody ‘proxy wars’ in allegedly ‘peripheral’ areas).”81  
Two different arguments in favour of reading this description as ‘war’ are being put forward.82 The 
first one focuses on the aspects of battle and blood shedding, highlighting how it is only a 
Eurocentric approach to the Cold War that can lead to its description as a ‘long peace’.83 When 
discarding the Eurocentric lens, one can see that the ‘long peace’ in the Atlantic North “went hand 
in hand with highly destructive wars in the global South, which accounted for almost all of the 
estimated 20 million war casualties in the period of 1945-90.”84 The other argument focuses on 
the ontology of war, arguing that “[w]hen seen as a contest for hegemony […] the Cold War fully 
retains ‘its war-like character’ as a key, defining feature of its origins and development as a deep 
East-West antagonism.”85 
Europe and Germany in particular played a central role in the Cold War in that the origins and 
solutions of the conflict ultimately resided in Europe, with the partition and ultimate (re)unification 
of Germany its prominent symbol.86 For Germany, the Cold War was very much an intra-German 
conflict, a ‘German Cold War; between East and West: “the position as Cold War border region 
par excellence, with the fault line between socialist East and capitalist West dividing the German 
nations into two antagonistic states, had the paradoxical effect of creating a sharp line of 
demarcation separating the two states, while simultaneously establishing a lasting zone permitting 
contact and interaction between them.”87 At the core of the intra-German Cold War was the 
Hallstein doctrine, which started as a West German mission to prevent the diplomatic recognition 
of the GDR, but later evolved into a world-wide campaign against anything that would assign 
positive value to the GDR. It deeply structured GDR/FRG interactions, hijacking considerable 
financial and human resources to contest the other’s legitimacy to represent Germany.88 Referring 
to the post-Cold War marginalization of ex-GDR diplomats from the newly all-German diplomatic 
service, former GDR diplomat Otto Pfeiffer refers to the petty nature of the intra-German Cold 
War confrontation: 
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“It was part vengeance, I can say this openly. There is a book by FRG diplomat Werner Kilian in which 
he depicts how some FRG embassies spent more than half of their resources on keeping the GDR down, up 
to petty things like having the FRG military attaché in Lissabon hide with binoculars in the dunes, in order 
to observe whether the GDR boats leaving Portugal perhaps raised the GDR flag too early. […] They were 
simply mad at us […]: we had given them so much trouble.” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 12-13) 
Ultimately, however, it does not matter for the purpose of this analysis whether we label the Cold 
War as war. The war/knowledge nexus does not describe an ontological but a heuristic connection; 
we do not need to label the Cold War as war in order to employ the war/knowledge nexus for 
analysis. In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the time period of 
the Cold War, it only matters whether the Cold War situation de facto comes close enough to a 
sharp bounding of knowledge spaces against each other in an antagonistic form for the nexus to 
be of relevance. Because this is empirically and historically the case, the colonization/knowledge 
nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at stake. Indeed, “[i]n each camp, political and 
cultural elites articulated their fear of war, and the corresponding strategies to prevent and deter 
it, not only in relation to the adversary’s military means and posture but to their own deeply held 
convictions about the inherently expansive and dangerous nature of the opposite system, 
symptomatically perceived as ‘totalitarian’ or ‘imperialistic’.” 89  
Colonization/Knowledge 
The colonization/knowledge nexus describes how colonization reshapes the way in which we 
think about international relations. It does so by recasting the relevant parameters within which 
knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and 
advising take place. Colonizing dynamics mean that these knowledge-making activities will take 
place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a formerly independent knowledge space 
becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another knowledge space. Activities such as 
studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by a 
reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the institutions and organizations formerly 
bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, imploding, reorganizing or reorienting 
themselves within the new context. The networks that they are embedded in will change as well, 
developing new international alignments, and connecting to knowledge actors within the new 
formation that they have become part of. The core logic of colonization/knowledge is hierarchical 
orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the ‘social entities’ involved in knowledge activities 
and the networks they are part of. 
In so describing the colonization/knowledge nexus, I draw on George Steinmetz’s extension of 
Bourdieusian field theory to the scale of empires.90 Steinmetz focuses on the relation between the 
fields of metropole and colony, arguing that modern colonial empires can be conceptualized by 
three different types of field extension from metropole to colony. Either the metropole’s field is 
extended in a straightforward manner to the colonial territory, the metropole’s field produces a 
colonial subfield, or the colony develops a new field specific to itself. For academic fields, though, 
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Steinmetz argues only the first two modes of relation are relevant. Academic fields are either 
extended from metropole to colony or they develop a colonial subfield. As examples of metropole 
field extension, Steinmetz lists settler institutions like the colleges in the 13 American colonies, 
scientific practices like psychological testing for work motivation, aptitude and intelligence, as well 
as the export of curricula in the Nazi Reichsuniversitäten of Eastern Europe or in the colonial 
universities of French Algiers and British Bombay.91 These describe processes of transfer with little 
to no changes in form. As examples of metropole fields that develop a colonial subfield, Steinmetz 
lists the colonial sciences. Instead of just transferring the field of medicine to the colonies, 
medicine for instance developed the colonial subfield of tropical medicine. This included a move 
away from studying “diseases in the tropics” to studying “tropical diseases”. 92 French sociology is 
another example of a metropole field that developed a colonial specialization. It retained its 
connection to the field of sociology, as the scholars located in the subfield were trained in the same 
places, published in the same outlets and competed for posts in the same institutions as their 
colleagues from the general field of sociology. At the same time, it had its own specificities, as the 
scholars from colonial sociology distinguished themselves by their empirical focus on both 
metropole and periphery, by their attention to issues of race, by their critique of what we now dub 
‘methodological nationalism’, as well as by a valorization of fieldwork.93  
In conceptualizing the mode of transfer of knowledge fields from metropole to colony, I also draw 
on the revisionist ‘colonial knowledge’ scholarship’s attention to the role of the colonized in this 
process.94 Where classic postcolonial literature95 assumed their passivity in the process of 
imposition, depicting them as mere ‘native informants’, the revisionist literature highlights the role 
and agency of indigenous intellectuals within the colonial process. In a ‘collaborationist’ mode, 
colonized intellectuals played a role in shaping the process, bringing in their own epistemic 
practices and forms of knowledge into a highly unequal form of exchange.  
Following these bodies of scholarship, the colonization/knowledge nexus describes the process 
whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is restructured by absorption into another 
formation. Echoing Steinmetz’s work, this can happen to varying degrees, from full absorption, 
whereby all parameters of the colonizing formation are transferred, to part-absorption, where the 
parameters become those of the colonizing formation but retain some specificity as colonial sub-
formation. Intellectuals, scholars, and experts from both the absorbing and the absorbed sides of 
this ‘colonial’ divide will take part in the historically concrete process of ‘takeover’ with varying 
degrees of agency and with varying desire, possibility and power to shape the process.  
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Core: Hierarchical Orientation Colonization/Knowledge 
  
 
Chapter 4 illustrates the colonization/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge 
production in the space of the former GDR in relation to the process of post-Cold War German 
(re-)unification. This raises the question: is the term colonization appropriate to describe the 
process that has taken place in the territory of the former GDR from 1990 onwards? The 
arguments in favour of reading the unification of Germany as colonization can be divided into a 
phenomenological argument and an ‘objective’ argument focused around a logic of effect. Cooke 
for example argues that while it remains debatable whether or not the reunification was indeed a 
colonial act, it matters that the reunification has been perceived as such and that these perceptions 
of colonization and a language of colonization have penetrated culture.96 Dümcke and Vilmar on 
the other hand have prominently argued for a reading of the German unification as what they term 
‘colonialization’; a process similar to colonization. They argue that, despite a lack of physical 
violence, a focus on the effects of a colonial situation shows four crucial elements applicable to 
the GDR: “the destruction of an ‘indigenous’ economic structure,” “the exploitation of available 
economic resources,” “the social liquidation of not only the political elite but also the intellectuals 
of a country,” and “the destruction of […] a population’s identity.”97 As former GDR colonial 
historian Van der Heyden puts it: 
“When using the lens of colonial history to examine the takeover of Eastern academic institutions by Western 
academics, I come to the theory of a colonization of the GDR […] If I look at the definitions [of colonization] 
that I have collected so far, I think that in the East of Germany we have experienced the same that overseas 
countries did in the 19th century: the replacement of the functional elites, replacement of values etc.” (Interview 
Van der Heyden, 2020: 8) 
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Hoerschelmann also highlights how ‘East Germans’ were silenced in a supposedly egalitarian 
public space during the process of unification and “captured in degrading, essentialising 
stereotypes not unlike those critiqued in the post-colonial literature”.98  
The arguments against a reading of the unification of Germany as colonization mirror the ones in 
favour of it. On the one side we find narratives arguing that perceptions of colonialization are false 
perceptions and distortions of a ‘true’ and positive reality. Cooke bundles different arguments and 
narratives aimed at disproving suggestions of colonization. They highlight the economic gains East 
Germany obtained through the unification, in particular if comparing the levels of consumer 
power and social security to those in other post-communist states. They also highlight the ways in 
which East Germans have supposedly developed a more coherent identity since the unification of 
Germany.99 The aim is to demonstrate that claims of economic exploitation or identity disruption 
are wrong but that the unification process was, overall, a positive, not a negative event. Perceptions 
of colonization despite these ‘demonstrably’ positive events are constructed as varying versions of 
false consciousness: ungratefulness, nostalgia, or a result of unrealistic expectations.100 
On the other side, we find narratives focused on a logic of intent and consent as opposed to the 
narratives of effect and consequence put forward by the colonization argument. Ultimately, this 
argument reduces the question of colonization to agency and consent: if the ‘colonized’ wanted 
and consciously sought out the ‘colonization’, then they are not ‘colonized’; if they had not wanted 
it and consciously opposed it, then it would be considered an act of colonization. Because the 
GDR held free and democratic elections and because the resulting majority vote was cast in favour 
of politicians clear about their intention to unite with West Germany on West German terms, the 
unification of Germany is not deemed a colonial situation.101 As Misselwitz points out, it is part of 
the specific dialectic of this revolution that the GDR citizen first made the GDR their own and 
then exchanged it for the unification.102  
The process of unification with West Germany parallels many elements of a colonial situation, but 
is not reducible to it either, exceeding it in many ways. Misselwitz’s analysis through the lens of 
the word pair Schulden (‘debt’) and Schuld (‘guilt’) perhaps best captures the situation. His analysis 
points to the way in which the recourse to the principle of non-recognition during the process of 
unification nullified everything positive that was grown in or had been built in the East, leaving 
the ex-GDR to bring only ‘negatives’ to the negotiation table: Schulden (‘debt’) and Schuld (‘guilt’). 
These negatives were then divided between East and West. The East was discharged of debt and 
charged with guilt, while the West discharged itself of any immaterial moral legacy and 
responsibility, taking on the material burden only.103 As such the process of unification traded in 
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legal and material stability for a psychological and political problem: the higher the asymmetry of 
dependence in the former, the stronger the latter.104 
In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the process of German 
unification, it does not ultimately matter whether we term it to be colonial or not. To draw on the  
colonization/knowledge nexus established above, it only matters whether the situation comes 
close enough to the restructuring of a knowledge space through the takeover by another such 
knowledge space for it to be applicable. Because this is empirically and historically the case, the 
colonization/knowledge nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at stake.  
Revolution/Knowledge 
The revolution/knowledge nexus describes how revolutions reshape the way in which we think 
about international relations. They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which 
knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and 
advising about international relations take place. Revolutionary events mean that these knowledge-
making activities will take place within a polarized space characterized by multiple split poles of 
sovereignty: the previously stable incumbent and the upcoming challenger. It also means that they 
will take place within an unstable space that gradually shifts from the former to the latter pole of 
authority. Knowledge-making activities will be characterized by a back and forth between both 
poles, but also by the fact that the actors, institutions and organizations bundling these knowledge-
making activities will partly implode, reorganize or reorient themselves within this shifting context. 
The networks that they are embedded in will change as well, developing new international 
alignments, connecting to processes of change elsewhere, but also engaging with new counter-
revolutionary forces, domestic and foreign. As such the revolution/knowledge nexus combines 
the two patterns of war/knowledge and colonization/knowledge: it pitches two polarized, sharply 
bounded spaces against each other and at the same time describes a situation where one of these 
spaces takes over the other.  
In so describing the revolution/knowledge nexus, I draw on Charles Tilly’s definition of 
revolutions as being composed of two elements: a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary 
outcome.105 Tilly’s revolutionary situation describes a splitting of original sovereignty and 
hegemony into at least two power blocs, the incumbents and the contenders. These power blocks 
each garner significant support from citizens and compete over state power, making incompatible 
and competing claims to state control. The revolutionary situation is thus defined by a situation of 
multiple sovereignty. This happened for instance, Tilly illustrates, when Lithuania asserted its 
sovereignty within the Soviet Union in 1990, when coalitions amongst skilled workers, bourgeois 
and intellectuls mobilized and successfully controlled some portions of the state in the 1848 
revolutions, or when the English gentry split into different blocks, the Cavaliers and the 
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Roundheads, and effectively controlled parts of the state in 1640.106 Tilly’s revolutionary outcome 
takes place after a period of struggle, when state power is transferred from incumbent to 
contender. Full sovereignty is re-established to one party alone with no other contender to state 
power. This does not have to entail a clean cut between old and new, however, as Tilly notes that 
a transition from revolutionary situation to revolutionary outcome is more likely to occur if 
members of the incumbent party defect to the contenders. The other important factor leading 
from revolutionary situation to revolutionary outcome is connected to military power: 
revolutionary situations are more likely to turn into revolutionary outcomes if the contenders 
acquire military power or if the incumbent’s military power either remains neutral or defects to the 
other side.107 Following Tilly, a full revolutionary process thus encompasses the splitting of 
sovereignty, a phase of struggle and the re-establishment of sovereignty under new banners.108  
I also draw on the work by Halliday and Lawson, who have pointed out the inherently international 
dimensions of revolutions, drawing out their embeddedness in wider processes of change.109 
Revolutionary situations are inherently international by “the role of ‘abnormal times’ in 
heightening demands for revolution; the unstable alignments prompted by shifting client-patron 
relations; the rise and fall of revolutionary waves”.110 Revolutionary processes are inherently 
international by “the brokerage role of revolutionary entrepreneurs, the externalization and 
internationalization of revolutionary repertoires, the closeness of the dynamic between 
revolutionary and counter/revolutionary forces”.111 Revolutionary outcomes, finally, are inherently 
international by “the relations among revolutions, counter-revolution, and war, as well as the 
material aid and more intangible aspects of ‘demonstration effect’ that revolutions afford to other 
states”.112 
Following these two bodies of scholarship, the revolution/knowledge nexus describes the process 
whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is restructured by splitting into two or 
more contending poles of knowledge production – with one of these poles ultimately taking over 
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Revolution/Knowledge 
Polarization and Split Struggle and Cohabitation Takeover 
   
 
Chapter 3 illustrates the revolution/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge 
production in the GDR in relation to the process of upheaval and change taking place in 1989-90. 
This raises the question: do the events in the GDR in 1989/1990 qualify as a revolution? They 
were not utopian, and they were not violent. Some have argued that they were part reform, part 
revolution, calling them refolutions.113 Marxists would see 1989 as counter-revolution. Habermas 
has coined the term ‘rectifying’ (‘nachholende’) revolution,114 while Lawson puts forward the concept 
of negotiated revolutions.115   
What to call the events of 1989 is a political issue.116 So far, the Western interpretation has 
dominated the readings of 1989, which is a narrative that Mark et al. have coined the “myth” of 
1989.117 It has set and solidified the meaning of 1989 through the interpretive framework of 
Western liberalism, reading it as a victory of liberal democracy and free markets over dictatorship. 
It interprets the events of 1989 as a shift “from immobility to mobility, passivity to activity, the 
old to the modern, obsolete planning to the market, and inertia to development”.118 The actors of 
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change in this narrative are ordinary people and civil society actors. They are depicted as primarily 
desiring to integrate a West they still need to catch up to, requiring Western aid to do so. This 
narrative of 1989 also sketches the East as an isolated, blank space cut off from the world to which 
globalization was to be brought to (by the West) in 1989.119 The spatial imaginary underpinning 
this myth is heavily Western-centric and relies on an expansionist narrative: it was a Western ‘wind 
of change’ that came upon the East, liberating it from its anachronistic dictatorships and bringing 
with it modernity, freedom and prosperity.120 As the terms anachronistic and modernity indicate, 
the temporal underpinnings are those of linear progress from Eastern Communism to Western 
liberalism. This narrative legitimized and normalized said mix of free markets, liberal democracy 
and a globalization on Western terms as the only viable model for statehood and world order.121 
It has also nurtured and confirmed ideas about Western superiority and has become central to our 
understandings of what ‘the West’ means and represents in the post-Cold War world.122   
In this narrative, two elements in particular about the events of 1989 are lost. The first is that the 
actors of change were to a large extent reform-oriented communist elites, not just civil society 
actors, and the second is that the East German and Eastern European actors involved in the events 
had agency of their own independently of the West.123  
I propose to read the role of communist elites, party members and other actors closely affiliated 
with state institutions through the lens of Tilly’s catalysts. As we have seen, following Tilly, 
revolutionary situations with multiple claims to sovereignty occur frequently, but they rarely lead 
to revolutionary outcomes. It is often only elite defection and/or the military’s neutrality that acts 
as catalyst and turns an attempted revolution into a successful one. Former SED member and 
professor Wilfried Schreiber argues in that direction: 
“These events brought about doubts. To whom? To the party members. Today you learn at school: the 
‘Wende’ of 1989, the fall of the old regime, was the work of courageous Christians who took to the streets. 
Yes, they did act in this way. But the crucial element was the change in the mass consciousness of the party 
members. The SED had around 2 million party members for a population of 18 million. […] I was part 
of a state institution, I was a soldier and I was a member of the party at the military’s political college. I 
cannot remember anyone there who was not a member of the SED. But we all asked the question: how are 
things going to continue? Things cannot continue this way?” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 10-11) 
Poorly understood, the role of the SED, the official party of the GDR, was crucial in the process, 
partly because it also structured the reaction of the armed forces not to intervene: 
 “We imploded, nothing else. And this so-called civil movement – they occupied an empty spot. They walked 
into an open door, only pushing it open wider than it already was. The fact that there was no use of violence 
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means in other words that a change of thinking and a separation from the Soviet hardliners had already 
taken place” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 11)  
The second element that gets lost in the liberal Western narrative of 1989 is that the East German 
and Eastern European actors were able to be ‘more Western than the West’ of their own accord, 
not needing help to do so, but also that their agendas were complex, contradictory and multiple – 
and not necessarily only embodiments of an eternal yearning for ‘superior’ Western modes of 
being.124  
In the Western perception, the GDR was by that time only seen as a phenomenon in transition […] 
From this perspective, the GDR ended […] with the fall of the Berlin wall. Celebrating the fall of the 
Berlin Wall expresses the Western perspective on the GDR: ‘They want to come to us, all they want 
to do, is to come to the West.’ After the fall of the Berlin Wall this was taken for granted and the rest 
was seen as a matter of detail. Which is a huge problem. Not only because it is a matter of respect with 
regards to the democratization of the GDR from within, but also because it is a matter of accepting 
that this society had interests of its own after 40 years of dictatorship (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3)  
At first the GDR revolutionaries were congratulated for their courage to claim their freedom, but 
with the unification to West Germany they became absorbed into new narratives that erased their 
agency. As Misselwitz argues, they were suddenly expected to show gratitude to the West, as if 
they hadn’t been the ones to bring an end to the GDR in the first place.125 At the same time, as 
the general interpretive frame to understand the GDR gradually became Stasi-centric, the 
revolutionaries of 1989 were reframed as victims, and naïve ones on top of that. This depiction 
reinforced previously held assumptions about a total lack of freedom in the GDR126    
So, do the events in the GDR qualify as a revolution? We have recovered revolutionaries with their 
own agency from a story of Western-bestowed freedom. And from a story of non-relevance, we 
have recovered defecting elites ensuring the success of the revolution. As such the GDR storyline 
fits the criteria established earlier to count as a revolution. Ultimately, however, this does not 
matter. In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the upheavals of 
1989/90, it does not matter whether we term it to be revolutionary or not. To draw on the  
revolution/knowledge nexus established above, it only matters whether the situation comes close 
enough to the restructuring of a knowledge space through its internal split into two contending 
poles, coupled with an ultimate takeover of one pole by the other. Because this is empirically and 
historically the case, the revolution/knowledge nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at 
stake.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have developed the idea of a global geopolitics of knowledge production, which 
is a re-reading of power/knowledge from an international perspective. This has involved sketching 
out the three ideal-typical relations of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and 
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colonization/knowledge. Each of these describe how knowledge production about international 
relations functions in different geopolitical contexts. War/knowledge describes a situation in 
which knowledge production about international relations is shaped by antagonistic exchange and 
enemy formation. Revolution/knowledge describes a situation in which knowledge production 
about international relations is shaped by polarization and splitting sovereignty. 
Colonization/knowledge, finally, describes a situation in which knowledge production about 
international relations is shaped by hierarchical orientation.  
Developing this global geopolitics of knowledge production serves two purposes. First, it is meant 
to support the analysis of East German geopolitics/knowledge relations put forward in the 
following chapters. Organizing these around the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and 
colonization/knowledge ideal-types helps make sense of the multitude of different, criss-crossing 
and entangled processes. As is the case with ideal-typical theorizing, the depictions of the relation 
between geopolitics and knowledge are not meant to be ‘true’ depictions of reality. They are meant 
to be helpful, cutting through the complexity of a historical situation that will always exceed them 
and providing insight about some of the core dynamics underwriting it. The following chapters on 
war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge will illustrate this. 
Developing this model of a global geopolitics of knowledge also serves another purpose. In putting 
forward a framework of how to think about knowledge in relation to geopolitics, it proposes an 
alternative to modes of thinking that either do not understand knowledge production in relational 
terms or, where they do so, fail to understand that this necessarily must entail an ‘international’, 
‘global’ or ‘intersocial’ perspective. A relational perspective on knowledge production is necessarily 
‘international’/‘global’/‘intersocial’ – not in the sense of prescribing a scale of anaylsis, but in the 





The Global Cold War and International Relations 
Expertise in the GDR pre-1989  
 
“The foreign policy apparatus was much more experienced. We knew that the ‘classic opponents’ were people 
who saw things in the same way that we did. From a diametrically opposite perspective, of course, but they 
were thinking just as rationally and sensibly as we did.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 5) 
 “The relationship between research and politics was multifaceted and ambivalent. A simplified formula could 
be: the less strategic-political relevance for the Soviet Union, the freer the research. When researching areas of 
high political relevance, such as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union - what kind of research could we do 
there? We wrote about their (official) activities and reproduced their statements. […] In the department on 
Western Europe, [research] leaned in the other direction, it became more solid, more professional. Solid 
analyses were required in this domain: We wanted to know what was really going on.” (Interview Krämer, 
2019b: 3,6)   
 
In the early 1970s, Lutz Kleinwächter attended his ‘theory of international relations’ class. This 
was a compulsory component in his studies to become a diplomat at the GDR’s elite Institute for 
International Relations, the IIB. Topic of the day: geography and maps. The professor arrived and 
instead of starting to lecture, he asked all the students to take ten steps back. He pointed to the 
map of the world hanging at the front of the classroom and asked: “Can you still see the GDR on 
the map?” The students were a little unsettled. From where they were standing, the GDR was not 
really visible. His next question went further: “Can you still see Germany?” The students could 
not. “This,” the professor proceeded to explain, “tells you something about Germany’s importance 
in world politics, it tells you something about the GDR’s importance in the world.” The students 
looked uneasily at each other, silently wondering whether the professor was out of his mind. They 
had all grown up with great pride in the GDR, and the professor’s casual irony clashed with much 
of what they had known and believed up to that point.127 In due time, of course, they would all 
learn to elegantly navigate the tensions of a job that simultaneously required a defence of the GDR 
and a flexibility of mind in understanding the realities it operated in.  This episode is symptomatic 
for the dynamics at play during the GDR’s involvement in the global Cold War: researchers, 
academics and intellectuals had to navigate an antagonistic system of meaning that required a 
simultaneous reproduction and transcendence of its boundaries and parameters.  
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This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during the global 
Cold War.128 It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-
typical relation between war and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. As laid out there, 
war/knowledge describes how wars shape the way in which we think about international relations. 
They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such 
as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising take place. A war situation 
means that these knowledge-making activities will take place within an antagonistic space where 
each of the contenders will be defined in relation to the respective other. Like a negative mirror 
image, activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be 
characterized by their orientation towards and against the enemy and these same activities in the 
enemy space. Its core logic is enemy formation, and that dynamic will inform both the ‘social 
entities’ involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.  
 










This chapter is divided into four parts. A first section presents the stable and bounded, yet 
multifaceted and interwoven system of GDR international relations knowledge production. The 
subsequent sections examine three different aspects of foreign policy expertise along the categories 
of constitution, instrumentality and performance. The goal of these sections is to demonstrate 
how the Cold War’s antagonistic friend/enemy distinction was inscribed into all these different 
aspects of international relations knowledge production, but also forced scholars and researchers 
into an unstable zone which required a simultaneous reproduction of dogma and transcendence 
of its limits.  
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A first characteristic of the war/knowledge situation was the boundedness of its system. The GDR 
during the Cold War featured a well-ordered and well-organized system of knowledge production 
in the field of international relations. Bounded, however, did not mean monolithical. Knowledge 
production in international relations was spread across multiple institutions, and these institutions 
were associated and served various institutions of the political and social life.129 This mirrored the 
fact that political life in the GDR, as in many communist systems, was not monolithical. First, the 
GDR was built on a double structure of state and party. State institutions, such as the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as MfAA), stood next to the party institutions, such as – in 
the field of international relations – the department of international liaison (Internationale 
Verbindungen) under the leadership of SED central committee secretary Hermann Axen. The state 
structures were of course subordinated to the party structures, but this did make for a more 
complex system of relations and interactions. Second, the members of the Politbüro formed the 
de-facto power centre of the GDR’s political system, yet also competed amongst each other for 
influence and power.130 From the outside, the SED seemed like a monolithical and totalitarian 
structure. From the inside, things were complex, and often contradictory:131 
“There were turf wars in every scientific institution. These turf wars were also carried out with the help of the 
party organizations. And nobody should think that the SED was simply a totalitarian structure. The SED 
featured high degrees of internal party democracy. Open discussions in the respective party groups were possible 
up to a certain degree. But if someone fell in disgrace, they got punished with all the tools of party discipline. 
This was the ambivalence and double-sidedness of this structure. That is also the same ambivalence that 
existed within the state security apparatus [the Stasi]. So, seen from the outside, it all looks monolithic. But 
there was some real fighting going on inside. And the ones at the top did not always necessarily win.” 
(Interview Fischer, 2020: 15) 
Each of the Politbüro members had resources at their disposal and drew on the support and 
knowledge of the various academic institutions dedicated to the study of international relations to 
support their efforts in this process.132 Conversely, each academic institution had its own internal 
rivalries and conflicts, and the involved academics also used the different party organs and 
organisations to their own ends in these conflicts.133  
IIB 
The GDR’s MfAA had a research and teaching facility attached to it: the Institute of International 
Relations (Institut für International Beziehungen), hereafter referred to as IIB.134 Formally, the IIB was 
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attached to another institution of higher education, the Academy of Statecraft and Law (Deutsche 
Akademie für Staat und Recht), DASR, but in practice stood under the jurisdiction of the MfAA. The 
IIB had a dual character as both research and teaching facility: its main functions were to train 
diplomats for the GDR’s diplomatic service as well as to carry out research in the field of 
international relations for the MfAA.135 Its internal organisation in thematic departments mirrored 
the organisation of the MfAA.136 While it thus covered all topics relevant to international relations, 
something particularly important for the breadth and quality of teaching, the importance and 
relevance of its research mirrored the importance and relevance of the MfAA. High-level politics 
were monopolized by Erich Honecker in the party’s central committee ZK and its respective 
department of international liaison under Hermann Axen and Günter Sieber. As such relations 
with the Soviet Union or the US were not the purchase of the MfAA. Its relevance lay in the low-
level, daily ‘normal’ foreign policy. In particular, expertise about the UN, disarmament and similar 
topics was only available at the MfAA. As such, the IIB pooled particular expertise around these 
topics and its research in these areas was particularly relevant.137 With the MfAA being subordinate 
to the party, the IIB’s work and research thus also reached the department of international liaison 
at the central committee ZK and was, to a certain degree, of relevance there. Of medium size, the 
IIB regrouped around 210 members of staff, of which around 120 were researchers, 50 were 
language teachers and language specialists, and 40 ere non-academic support staff.138 
IPW  
The department of international liaison under Hermann Axen was not the only player in the field 
of international relations at the central committee. Another important player was the department 
of West Relations under Häber, and after his political marginalization, under Gunter Rettner. 
Closely connected to this department was the Institute of International Politics and Economy 
(Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft), hereafter referred to as IPW.139 The IPW was the 
GDR’s other major centre of research on international relations with a clear mission and 
specialization to study the enemy. Its remit was research on ‘imperialism’ and in particular the 
imperialism of Western Europe and West Germany.140 In the socialist alliance’s division of labour, 
it was the IMEMO in the Soviet Union that has primary responsibility in studying the US; East 
Germany is responsible for West Germany.141 The IPW had a dual character as both research 
facility and political actor in the relations with the West and West Germany in particular. Despite 
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its close cooperation with the central committee’s department of Western affairs, the IPW’s 
research was also used by the ministries of foreign trade (MAH) and foreign affairs (MfAA), the 
trade union (FDGB), the GDR’s other parties in the form of the Nationale Front der DDR, as well 
as by the ‘league for friendship amongst people’ (Liga für Völkerfreundschaft), the GDR’s societal 
organization orchestrating solidarity relations with people across the world. Despite being the 
biggest organization of its kind, grouping together around 400 researchers, the IPW did not have 
a monopoly position on the topic; the central committee’s very own academy for social sciences 
(Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED), hereafter referred to as AfG, also had an 
institute for the study of imperialism.142 The IIB also had a department on Western Europe (and 
Japan), as well as a research group on American foreign policy, and the various research and 
teaching institutions of the military concerned themselves also with the West through the lens of 
military technology and armaments.  
Military institutions 
Next to the MfAA and to the central committee’s various departments of expertise, the GDR’s 
army NVA (Nationale Volksarmee) also had its own organizations.143 Three of these had the right to 
supervise and confer PhDs and were thus part of the field of knowledge production in the areas 
of peace, security and military affairs: the military academy located in Dresden, the military’s 
political college in Berlin, and the GDR’s institute for military history in Potsdam.144 The military 
academy in Dresden (Militärakademie “Friedrich Engels”) was the institution for the training of all the 
higher-ranking military staff. Lower-ranking militaries had their colleges separated by function: 
land, air and sea.145 Training covered all the military topics but also a solid social science 
foundation, where research and teaching touched on questions of war and peace. The military 
academy’s focus lay on the army and unlike the IIB or IPW did not touch on broader questions 
of international relations, nor did it interact with many actors and stakeholders.146 But as further 
sections will expand, the philosophers of the military academy will grow to take an important place 
in debates around questions of war and peace in the Cold War confrontation of the 1980s. The 
military’s political college in Berlin (Militärpolitische Hochschule) was dedicated to the training of the 
military’s political officers, a function that encompassed the political education of soldiers as well 
as the provision of pastoral care. This college was not geared towards research despite supervising 
PhD research and was primarily focused on teaching and training.147 The Institute for Military 
History (Militärgeschichtliches Institut der DDR) in turn was primarily geared towards research and the 
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supervision of PhD theses by military personnel. This institute formed part of the circles of 
historical research and as such was more widely embedded in the GDR’s academic circles.  
Universities 
A last type of institution not formally allocated to any specific political institutions was the 
universities. Relevant in the area of international relations were the history and the area studies 
departments. Area studies were spread by region across the GDR: Latin America was taught and 
researched at the university in Rostock; Africa and the Middle East in Leipzig and Berlin; and Asia 
at the Humboldt University (HU) in Berlin.148 Diplomatic staff were also recruited from amongst 
the area studies students, who were more proficient in rare languages and rare area specializations 
than their IIB counterparts or the GDR students educated in Moscow at the IMEMO. Area studies 
were also partly represented at the IIB, whose department on “Developing countries of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America” covered research and teaching on these areas as well. The various 
institutions cooperated and coordinated through the Central Council for the Study of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (Zentrale Rat für Asien- Afrika- und Lateinamerika Wissenschaften der DDR), 
ZENTRAAL, which was located at the IIB. The main function of this council was to make 
research on developing countries usable by political decision-makers and political actors as well as 
to allow the latter control and guidance of the former.149 Colonial history, of course, straddled both 
areas. But history departments also engaged with IR-relevant topics. In the early days of the GDR 
an institute specialized in the analysis of developments in the socialist ‘brother states’. This institute 
had then been closed down for political reasons, and with the argument that the socialist ‘brother 
states’ knew best what was going on in their own countries.150 But later, after the developments in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, some of the respective researchers were regrouped at the Leipzig 
University in a history faculty and studied ‘the East’. Officially as historians, focusing on socialist 
revolutions, but de facto their point of focus was also on current political developments. As in 
most disciplines, their research was coordinated and pooled together through a scientific council, 
in this case the ‘council for socialism research’ attached to the central committee’s social science 
academy. This council then had working groups on the different countries, where researchers from 
different institutions came together.151  
Relations between institutions 
The GDR’s landscape of knowledge production on international relations thus encompassed a 
number of discrete institutions and working groups. All of them were internally well-organized 
entities who engaged with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in 
manifold ways. With regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of 
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closeness or distance to political stakeholders, varying levels of depth of engagement and varying 
levels of diversity and quantity of different contact partners. With regards to contacts amongst 
each other, these took place mainly through topic specializations, as similar topics across 
universities were often regrouped and coordinated through working groups. The various 
institutions also differed in their division of tasks between research and teaching, as well as in their 
contact with foreign stakeholders. The IPW for example had close contact with Western actors 
and West Germany in particular. Some of their researchers would go on regular trips to West 
Germany to meet with politicians and analysts. The IIB, on the other hand, had virtually no contact 
with the West but cooperated with the various socialist institutions and stakeholders ‘in the East’.152 
But all the institutions also stood in a certain relation of rivalry and competition towards each 
other. The researchers at the universities or at the academy of sciences had a distanced relationship 
with the ruling party. They also distrusted their more ‘politically’ engaged colleagues at the IIB and 
IPW for their connections with the MfAA and the central committee respectively.153 But 
differences also existed within the university landscape between colleagues who worked more or 
less closely with sources and thus also saw each other as more or less political – with the colleagues 
taking sources seriously seeing themselves as more ‘scientific’ and ‘less political’ than their 
colleagues who used sources more sporadically in support of their theoretical constructions.154  
The IPW also stood in a position of rivalry with the other institutions close to power, in particular 
with the central committee’s very own institutions of research and teaching, such as the central 
committee’s academy of social sciences AfG (Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der 
SED) and the party academy “Karl Marx” (Parteihochschule). In particular, the IPW clashed with 
these two institutions around the question of how cooperative or separate a pan-European security 
architecture should be. The IPW saw West Germany as a necessary partner for common security 
while the AfG and the party academy considered West Germany mainly as a ‘class enemy’ opposed 
to the very existence of the GDR155 Rivalries amongst Politbüro members led to the closure in 
1982 of the GDR’s main international relations journal, “German foreign policy” (Deutsche 
Außenpolitik).156   
The military’s academic staff, were not well regarded by the other ‘academic’ institutions. They 
stereotyped all militaries as not capable of critical reflection and only capable of carrying out orders. 
They certainly were not considered ‘scientists’ or ‘academics.’157 The IPW was suspect to the other 
institutions in other ways. Many assumed or suspected the IPW to be an organ of the Stasi. This 
was not true, but with the IPW’s mission of finding out everything it could about the West, and in 
particular West Germany, some blurring between institutions did take place. Part of the IPW’s 
tasks for example lay in examining West German parties, including their internal differences and 
positions – information that would of course be useful and handy for the secret service in placing 
their own informants. The IPW’s research certainly served all institutions needing its analysis and 
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it drew on all material available to them, regardless of where it came from.158 The IIB researchers 
in turn came across as ‘arrogant’ and were perceived to consider themselves as being the only real 
intellectual elite of the GDR. This did not go down well with other researchers who saw both the 
limits of their knowledge claims – the IIB for instance bracketed economic questions largely out 
of their analysis, and had not much understanding of economic issues – as well as the limits of 
their impact, as many of the studies written by the IIB would never be used in political circles.159  
Finally, IIB and IPW stood in positions of rivalry with regard to their political influence. The IPW 
was located in Berlin, close to the central committee. IPW researchers and central committee 
members of the ‘international liaison’ department would regularly go lunch together. That was a 
different quality of connection than between the IIB and the MfAA. The IIB was located in 
Potsdam, which meant that West Berlin was geographically located between the two. If a 
ministerial official wanted to visit the IIB, or if IIB researchers needed to visit the MfAA, it took 
them a one-and-a-half-hour train ride to get to one another, having to circle all the way around 
West Berlin. As such the IIB was felt to be ‘far away’ and this translated in a certain independence 
and leeway in the allowed thinking but also in a reduced impact on political decision-making. This 
bothered some colleagues at the IIB, including Prof. Stefan Dörnberg, director of the IIB from 
1977 to 1982, who tried to have the IIB location moved to Berlin, but to no avail.160  
In order to understand and make sense of this complex interwebbing system of knowledge 
production, consumption and dissemination in the GDR, the following section approaches it 
through the three lenses of ‘science as a weapon’, ‘science as a resource’ and ‘science as a 
performance’. 
Science as a weapon: Becoming international relations experts 
“The line between follower and perpetrator is a fine one. I have to say of myself that I was also a co-perpetrator 
in that I defended this ideology offensively. I only disassociated myself from it very, very late. I don't know 
what everyone else claims, whether they say that they had always been against it.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 
14) 
One way of looking at the different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR 
international relations knowledge production is through the lens of science’s constitutive role in 
forming its experts. In order to practice ‘science’, one had to become a ‘scientist’. In order to ‘be’ 
an international relations expert, one had to ‘become’ one. This section turns to teaching and 
training and examines how the GDR has ‘made’ its international relations experts. It also explores 
the idea of ‘science as an effective weapon’, the conception that required its experts to 
simultaneously reproduce and transcend the system.  
Training international relations experts both for the practical tasks of diplomacy and for the 
academic tasks of research and education focused on the creation of ‘socialist personalities’ who 
would use “science as an effective weapon” (Wissenschaft als eine wirksame Waffe) in the fight against 
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imperialism.161 This meant that they were expected to be able to use the ‘scientific’ tenets of 
Marxism/Leninism in the diplomatic and academic confrontation with their Western opponents, 
but also to put their specific international relations expertise to use in that confrontation. In short, 
their expertise was a weapon in the Cold War confrontation.  
In order to do so, international relations experts had to learn two things. First, they had to 
understand, internalize and reproduce official ideology and official interpretations. They had to 
become skilled at using the framework of Marxism/Leninism to study, analyze and write about 
international relations, so that they could defend the GDR’s positions in the ‘diplomatic’ and 
‘academic’ confrontation with the enemy. Yet at the same time, precisely in order to be good at 
this task, they also needed to transcend the framework and go beyond its limitations and 
restrictions. They had to learn to use it flexibly and with a certain mental distance.  
This section examines the various elements of international relations training that led to the double 
effect of internalization and transcendence of the friend/enemy framework. It organizes these 
elements around the two lenses of ‘method’ and ‘abroad’.  
Method 
One way in which the simultaneous internalization and transcendence of the Cold War 
friend/enemy framework was achieved can be examined through the lens of ‘method’. Three 
elements played a role here: a temporal distinction over the course of a five-year training between 
‘internalize first, transcend second’; a focus and intensive tutoring around analytical methods and 
skills; open and critical discussions within a strict and structured environment.  
Temporal progression 
A first way of transmitting the delicate balance between internalization and transcendence lay in 
spacing these two elements out temporally. This is how the internatinal relations training at the 
IIB proceeded. The five-year study program had been introduced to the GDR in 1970 in the wake 
of its increased international recognition. Previously, a four-year programme had been in place, 
which in turn had already replaced the shorter training programmes of the GDR’s first years.162 
The first cohort of the new five-year degree started with their studies in 1970 and graduated in 
1975. The five years of study gave the students the occasion to ingest a lot of content: the first two 
years were dedicated to the foundations, the last three years to international relations 
specialization,163 or to put it differently, year one and two were dedicated to the internationalization 
of the Marxist/Leninist framework and outlook on international relations, while years three to five 
were designed to transcend this framework.  
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Year one and year two: “Basics” 
In the first year of their study, students had to focus on three main components: complete their 
compulsory foundational training in Marxist-Leninist theory, start with introductory courses in 
international relations and begin with intensive language training. The compulsory training in M/L, 
Marxism-Leninism, included three courses and made for a total 284 hours of teaching throughout 
the year: ‘Marxist-Leninist philosophy’, ‘History of the German worker’s movement’ and ‘Key 
issues of the international worker’s movement’. Introductory courses in international relations 
included three courses and made for a total of 154 hours of teaching throughout the year: ‘History 
of international relations’, ‘Key issues in international relations theory I’ and ‘Socialist world system 
I.’ Language training, finally, made up the bulk of the teaching with some 390 hours per year.164 
 Year 1: Topics Hours per year Exam 
 1-week introductory seminar: evaluating the documents of 
the VII. SED party convention (1st week of September) 
1 week  
1 Introduction to the methods of scientific study 20  
2 Marxist-Leninist philosophy 128 Yes 
3 History of the German worker’s movement and key issues of 
the international worker’s movement 
100 Yes 
4 Marxist-leninist political economy I 56   
5 History of international relations 78 Yes 
6 Key issues in international relations theory I 46   
7 Socialist world system I 30   
8 Foreign language training 390  
9 Sports 78  
 End of year internship in industrial production 4 weeks  
Table 1 IR Curriculum: IIB 1st year of study 
In the second year, the students finished their compulsory studies in Marxist-Leninist theory. They 
continued taking international relations courses and language training, and started with a 
specialization that would carry through their whole studies. The compulsory training in M/L, 
Marxism-Leninism, included three courses and made for a total of 253 hours of teaching 
throughout the second year: ‘Political economy of capitalism and political economy of socialism’, 
‘Scientific communism’ and ‘Socialist cultural politics’. Courses in international relations included 
four courses and made for a total of 154 hours of teaching throughout the year: ‘Key issues in 
international relations theory II’, ‘Socialist world system II’, ‘GDR foreign policy: strategy and 
tactics I’ and ‘Imperialist countries’. Language training still made up the bulk of the teaching with 
some 438 hours per year. Finally, the specialization training was introduced with 20 hours of class 
and a one-week internship at the IIB respective department.165 
 
 Year 2: Topics Hours per year Exam 
1 Political economy of capitalism and political economy of 
socialism 
92 Yes 
2 Scientific communism 143 Yes 
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3 Socialist cultural politics (evening lectures) 18  
4 Key issues in international relations theory II 10 Yes 
5 Socialist world system II 50  
6 GDR foreign policy: strategy and tactics I 56 Yes 
7 Imperialist countries 48  
 One-week research ‘internship’ at a specialized department of 
the institute to kick off the specialization track 
  
8 Specialization  20  
9 Foreign language training 438  
10 Sports 66  
11 Key aspects of the creation and functioning of the socialist 
state institutions of the GDR (internship preparation) 
10   
 End of year internship: social and political internship in a local 
state institution 
  
Table 2 IR Curriculum: IIB 2nd year of study 
The stated goals for the student’s first two years of training were to empower the students to carry 
out “scientifically grounded”, yet “offensive” debates with imperialist and social-democratic 
positions about the GDR’s foreign policy. In these first two years, this was trained by focusing on 
internationalizing the fundamental tenets of Marxist/Leninist international relations analysis.  
This meant acquiring knowledge about the international class struggle and understanding how 
structure and superstructure affected international relations. Students had to learn how to analyze 
international class power relations and understand the historical place, the role and the 
responsibility of the socialist world system in the global revolutionary process, as well as the role 
of the Soviet Union as a main force in the socialist world system. Students had to learn to use the 
Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism to analyze the development of imperialist countries and of 
the imperialist system, to understand the development of the contradictions immanent to 
imperialism, as well as to understand the economic foreign policy of state-monopole imperialism. 
They were expected to be able to carry out a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the general crisis of 
capitalism and its international system, of the relation between imperialist domestic and foreign 
policy, of the foundations of its anti-socialist tendencies and in particular of its anti-GDR 
orientation.166 Overall, the first two years were meant to solidify the students’ conviction that 
imperialism was “the main enemy of all peoples” and “the main obstacle of any societal progress”; 
the students had to be specifically educated for conscious and active hatred towards the 
exploitative system of capitalism and its aggressive politics.167 
Years three and four: “Practice” 
In the third year, the focus moved onto the acquisition of targeted foreign policy knowledge. Next 
to a Marxist-Leninist colloquium of 28 hours over the course of the year, the training in 
international relations included four courses and made for a total of 234 hours of teaching 
throughout the year: ‘Socialist world system III, ‘Imperialist world system’, ‘GDR foreign policy 
II’ and ‘Developing countries in Africa and Asia I’. Language training made up the bulk of the 
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teaching with some 346 hours per year. Finally, the specialization training continued with the 
implementation of two one-week internships after each term at one of the following departments: 
“Socialist States”, “Capitalist States of Western and Northern Europe”, “Foreign Policy of the 
American States”, or “Core Issues of International Relations”. 168 
 Year 3: Topics Hours per year Exam 
1 Marxist-Leninist colloquium 28  
2 Socialist world system III 54 Yes 
3 Imperialist world system  94 Yes 
4 GDR foreign policy II 38 Yes 
5 Developing countries in Africa and Asia I 48  
6 Foreign language training 346 Yes 
7 Sports 60  
 One-week research ‘internships’ at the institute after 
each term (term 5 & term 6) 
  
 First “short” foreign policy internship 6 weeks  
Table 3 IR Curriculum – IIB 3rd year of study 
In the fourth year, students continued taking international relations courses and language training, 
while continuing training in their area of specialization. Next to a Marxist-Leninist colloquium of 
18 hours over the course of the year, the training in international relations increased to six courses 
and made for a total of 262 hours of teaching throughout the year, with a particular new focus on 
the international legal architecture: ‘Developing countries in Africa and Asia II,’ ‘International 
Law’, ‘International Organizations’, ‘Diplomatic law and consular law’, ‘Protocol’ and 
‘International Economic Law’. Language training, still important, continued with 258 hours of 
teaching per year. Finally, the specialization training increased with 56 hours during the year.169  
 Year 4: Topics Hours per year Exam  
1 Marxist-Leninist colloquia (in particular history of the CPSU) 18  
2 Developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America II 76  Yes 
3 International law 60 Yes  
4 International organizations 60 Oral only 
5 Diplomatic law and consular law  30  
6 Protocol 16  
7 International economic law 20  
8 Foreign language training 258 Yes 
9 Sports 132 (??)  
10 Specialization 56  
 Second “long” foreign policy internship between year 4 and 5  3 months  
Table 4 IR Curriculum, IIB 4th year of study 
In the third and fourth year, the focus lay entirely on international relations and on putting 
knowledge and skills into practice. The official focus was “to consolidate, amplify, and expand 
further scientific insights and political convictions” and “to achieve their implementation into 
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active action and behaviour”. In short, the focus lay on a more practical training, in particular with 
regards to legal knowledge and its application.  
More particularly, students had to learn how to deal with “imperialist strategies and tactics” in the 
practice of international organizations and state relations, and how to closely cooperate with the 
Soviet Union and the other socialist states to thwart those imperialist strategies and tactics. These 
skills and knowledge elements were transmitted and practised in particular by focusing teaching 
around the following core issues: the growing role of the working class, and the strategy and tactics 
of the Marxist-Leninist party in the conquest, consolidation and development of the working class’ 
power. The importance of the close alliance between the socialist states, the role of the 
international working class and the national liberation movement as well as the role of the national 
anti-imperialist liberation movements as an integral part of the revolutionary world process. 
Students had to understand the objective processes in the formation of international organizations, 
and learn to see them as a result of the internationalization of the productive forces operating 
under the conditions of the transition from capitalism to socialism. They had to master the 
Marxist-Leninist approach and assessment of the international conflict between socialism and 
imperialism in the field of universal international organizations; of the development tendencies of 
the political and economic power relations, of the policies of the socialist states in these 
organizations. Students had to acquire a good knowledge of law and understand it as an object and 
instrument of the global class struggle between socialism and imperialism in the field of inter-state 
relations as well as understand it as the result and expression of the progressive change of the 
international power in favour of socialism and see the main contribution of the Soviet Union in 
this development process. Teaching had to transmit the determined struggle of the Soviet Union 
and the states of the socialist community to deepen the “progressive” content of international law 
and thereby make it an ever more effective weapon in the struggle for the consolidation of peace 
and the enforcement of the principles of peaceful coexistence.170  
The increasing focus on practice naturally brought elements of self-reflection with it. Having to 
learn how to deal with “imperialist strategies and tactics” in practice meant getting more and more 
acquainted with the enemy ‘imperialist’ positions. It meant having to engage in debates with that 
other position. Looking at practical contexts involved acknowledging problems and limitations. In 
short, it provided a natural transition between a simple reproduction of the learned content to a 
more flexible and reflective engagement with it.  
Year five: “creative” application 
The fifth and last year of study was organized differently from the previous years. First, the 
teaching year only started in December instead of September, because students had to finish their 
foreign policy summer internship placements. Teaching took place over a period of three months 
from mid-December to mid-March. The rest of the year was dedicated to 10 weeks of “master’s” 
dissertation writing (Diplomarbeit), its defence and the final study exams. With regards to the three 
months of teaching, these were focused on advanced issues and topics.  Next to a Marxist-Leninist 
colloquium of 18 hours and some allocated 40 hours to study recent party documents, 140 hours 
of teaching time were dedicated to advanced issues in international relations, 24 hours of 
                                               
170 Studienjahresprogramm 4. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.  
 57 
specialization training, including research colloquia, and some 112 hours of advanced language 
training.171 
 Year 5: Topics Hours per year Exam  
 Second “long” foreign policy internship between year 4 and 5 3 months  
 Marxist-Leninist colloquia  18  
 Reserved free time to study the party documents  40  
 Key & transversal issues in international relations 52  
 GDR foreign propaganda (“Auslandsinformation”) and cultural 
diplomacy   
50  
 Organization and methods of the diplomatic service  38  
 Foreign language training 112  
 Sports 24  
 Research colloquia 12  
 Specialization 12  
 Writing the master’s thesis (“Diplomarbeit”) Ca.10 weeks  
Table 5 IR Curriculum, IIB 4th year of study 
The official goals for year five were to further enable “the wide and complex application, 
deepening, consolidation and expansion” of acquired knowledge, skills, abilities and class-
conscious behaviours acquired during the course of the whole study. Its goal was for students to 
be able to analyze the fundamentals of the international power relations “in their complexity, 
dynamics, specifics, and current manifestations.” Students had to be further trained in their 
strategic thinking, their tactical abilities in foreign policy and foreign propaganda, and their creative 
ability to practically put all their acquired knowledge and skills to use.  The knowledge and abilities 
for “an offensive, partisan, convincing and flexible presence and demeanour in the ideological 
class struggle” had to be strengthened so that the students would be able to deal “with all variants 
of reactionary, anti-communist and anti-Soviet ideology”.172 In short, by the end of their studies, 
students were expected to “creatively” use their knowledge for a “flexible” engagement in the Cold 
War confrontation.  
Skills 
An important focus of the training at the IIB lay on skills and methods. Marxist/Leninist theory 
was of course the official and primary focus of learning. But in order to achieve that balance 
between simple reproduction and transcendence, analytical skills were seen as crucial.  
This started in year one with a dedicated class transmitting methods of scientific study.173 In this 
course, students were meant to learn how to read and work with books, articles and political 
documents; how to write summaries, note down and quote key text elements; how to prepare a 
class and what to do after a class. Students were also taught methods for working with content: 
how to write a prospective plan, how to structure a presentation and summarize its main points, 
and how to prepare a ‘talking contribution’ with a written note or in free speech. The course taught 
how to use the facilities and the help available on campus such as the library and all the documents 
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available there. Students also learned how to produce a piece of scientific writing: how to write a 
bibliography and reference; understand the function and construction of a content overview, of a 
preface and an introduction, how to build up a personal knowledge database with cards, document 
collections and extracts from texts, as well as how to organize a piece of scientific work. The course 
put these skills into practice by asking the students to write short analyses of historical processes, 
of strategic and tactical party decisions, of Soviet foreign policy documents. 
In year two, students were expected to be able to systematically analyze and use the documents of 
the Soviet party and state leadership as well as other Soviet primary sources. They were expected 
to be able to analyze the social and class structure of countries and analyze statistical materials. 
They had to master scientific methods of collecting materials and learn how to work with the 
document and information collections available at the institute. They had to be able to scientifically 
justify their arguments and reasoning in oral discussions and written work. Finally, they were 
expected to start working with primary source materials in short assignments.174 
In year three, the following skills and abilities had to be practised or newly introduced: the 
systematic evaluation of the documents of the GDR’s party, of the CPSU and of other brother 
state parties. The systematic and purposeful study of Soviet original literature; the theoretical 
analysis of given problems, the scientific assessment of theoretical and current foreign policy issues 
and problems. In terms of methods of analysis, students had to be able to analyze the social and 
class structure of different countries, analyze foreign policy documents; know the distinction 
between strategic and tactical goals, and be proficient in the analysis of statistical materials. 
Students were required to independently solve assigned short-term tasks, be proficient in their use 
of a scientific apparatus (bibliography, references, footnotes, and quotes), the “free” (sic) 
interpretation of specialized foreign policy topics, and work with original language literature in the 
solution of study assignments, depending on areas and languages of specialization.175  
In year four, expectations increased. Students had to develop deeper analytical and prognostic 
thinking. Students were now expected to be able to draw on various forms and methods for 
“independent scientific work” and a “creative application of Marxist-Leninist theories”. In 
particular, they were expected to have the ability to deal “scientifically” with the political-
ideological, economic and legal conceptions of the imperialist states and the differentiated attitude 
of the developing countries and to push through the socialist states’ position. They had to be able 
to develop and defend their assessments of various source materials such as resolutions, 
declarations, documents, and so forth. This was to be developed and trained through practical 
exercises on international law issues and in particular through exercises aimed at training tactical 
methods and thinking agility in dealing with imperialist-revisionist, as well as with Maoist 
interpretations of state relations in a UN work type of setting. Students had to acquire exact 
knowledge of international legal norms and legal methodology, as well as develop basic skills in 
legal thinking and in the application of international, diplomatic and consular law and  international 
commercial law. On a practical level, this had to be trained through learning how to prepare talking 
notes, memoranda, explanations, ‘circulaire’ letters and various other bureaucratic formats. All of 
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this was now to be done by systematically using primary sources in their original language, 
especially in Russian.176 
At the end of year five, the students were expected to have reached high methodological levels of 
analysis and showcase their ‘creativity’ in their final master’s thesis (Diplomarbeit) written in their 
area of specialization. This was evaluated on the basis of the following five criteria. First: has the 
candidate solved the scientific research problem allocated to him or her – if so how, and to what 
degree of quality? Second: What contribution did the candidate make to the department's research 
tasks? Third: What is the level of the candidate’s skills? This included analytical skills, practice-
oriented thinking, the use of Soviet and other foreign-language literature, linguistic expressiveness, 
and the mastering of the norms of independent scientific work. Fourth: How well did the candidate 
‘creatively’ apply Marxist-Leninist knowledge to the solution of his or her research tasks? How 
well does the candidate master the latest developments in this area (party conclusions, speeches by 
leading comrades, etc.)? Fifth: Which political-ideological attitude and dominant character traits 
characterized the candidate in the process of researching and writing the thesis?177 
Throughout the years, these skills were taught and practised through intensive tutoring. Thirty to 
40 students per cohort studied at the IIB, and they were usually divided in two seminar groups of 
around 20 students.178 Given that it was a five-year study programme, some 150 to 200 students 
were usually present at the IIB. With a total number of around 120 academic staff and some 50 
language teachers, the student/staff ratio was excellent. The specialization study in particular 
offered very small group work and intensive tutoring, as the group sizes usually varied between 
two and six students. Because writing assignments were evaluated on the basis of quality, and 
because students were supposed to succeed in their study and ‘get through’, much of the teachers’ 
work and time went onto student coaching and support, making sure they understood the materials 
and turned in their work.179 
The specialization study allocated students to a particular area of specialization corresponding with 
their planned later area of employment, and matched their various internship requirements. In the 
specialization training, students were taught particular content knowledge, but were also 
particularly coached in the methodical skills necessary to perform well. One of the first required 
activities of the specialization training was to write an essay at the end of the semester. This was 
to be the student’s first essay in international relations, as previous ones in year one had been in 
M/L. As such, students were particularly coached for this first exercise. In the specialization area 
“International Organisations” for instance, the essay was meant to train the format of 
“documentation” (Dokumentation), a format required for work at the MfAA. The task was to write 
an essay composed of two parts: an analysis and a collection of relevant documents. Good essays 
would be put to use at the MfAA. The aim was to teach and train a particular format of writing, 
but also to foster familiarity with the type of sources students would need to be familiar with in 
their specialization – in this case UN materials. Students had to learn how to read, assess and 
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analyze UN documents, provide an assessment based on M/L argumentations as well as describe 
the positions of the Soviet Union and other socialist states on that respective issue. Relevant 
sources included UN yearbooks, UN general assembly collections of resolutions, Soviet resolution 
drafts and special statements, GDR MfAA assessments and so forth. Students were coached how 
to do so on a five-step basis. In step one, students had one month to read UN yearbooks and 
other UN primary materials and produce and turn in a descriptive paper summarizing how the 
respective topic allocated to them had been treated, debated and discussed in the security council 
or general assembly. In step two, students had another month to work out a concept paper on 
how to examine and analyze the resolutions and decisions that had been taken by the UN. After 
turning this paper in and receiving feedback, students had another month to carry out a descriptive 
examination of the resolutions and decisions and turn that paper in. After receiving feedback on 
this, students would have another month to write their analysis of the resolution and decisions. 
After turning it in and receiving another round of feedback on it, students had a last month to 
incorporate the feedback, carry out revisions and compile everything into the “documentation.”180  
These various skills were put into practice during the students’ practical placements and 
internships. At the end of each study, students had to complete practical internship placements 
during their summer holidays. At the end of year one, students had to complete a four-week 
internship in industrial production as part of the international student brigades.181 At the end of 
year two, students were sent to complete a social and political internship in a local state 
institution.182 At the end of year three, students were placed at the MfAA or, in some cases, at 
international relations press and media outlets, in order to complete a first ‘short’ foreign policy 
internship of six weeks.183 Finally, at the end of year four, students had to complete a second ‘long’ 
foreign policy internship of three months. This internship took place at the MfAA in the 
department corresponding to their area of specialization and put into practice all the acquired 
skills.184 
Open and critical discussions 
“We approached problems a little bit more openly and clearly than most were used to. That came from our 
training. We had a slightly different view and that was not always easy.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 3) 
Finally, classes themselves were generally open and critical. The curriculum and content were 
officially ‘dogmatic,’ but in the practice of class discussions, many topics were talked about and 
discussed openly and critically. This included the attitude of not assuming anything to be a 
universal truth. Not all classes conveyed this, but many did.185 This was even noticeable in 
Marxism/Leninism classes which they all had to complete in their first two years of study, and 
which were generally more ‘boring.’ These classes were not taught by former diplomats. But even 
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there, due to the special nature of the IIB, the teachers were more interesting and better qualified 
than regular M/L teachers at other institutions as they were assigned experienced activists: 
“We had classic subjects, e.g. ‘History of the labour movement’, which sounds absolutely boring. But it was 
taught by the colleagues Libera and Köstner. The latter had been a member of the 'National Committee Free 
Germany' and had been parachuted out of the Soviet Union into Germany. They were old and had been in 
the Resistance. So, of course, they put on a show in class. They taught normally, but also discussed problems” 
(Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 18-19) 
Almost all the international relations professors had practical experience abroad, having been 
posted as diplomats to various embassies, often for years or decades. This gave them a different 
outlook on things and differentiated them from teachers at other institutions. Many of them used 
irony and humour to convey the limits and tensions between official ideology and practical 
reality.186 This is where the opening story of this chapter fits in. Lutz Kleinwächter and his 
classmates were confronted by the professor’s open acknowledgment that the GDR was not a 
very important player in world politics – a statement that went against their socialization up to that 
point. They had grown up with the idea that the GDR was an important, great and positive force 
in the world. And they had to be convinced of it in order to be chosen for their studies. But now 
they needed to recast that conviction in a new frame, and it was a difficult and challenging process 
for many.   
One important aspect was the reflection on the Soviet Union, including its Stalinist crimes. A topic 
denied and tabooed in the GDR at large, the Stalinist crimes were a difficult topic also approached 
at the IIB:  
“Nowadays you can read about the problems of the Stalinist crimes. But they taught us that. From day one. 
That was a form of teaching that partly shocked us. And made us desperate. Some did not understand it. 
Which created difficulties. [...] The result of this was that during our course of study – if you wanted to – a 
certain distance built up towards this system. Or to the problems of socialism.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 
2019: 18-19) 
This created debates and sometimes also difficulties amongst the students. Some remained caught 
in dogmatic positions and could not deal with this openness. Being unable to process the 
information, they discarded it as falsehood or agitation.187 English language learning was another 
such area of confrontation, as the language classes included exposure to original language 
broadcasters such as the BBC. Some of the more ‘dogmatic’ students, often the ones coming from 
a radical left family background, were uneasy with this, as listening to Western broadcasting was 
not allowed in the GDR: 
“We all listened to the BBC. To learn English, of course. Then some [students] got upset because it was a 
Western broadcaster. The dogmatics. Completely stupid. Because they came from radically left homes. The 
English teacher came in, turned on the BBC and said, ‘Summarize this’. They called in a party meeting and 
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discussed it the whole night. Then the next day someone from the MfAA came, from the party. He said: 
‘Let’s not make this bigger than it is. You need to study a lot, please keep your focus on that.’ So these were 
some of the little conflicts between students.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19-20)  
Overall, the critical openness of the class discussions proved to be an important element in 
manoeuvring the students towards mastering the balance between ‘dogma’ and ‘reflexion’, 
between reproduction and transcendence of the official ideology. The effect and impact of these 
methods were different from student to student, of course, and the student body was distributed 
on a spectrum from the more ‘dogmatic’ to the more ‘critical’, though the differences were not 
necessarily always clear-cut. Positions and views differed from topic to topic, from issue to issue. 
But overall a sense of solidarity and community around the common task of representing the GDR 
as diplomats and foreign policy experts prevailed.188  
Abroad 
While a focus on method proved to be an important component in training the practical and 
academic foreign policy experts of the GDR, the orientation, contact and exposure to ‘abroad’ 
proved to be another crucial element. This happened through the study focus on other countries 
and areas, in particular in the field of area studies, as well as through contact with foreign sources 
and actual travel and exposure to foreigners and foreign places.  
Regional specializations: knowing the world  
One important part of the GDR’s system of foreign policy education lay in its expert regional 
specialization. Unlike the West German diplomatic system, which recruited and trained generalists, 
GDR diplomats and most foreign policy experts were specialists with strong language skills and 
area specialization.  Diplomats who spoke the regional languages did not need translators and were 
able to connect better with their local partners as well as provide better regional analysis.189 This 
was implemented in the GDR by hiring diplomats not only from amongst the IIB graduates, but 
also from amongst area studies students and from amongst the East German international 
relations graduates from the IMEMO in Moscow.   
In the GDR, specialized regional knowledges were taught at the IIB but also at the area studies 
faculties of the universities in Berlin, Leipzig and Rostock. At the universities, area studies students 
fully studied the language, country and region in question. A big emphasis lay on language 
acquisition, and the levels of language fluency at the end were very high.190 Thomas Ruttig, for 
example, completed a five-year degree in Afghanistan studies and was fluent in Dari and Pashto 
by the end of his degree, which also included a half-year stay in Afghanistan. Students in the area 
studies departments were taught in very small groups and tutored intensively. In his Afghanistan 
studies degree, for example, Thomas Ruttig sat in a cohort of seven.191 The GDR had excellent 
contacts with national liberation movements all across the world, and these political connections 
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also led to an offering in many niche languages and specializations.192 Regional studies, however, 
did not include any general international relations training, which was transmitted at the IIB and 
the IMEMO.  
Every year, the students selected for a study in international relations had to be divided between 
those going to the IIB in Potsdam and those going to the IMEMO in Moscow. In order to do 
this, first-year students had to take an intensive, multi-months-long Russian language course. 
Those who were good at language learning and performed well at the tests were subsequently sent 
for their studies to Moscow to the IMEMO. There they would specialize in a difficult or rare 
language, while those with poorer language skills were sent to the IIB with a specialization in 
European languages. 193 The IIB taught Russian, English, French, Spanish and Arabic; the IMEMO 
offered studies in almost every official language of the world. Around half of a year’s student 
recruits were sent to the IMEMO, and the other half to the IIB.194 The choice of language 
determined the area specialization, choosing Spanish for instance led to a specialization in Spain 
or Latin American countries.195  
At the IMEMO, foreign policy experts were trained with a stronger regional focus than at the IIB. 
About half the study time was dedicated to language learning, the other half to subjects such as 
history of international relations, contemporary history, history of the Soviet Foreign Policy, 
political economy, philosophy, global economic and financial relations as well as the history of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. The study also included specialized historical and cultural training 
both about the area and the specific country under study.196 Language levels at the end of the study 
were very high; students were generally fluent in their language of choice, whether Chinese, 
Japanese, Vietnamese and so forth.197  
At the IIB, the primary focus lay on international relations, but each student was allocated a 
specialization, and language training was an important part of education. The specialization 
training allocated each student to a special area of focus determining their later job postings. The 
specialized area of focus thus allocated each student to a research department at the IIB, a later 
department at the MfAA or in certain cases at the press and media agencies, as well as a specific 
language training combination. Specializations existed in the following areas: socialist states, 
security/disarmament, international organizations, international law, Arab States, the US, Latin 
America, consular and diplomatic law, and “foreign information” (Auslandsinformation), the latter 
of which directed students to press and media postings.198  
The MfAA was involved in the selection of students, their work placements and trajectories. 
Students were put on specific thematic and functional pathways, though things did not always go 
as planned. While studying in Moscow to become a GDR diplomat, Wolfram Wallraf, for example, 
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married a ‘Soviet citizen’. This was an act of insubordination; diplomats were not supposed to 
marry foreigners. Wallraf was demoted and set on the path of becoming a scholar instead.199 After 
his studies at the IIB, Lutz Kleinwächter was sent to start his career at the MfAA, first at the US 
department, then at the UN department. However, he quickly ran into trouble and was ‘punished’ 
and sent back to the IIB to do a PhD before being allowed to return to the ministry.200  
The specialization training started in year two and comprised targeted classes regrouping all the 
students of a speciality, usually two to six students per area. It also required students to start writing 
essays every year in their specialization area and receive special coaching on this, particularly also 
on how to find and use primary sources. This culminated in their having to write their “master’s 
thesis” (Diplomarbeit) on a topic from their specialization. Additionally, the specialization 
determined placement in the IIB internal research internships and the policy internship placements 
at the MfAA, during which, in turn, they also had to collect information for the completion of 
their “master’s thesis”.201 
In the specialization course on ‘Arab States’, for example, the advanced fourth-year classes 
included the discussion of the following topics: how the Middle East problems were being dealt 
with at the UN, the positions of the various Arab states on how to solve the Middle Eastern 
conflict, the role of natural resources and economic independence in the conflicts, the current 
problems faced by national liberation movements in the Middle East, and the role of the North-
African Arab states in the relations with Africa.202 In the specialization course on ‘Latin America’, 
for example, the advanced fourth-year classes included the discussion of the following topics: the 
current state of relations between the GDR and Latin American states, contemporary problems in 
Latin America, the different communist parties,  resources and economic independence from 
imperialist states, ideological currents in Latin America, national liberation movements, China’s 
strategy and tactics in Latin America.203 Overall, these strong specializations meant that each 
diplomat, researcher and foreign policy expert had a unique profile and quasi-monopoly in their 
specialization.204 It also meant that they had all been intensively exposed to other cultures, other 
political, cultural and economic systems, different histories and mentalities. This gave a basis for 
comparison, which, in turn, provided perspective and distance to one’s own system.  
Western sources 
Another type of exposure to ‘abroad’ was through the use of Western sources. At the IIB, most 
courses were based on the familiarization with and use of primary sources, including Western ones 
where relevant. For example, session 20 of the course ‘Imperialist countries’ on United Kingdom 
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was based on the examination of the following six primary sources:205 an extract of a declaration 
of prime minister Harold Wilson from 1967, an extract of a British-Italian declaration from 1969, 
an extract of a declaration of prime minister Edward Heath from 24.05.1971, an extract from the 
British government’s white book on “the UK and the European Communities” from 1971, an 
extract from an interview with the British foreign secretary Alec Douglas-Home published in the 
West German venue “Der Spiegel”, and an extract from the speech of prime minister Edward 
Heath in front of the national press club in Washington in 1973.  
Western sources were sometimes also used as study material. As Thomas Ruttig at the HU for 
instance later found out, much of his study materials on Afghanistan had been based on West 
German sources. In the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan had been an important partner of FRG 
development cooperation and in the wake of these connections, much sociological and 
anthropological research had been carried out.  Lesson plans had been based on a mix of Marxist 
and Western sources on Afghanistan.206 The lens of Marxism had both positive and negative 
aspects, as it gave some interesting analytical tools but also restricted the possibilities of talking 
about certain things, though the small circle of 7 students allowed for a certain degree of freedom 
of discussion.207 
Another type of exposure to Western sources lay in learning about Western ‘bourgeois’ theories 
of international relations. At the IIB, this was covered in the course “theoretical problems of 
international relations”. The course elaborated on the main branches of ‘bourgeois’ international 
relations theory and how to critique them, and looked in particular at its strategic components and 
its influence on Western strategies. The focus lay on training and sharpening the ability to critique 
the theoretical and ideological foundations of ‘imperialist strategies’ and the ability to critique its 
philosophical and political sources.208 While this was part of the teaching curriculum, it did not 
actually play any prominent role in most people’s later research and specialization. Because of their 
overall strong practical focus, knowledge production did not have to engage in theoretical debates 
with Western models on a regular basis.209 But academic debates were certainly carried out around 
theoretical issues. For instance: did growing regional cooperation necessarily lead to an increase of 
regulation and formalized interaction? Were the premises of functionalism correct? Various 
researchers at the IIB had different views on issues such as these, and informal discussions were 
carried out around these points.210 
Going abroad 
Finally, an important manner of contact with the world ‘abroad’ was through actual trips and stays 
abroad. These allowed some freedom and contact with different people. This included long-term 
study placements such as the five-year studies at the IMEMO in Moscow, summer internships in 
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the Soviet Union, research stays at local universities, conference attendance and job placements at 
various embassies. Going abroad gave a more critical perspective, an outsider’s look into the 
GDR211  
One of the most confronting experiences lay in travelling to the Soviet Union for the first time. 
Studying at the IIB involved completing an internship every year during the summer vacations, 
and one of these internships took place in the Soviet Union. The trips were organized in a small 
group format and regularly triggered heightened discussions, due to the unsettling nature of the 
trip. The IIB students had been chosen for their studies by the youth organization FDJ and the 
SED on the basis of their positive attitude towards the system, as demonstrated by their family 
background, learning performance, general development over the years and behaviour in the FDJ 
youth groups. This included all types of students, from the highly intelligent, reflective and critical 
to narrow-minded radicals and extremists.212 Students all had to have a positive relation to the 
GDR, but beyond that, they all came with their individual biographies.213  
When travelling to the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s from the GDR for the first time, the 
confrontation with its reality was shocking to many because it contrasted so strongly with the 
image propagated in the GDR Depending on their background and horizon, this affected students 
differently.214 Some were better prepared than others to stomach this, but for a number of students, 
this was the total collapse of everything they knew and believed in. As a result of this experience, 
every year a handful of students either left their studies voluntarily or were reallocated to another 
study. Others became more cynical and others, still, turned more radical in their convictions and 
support for the system.215 
Other experiences were perhaps less confronting, but did provide important changes of 
perspectives. Studying at the IMEMO in Moscow for instance enabled a different view on the ‘real 
socialism’, its nature and its limits, good and bad.216 Up into the 1980s, foreign students at the 
IMEMO studied in the same classes as their Soviet counterparts. This enabled insight into Soviet 
foreign policy thinking, as things were discussed and debated with much more openness than back 
home in the GDR The secret agreements of the Hitler-Stalin pact, still a taboo in the GDR, were 
discussed openly in Moscow. Professors, who often had practical diplomatic experience, talked 
openly about the Soviet Union’s concrete interests in various foreign policy issues:  
“They did not mince their words. That was the inner circle, there was no more ideology or propaganda. […] 
I can remember Professor Mirsky’s lectures on the Middle East and the Palestine question, how he was 
weighing the various options for action. Professor Petroff taught Japanese foreign policy and also thought out 
loud about how to solve the Kuril problem. It would have been inconceivable in the GDR to simply discuss 
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such internal matters with students, but they had no problem with it. A great power is simply much more 
self-confident than a small country.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 25-26) 
Thomas Ruttig, the Afghanistan specialist, spent a half-year in Kabul studying at the local 
university and living in the student halls with other Afghan students. In their first meeting with 
the GDR ambassador, the ambassador showed him and his classmates a map of the city in which 
all the forbidden areas had been crossed out in red. Their allocated student hall, however, was 
located right in the middle of such a red-crossed zone. They decided to interpret this as indirect 
and unofficial permission to go wherever they pleased and chose to roam free around Kabul.217 
Half of their days were spent at the university. For the rest of the time, they had been tasked with 
the collection of materials for their Masters’ theses (Diplomarbeit), which meant a lot of time spent 
in the general library. Thomas Ruttig had picked a topic on Afghanistan’s opposition movements 
in the 1940s and 1950s, a topic chosen because it opened the possibility to study opposition 
movements, a topic otherwise difficult in the GDR. Over time, he made good contacts and came 
in touch with various figures of the opposition sitting out an internal exile at the academy of 
sciences. They passed on many documents and primary sources, and Thomas Ruttig was able to 
write a thorough study on his chosen topic.218  
Conferences were another manner of travelling abroad. The amount of freedom differed according 
to the topic and the country of destination. When travelling to London to an IISS conference on 
European security, special directives specified one’s radius of action: did one just present a pre-
prepared paper, or did one have to engage in the conversations? Were there special topics and 
approaches that one had to bring into the conversation? Was one allowed to make comments 
about one’s institute of origin? Could one contact or communicate with Western press or media 
outlets? All these points and questions were determined beforehand.219 Other conferences were 
less high-stakes. As a Japan expert, for instance, Wolfram Wallraf was able to travel to Moscow 
and freely debate with colleagues at conferences about their East Asia themed papers. For 
something like this, there was no need to get pre-approval for his contributions. Ongoing topics 
at these conferences included whether or not Japan would become a military power again and how 
to solve the Kuril Islands dispute. Leaning towards one side of the argument or the other in the 
context of such a conference was irrelevant for the GDR, and so Wolfram Wallraf had a lot of 
freedom in this context.220 
Overall, knowing the realities of other places, studying them and travelling there gave most 
researchers a more flexible and creative outlook on the reality of their own system and helped 
most of them achieve that balance between ‘dogma’ and ‘reflection’. Having this orientation, 
though, made many international relations experts suspicious to others who were not. The 
scientists at the Academy for Statecraft and Law (the DASR), which the GDR was formally 
attached to, always saw the IIB with suspicion, precisely because their gaze was oriented away from 
the GDR221 Accordingly, all its institutions, including the IIB, also stood under surveillance by the 
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Stasi and the KGB.222 And coming back home with a wider understanding of things meant that 
one had to navigate the political waters at home carefully.223  
Science as a resource: Studying the enemy 
A second way of looking at the various different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR 
knowledge production about international relations is through the lens of instrumentality. Beyond 
its constitutive role in ‘making’ experts, international relations knowledge production was also 
valuable as a resource, in particular when it came to studying the enemy. Engaging with and 
understanding the other side of the friend/enemy distinction, proved to be both a valuable 
resource for political decision-making, but at the same time also a centrifugal force of 
differentiation: realizing that the enemy was not so different from oneself led to a questioning of 
central Cold War ideology. 
The IPW, the Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft in Berlin, was the institution dedicated 
to studying the enemy. It was primarily a research institution, and students joined to do their PhDs 
there after having completed their studies elsewhere, often at the IIB, the IMEMO or in other 
disciplines at the universities. The IPW was divided into three parts dedicated to the study of 
economy, international relations and ideology respectively. This was a result of its creation in 1971, 
whereby three formerly independent institutions had been put together. It comprised 400 staff 
members, of which around 150 were researchers.224 In the economic sections of the IPW, some 
focus of analysis also lay on capitalist development countries, but the institute’s main purchase was 
the FRG, the US, international organizations such as NATO or the EU and then, to a lesser degree 
of importance, the UK, France and Japan.225 The IPW’s task was to analyze Western countries, 
monitor changes and developments and study their decision-making processes as far as it was 
accessible in public sources.226 Their task was also to present the results of their analyses in such a 
way that they would be usable and useful. 227 Until the beginning of the 1980s this also had to be 
presented in a framework that was ideologically determined, namely within the framework of the 
idea that ‘imperialism’, thereby meaning ‘the West’, was intrinsically incapable of peace and had to 
be forced to be peaceful by a coalition of Western leftist and other peace-oriented forces in the 
world to be peaceful.228  
‘Studying the enemy’ was not only the task of the IPW, though. It included research on specific 
Western countries, but also the study of general security themes such as issues of armament, 
disarmament and the arms race. The MfAA had a UN department as well as a department on 
“fundamental issues” (Grundfragen), which covered security topics, similar to the ministry of 
defence department on “fundamental issues”.229 This expertise was mirrored at the IIB. In their 
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department, “fundamental issues” researchers studied military questions, American foreign policy, 
investigated Reagan’s “Star-Wars” programme and so forth.230  
Sources 
‘Studying the enemy’ was premised on the ability to actually ‘study’ the enemy. This meant full 
access to Western sources was needed, and both institutions provided these. At the IPW, all 
Western political science and security politics journals such as Foreign Policy as well as many West 
German publications on the topic were available.231 The IPW also had extensive contact with 
Western institutions. IPW researchers regularly went on research trips to West Germany and 
visited in particular the ISFH research institute in Hamburg and the HSFK research institute in 
Frankfurt. They also met with the political research think tanks of the left, and of the conservative 
spectrum, as well as with politicians of different convictions. All of this was done with the aim to 
understand the other side, understand their problems and their expectations of the GDR232   
The underlying idea was that more than 95% of what one could know or needed to know about 
the other side was publicly accessible. This is why the IPW’s focus was to assemble and analyze all 
those publicly available sources, including through the personal contacts with Western partners.233 
The rest of the information was provided by the HVA, the GDR’s secret service, and materials 
from both sides of enquiry came together at the office of director Max Schmidt.234  
The situation was comparable at the IIB and at the military institutions, minus the personal 
contacts abroad, which were a prerogative of the IPW.235 Researchers at the IIB had everything 
they needed at their disposition. They could take out any Western books they wanted, though the 
daily Western newspapers had to be consulted at the library.236 Additionally, they also had sources 
from the foreign office and all the local embassies at their disposition.237 
Output 
The output of research found its way into a mix of internal reports, including travel reports and 
internal studies for the central committee, and for the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign 
trade, as well as external publications and public talks.238 Internal studies and external publications 
differed. Before becoming the assistant to the IPW’s director, for example, Wolfgang Schwarz had 
been an expert on NATO affairs. NATO organized meetings twice a year in the spring and in the 
fall. Meetings took place from Friday evening to Saturday noon and communiques were released 
at the end of their meetings. Wolfgang Schwarz picked those communiques up at ADN, the 
GDR’s state news agency and had to deliver an internal summary and analysis by Monday morning. 
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The international information went to the central committee and on the basis of that information, 
Wolfgang Schwarz would then write up a longer study meant for external publication a month 
later in the IPW-Berichte, the journal published by the IPW. But not everything of the internal 
communication was made public; he had received instructions as what to keep and what to cut 
out.239  
SED party conferences in particular required a lot of internal studies, and every trip to the West 
had to be thoroughly documented, and analyzed, with the travel report promptly filed in one day 
upon return.240 External publications included regular publications in IPW-Berichte, the monthly 
journal, as well as in IPW-Vierteljahresberichte, the journal that came out four times per year. Next 
to this, researchers had to regularly participate in book publications, edited volumes, and 
conference contributions. Public talks were required on a regular basis, whereby each researcher 
had to go and give talks all throughout the GDR to the employees of factories and other economic 
institutions, such as power plants, constructions sites and so forth. Sometimes IPW employees 
would be sent to assist in international political negotiations and contribute to the respective 
working groups.241 
At the IIB, internal studies also tended to be written in very open and explicit ways, and certainly 
so in the departments concerned with ‘studying the enemy’ which were the “Western Europe & 
Japan” departments as well as the department concerned with “fundamental issues” (Grundfragen). 
There, internal memos and studies were not censored. The analyses of specific power relations, 
power constellations and current situations were written in a straightforward way. They would 
never be published and did receive a secrecy classification.242 These studies then went on to the 
international liaison department at the central committee, as well as to the MfAA and the defence 
ministry, as well as sometimes to the secret services.243 While not getting published, these internal 
studies were often the basis for later articles or other external publications, after some editing and 
re-writing.244 In other cases, though, the difference between internal and external output did not 
vary much.245 In short, researchers were required to move and operate in many different output 
fields and straddle all their various requirements.246  
Freedom of analysis 
Being officially commissioned to study capitalism and imperialism, the researchers doing so had a 
certain weight and influence on decision-making processes. But in order to provide good analysis, 
they could not afford to have ideological blinders, which gave them a certain degree of freedom 
in their research and in their writing.247 Rigorous scientific work was expected at the IPW, whose 
main task was to analyze Western sources and monitor ‘the enemy’. Researchers there had to learn 
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how to examine sources minutely, determine how important or unimportant they were and look 
at them without ideological prejudice:  
“[My director] didn’t tell this to me directly, that would not have been possible, but indirectly, so to speak. 
He taught me to keep my ideological blinders in the drawer wherever possible. If I already know in advance: 
everything in the West is evil anyway – to put it simply – then I don’t need to examine it. Then I already 
know everything and only need to scout for bits and pieces that fit this scheme.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 
9) 
The freedom of thought and research extended to the younger researchers, who had a lot of leeway 
to experiment with ideas and accordingly received protection from the director.248 Independently 
of any official restrictions, though, researchers were of course never fully ‘objective’ in the sense 
that their writings all reflected personal history, experience, education and tradition.249  
The leeway and freedom of analysis always stood in a relation of tension with official narratives, 
and between researchers’ orientations. Divisions within the IPW existed between the ‘ideological’ 
economy and ideology departments and the somewhat more ‘liberal’ international relations 
department, though each of these departments were also internally divided between those in 
favour of cooperation and those in favour of confrontation with the West.250 However, the IPW’s 
director from 1973 to 1990, Max Schmidt, was an important protagonist of the ‘new thinking’ in 
the GDR and in its public media. This influenced the mood and orientation of the whole 
institute,251 despite the underlying tension between those who saw the IPW function in supporting 
the party and those who saw it in providing independent analysis.252 
Research about ‘the enemy’ was overall valued and well received. At the MfAA, for instance, IIB 
research on armament and disarmament was appreciated and drawn on. Research on Western 
Europe and West Germany was also received well, in contrast to the studies and memos authored 
by the researchers studying ‘socialism’ in neighbouring states. These did not generate much interest 
and were largely ignored by the political practice.253 
Knowing the class enemy, transcending the boundary 
As we have seen in the previous section, the foreign policy experts were much more experienced 
than other researchers due to their contact and orientation with the world beyond the GDR’s 
borders. They had seen, met and talked to the ‘class enemy’ and found that they were human too. 
The ‘enemy’ looked at things from a diametrically opposite perspective, but they did think about 
the same problems in the same rational and sensible manner. This triggered a process of 
differentiation in the GDR, whereby those who had had the international experience of getting 
acquainted with the reality of the opponent, developed a more nuanced relation with the official 
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ideology and started thinking about reform alternatives.254 This included having to understand how 
to communicate with the other side. Talking about peaceful coexistence, even when meant literally 
and seriously, signalled to the West an aggressive communist intention. Using the Western terms 
antagonistic cooperation, however, signalled to the West a real intention of acting peacefully.255  
As such, the Cold War dynamics split politicians and researchers into pro-cooperation and pro-
confrontation advocates. The latter were particularly upset at the former, because cooperation 
made it harder to uphold the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology:  
“Our anti-capitalist hardliners cursed us: ‘You are destroying our ideology, we cannot cooperate with these 
imperialists.’ This was more or less how they put it, and we had to convince them by saying: ‘Don’t be crazy, 
this way of proceeding actually divides people over there. And it divides in a real, not an artificial way, it 
divides them into Cold War hardliners and those who want a security partnership” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 
5-6)  
As Siegfried Fischer highlights, the Cold War dynamics not only split East German researchers 
and politicians into two camps, they also did the same with the other side. Studying the enemy 
thus triggered a process on both sides of the divide whereby the involved were forced to go beyond 
their horizon of knowledge and understanding. Engaging with the ‘other’ side gave them 
perspective and distance towards their own.  
Science as a performance: Enacting the global alliances 
A third way of looking at the different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR 
international relations knowledge production is through the lens of performativity. Beyond its 
constitutive role in ‘making’ experts and its instrumental role in providing knowledge and 
information to decision-makers, GDR international relations knowledge production also played a 
performative role, both by inscribing the GDR into its wider system of alliances and by 
demonstrating the GDR’s currency as a knowledge producer.  
Unwelcome science 
 “The Soviet Union, the GDR and later the Federal Republic – it is of course not 100% the same – all 
shared the same tendency not to listen to scientists. Because they are too complicated, they have to explain 
everything down to the smallest detail, and  you often don't get any specific recommendations. ‘Do it this way, 
do it that way:’ they always say that you also have to consider this and that. And they cannot handle this on 
the diplomatic political level. That is system-independent, the GDR was deeply anti-science when it came to 
social sciences and results contradicted ideology (in internal discussion it was occasionally more open). The 
same is, I would say, to 90% also true in the political reality of the Federal Republic of Germany, as I have 
experienced it.” (Interview Ruttig, 2019: 22)  
In general, the GDR did not really value research and science as a guideline for politics. 
Researchers and academics were too lengthy, too complicated, did not give clear instructions for 
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action. The practical experts of international relations at the MfAA used three main sources of 
international relations ‘knowledge’ instead: the knowledge basis acquired during their studies, the 
internal analyses circulating within the ministry and compiled from the country reports sent in by 
the respective embassies, and the daily press news, which included the illegal use of Western 
sources such as DPA and Reuters.256  
As we have seen in the previous section, some areas of research were relevant for the political 
practice, especially when they provided insight and knowledge about the Cold War enemy. There, 
science and research had instrumental value for politics as a resource. Many other areas of enquiry, 
though, were not relevant to political practice. After delivering studies about these topics to the 
MfAA, one did not generally get feedback, especially not positive.257 The staff there generally 
considered themselves to be the ‘smarter’ ones258 and they certainly were the better-informed ones, 
having updates about the latest news at all times.259 In these ‘irrelevant’ areas of enquiry, the relation 
with the MfAA was not generally a very stimulating or fruitful one. While personal sympathies and 
friendships did exist, MfAA employees did not, as a general rule of thumb, regard the IIB 
researchers very highly, and the other way around.260 The MfAA treated IIB staff with distance; 
they were not allowed to come and go at the ministry as they pleased. When coming for a meeting 
all the way from Potsdam, they were treated as visitors and had to wait in the lobby to be picked 
up.261 They were disparagingly seen as ‘academics’ writing ‘academic’ papers with little practicable 
use.262  
But regardless of its actual importance for political decision-making, scientific practice had to be 
justified by its practical use for politics. As such the IIB heads of department had to go to the 
MfAA regularly and report. Yearly research plans had been drafted and they had to account for 
the research done to meet the plan: 263  
“I was regularly at the MfAA – at least once a month – and talked to people and was also invited to 
meetings and to present our work. Once a year the moment came when it would be decided which topics our 
colleagues in the MfAA wanted us to work on in the next year. Most of the time, these meetings were not 
particularly well prepared, and it was decided quite spontaneously which topics should be researched in the 
coming year. That is then what became the plan. When the work was finished, nobody could really remember 
why this particular topic had been commissioned.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 8)  
As the quote above shows, research in the areas without clear political relevance was not taken too 
seriously by the MfAA. It was something that needed to be done, something one had to have a 
plan for, commission and then hear back from. Despite its lack of direct relevance, it was a practice 
that needed to be kept up and everyone needed to play their part, because research was formally a 
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part of the system.264 In these areas, research would not necessarily be commissioned for a specific 
instrumental information need, but because of certain events like an anniversary or an important 
political visit that required the existence of a publication.265   
Allegiance to the Soviet Union: Dependent and Independent Areas of Enquiry 
Within this type of research done for the sake of research and for the sake of having publications, 
much leeway was possible in principle. However, the degree of independence in these areas of 
knowledge production stood in direct relation to the GDR’s, and hence the Soviet Union’s, 
geopolitical interests. The closer to the Soviet Union’s interest, the more dependent the research, 
the further from its interest, the more independent its research.   
“The relationship between research and politics was multifaceted and ambivalent. A simplified formula could 
be: the less strategic-political relevance for the Soviet Union, the freer the research. When researching areas of 
high political relevance, such as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union – what kind of research could we do 
there? We wrote about their (official) activities and reproduced their statements. […] In the department on 
Western Europe, [research] leaned in the other direction, it became more solid, more professional. Solid 
analyses were required in this domain: We wanted to know what was really going on.” (Interview Krämer, 
2019b: 3,6)   
In that sense, GDR research also performed its alliance with the Soviet Union by aligning 
knowledge production into the fold of its allies’ interest.  
At the end of the dependence spectrum was research on the Soviet Union. Here publications on 
its foreign policy were limited to a rendition of facts about its activities and declarations.266 Next 
in line were the other allied socialist countries. Here, research followed alliance politics, and 
nothing critical was published. Researchers of socialist countries were not taken very seriously by 
their other colleagues. While they knew a lot and had good internal analysis, their publications only 
featured what the political sphere wanted to hear or already knew.267 Closely related developing 
countries on a ‘socialist’ path of development could not be written about freely. Bilateral treaties 
with the GDR had been signed, and in cases such as these it became important to demonstrate 
that the respective countries were on the right path to socialism. Factors such as ethnicity were 
discarded in favour of class relations.268 Cuba was another such example. Following the MfAA’s 
classification, Cuba, Mozambique and Angola were categorized as ‘socialist’, not ‘developing’ 
countries and thus studied in the department for socialism research.269 Cuba was a problem for 
enquiry: the Cuban revolution did not confirm to the communist model. So, the area specialists 
for Latin America had to straddle the tension between Cuban reality and communist orthodoxy.270  
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China was a different case. Because of the break with China, and the subsequent enmity between 
the GDR/Soviet Union and China, research had to focus on China’s political action in developing 
countries so as to prove its negative impact. As such, this impacted the choice of research topics, 
including also the discontinuance of previously begun research. In one case at least, a PhD 
dissertation on China had to be interrupted, because this was not wanted anymore by the Soviet 
Union.271  
Research on ‘developing’ countries sat somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, varying 
according to the country and current situation. Work on Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico was more 
constrained, whereas work on Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia was freer: 272  
“In Argentina, the militaries could not be criticized if they had just signed a trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union for deliveries of wheat. Wheat was the Soviet Union’s big problem. In Chile, on the other hand, you 
could criticize the military. There were good reasons for it.” (Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3) 
On the other side of the spectrum lay the research that was of no interest to either the MfAA or 
central committee and that one could call “l’art pour l’art“,273 i.e. research done for its own sake 
without practical relevance, as was Raimund Krämer’s 20-page study on the border conflict 
between Ecuador and Peru. In these cases, one did have to conform to the political framework on 
a very broad level, but the actual research and analysis could go in whichever direction the 
researcher thought appropriate.274  
Western countries of lesser importance to the GDR and to the Soviet Union could also be analyzed 
with a greater degree of freedom. On a political level, it did not matter too much whether one 
evaluated current political development in France one way or another.275 Japan was another case 
where research was relatively free and could be solid, as long as one stayed clear of the Kuril 
Islands problem. People really wanted to know what was happening in Japan, and so proper 
research was possible.276 The question about Japan’s fast rise to modernity, for example, could be 
dealt with quite freely. One had to quote the general secretaries of the SED and of the CPSU in 
the introduction, but in the main part of the publication one did not have to reference it 
anymore.277 Scholarship about Japan did not revolve around ideological debates, but more around 
theoretical schools or empirical puzzles: in the 1970s, for example, Japan’s economic rise was 
explained by the interconnections between the economic, politic and bureaucratic tops and the 
strong state guidance – as described by Chalmers Johnson’s “MITI and the Japanese Miracle”. But 
in the 1980s, the neoliberal wave with Milton Friedman brought forward a different, radically 
opposite explanation for Japanese growth: the Japanese industry made it to success not because 
of, but despite state bureaucratic control. These were the debates and they were free of East/West 
ideological polemic.278 One of Wallraf’s last research projects revolved around Japanese parties and 
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investigated the various explanatory factors behind their fluctuating nature. Hypotheses involved 
the electoral, system, political culture, and so forth, but not ideological East/West divisions.279    
Global alliance system 
The Cold War’s antagonistic logic led to the formation of hierarchical alliances on both sides of 
the conflict. These constellations of alliances were “very diverse, asymmetrical, and yet to a certain 
extent mirroring each other.” 280 The GDR cultivated close ties with national liberation movements 
across the globe and pursued alliance relations with many newly independent countries in Asia and 
Africa. International relations expertise played a role in performing and upholding this alliance 
system. Just as research and teaching played a role in enacting the GDR’s allegiance to the Soviet 
Union – by sending students to be trained in Moscow and by respecting its geopolitical interest in 
publication outlets – it also played a role in enacting the GDR’s alliances with ‘Third World’ 
countries.  
In particular, the GDR offered training programmes for foreign diplomats. These had ostensive 
instrumental value, as they directly contributed to the knowledge and skills of foreign diplomats. 
But they also had a strong symbolic value: in carrying out these training programmes, the GDR 
was enacting its alliance loyalties. Teaching both locally and in Potsdam, training took place in 
particular with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Democratic Kampuchea, and with the 
People’s Republics of Angola, Yemen, Benin, Mozambique and Congo.281 This gave IIB 
researchers the opportunity to confront other perspectives and opinions from within Potsdam,282 
though contact remained limited beyond the few teaching hours.283 
Most of these training programmes took place in Potsdam for the duration of a few weeks to a 
few months, on a one-off or yearly recurring basis. The cooperation with Mozambique was an 
exception to this, however. With a duration of twelve years until 1989 and an average of three IIB 
staff members posted in Maputo, this was an exceptional project of support in comparison to the 
other, shorter training programmes offered. The GDR had been supporting Mozambique’s 
national liberation movement FRELIMO for a long time before Mozambique became 
independent of Portugal and the FELIMO took over the government. Extensive bilateral treaties 
ensued, with the GDR sending material support for Mozambique’s socialist development.284 
Amongst many other cooperation projects, the GDR also agreed to support Mozambique in 
training the diplomats it now direly needed as a newly independent country. The IIB was tasked 
with training Mozambican diplomats in Maputo and help establish a centre of international 
relations for this purpose.  
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In 1978, Günther Thole left for Mozambique with the task of helping build up its diplomatic 
training facility – the future ISRI Maputo. In doing so, his task was to teach international relations 
to Mozambican students – a mix of young school graduates and experienced political actors – so 
that they could become diplomats and act as multipliers building their own diplomatic training 
facility. At the beginning, there were many problems. Thole did not speak Portuguese well, there 
were no translators available, and the new Mozambican government could barely find enough 
candidates to spare for training. The differences between the students were enormous: unlike those 
who could be spared from ministry and government work, those who just graduated from high 
school had not much previous methodical skills or training, nor much knowledge about current 
international political processes. Thole’s teaching concentrated on delivering two courses: one on 
Marxist/Leninist core knowledge about world revolutionary processes and one on contemporary 
problems in international relations. He also introduced a weekly press review to keep up with the 
international news, and this proved a popular teaching tool. His Mozambiquan partners were 
particularly interested in what he had to say about the problems of African countries, about China, 
and about the people’s rights for self-determination. Thole was careful in what he said and how 
he said it.285 In his report back home, he wrote: 
“I choose my words carefully, make sure the translations are done with exactitude, and I do not mention 
anything that could point to diverging views and interpretations between the GDR and PRM. I coordinated 
with comrade Ipolito how we are going to deal with China in the training sessions (presentation of objective 
facts, no ideological engagement with Maoism).”286 
He also paid attention not to accept teaching any practical and ‘apolitical’ courses, such as 
diplomatic and consular practice. To his Mozambican partners he argued that an experienced 
practitioner would be a better teacher. The real reason, though, lay in wanting control over all the 
courses of a more ‘political’ nature, so that he could explain and present the Marxist/Leninist 
position as well as the positions of the socialist countries on that specific issue.287  
In 1979 he was joined by another colleague, and by 1980 a rotating team of around three IIB 
researchers would be permanently posted in Maputo until 1989. While being one of the few 
foreigners in Maputo in 1978, with the exception of a Swedish advisor who was “not a reactionary, 
not a full reactionary,” 288 the presence of foreigners from all parts of the world trying to influence 
the development of Mozambique increased every year. Over time, the political situation in 
Mozambique also deteriorated. After becoming independent from Portugal, the Mozambican 
FRELIMO government under Samora Machel had taken on Marxist/Leninist principles. From 
the start, though, the country had also been immersed in a civil war with the RENAMO, the 
Mozambican anti-communist opposition. Over the years the civil war would worsen, with the 
tensions between ‘anti-communists’ and ‘communists’ increasing and Mozambique slowly sliding 
towards the ‘imperialist’ camp.   
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In 1982, the highest-ranking IIB researcher in Maputo, Klaus Lingner, reported back. The situation 
in Mozambique was worrisome, “critical” even. The country’s economic hardship was increasing, 
and the imperialist direct and indirect pressure, including economic sabotage, had grown 
stronger.289 More worrisome, though, Klaus Lignner noted that the imperialist enemy had moved 
into the offensive. In order to discredit the orthodox Marxist/Leninist positions, they did not push 
for a ‘capitalist’ position. Rather, they used the more discrete tactic of insisting that Mozambique 
ought to take on its own version of Marxism/Leninism, a version tailored to its own concerns and 
problems: 
“Since we are already talking about Marxism-Leninism, the opponent is moving into the offensive in this 
domain and uses as a tool the question of the ‘right’ application of M/L in the PRM. The problem is very 
complex, because it is connected to real and existing problems of development, and many cannot hear the 
‘wrong notes’ in what they are saying. This is only the beginning of our problems and they come from the 
source at the university, which you also know. Despite their clever staging, it is old wine in new bottles, the 
issue of ‘specific socialisms’.”290 
A big challenge of the job resided in the fact that for Mozambicans, Marxism-Leninism was only 
one approach amongst many. They had access to literature from East and West and were debating 
and comparing both perspectives. Much of the teaching time, so Klaus Lingner complained, went 
into “ideological debates” when students wanted to know the truth about certain facts they had 
read in Western literature and see what his position on it would be. A big problem was that the 
available Marxist literature did not deal with any of those facts and thus almost discredited his 
work: 
“Sometimes I am consumed by anger, when I consult our own books and materials. Despite the fact that the 
students know very little otherwise, they do have very detailed ‘knowledge’ of the imperialist interpretations 
(e.g. Rumania/Jugoslawia 1944/1959; cult of personality). If you look in our own books to freshen up 
your memory, you can only laugh. Nothing happened! I am happy to still have some of my own bits of 
knowledge about it, or else their trust in me would be gone fast. We probably still have to wait a few years 
for some good historiography.”291  
In the meantime, the efforts increased to not only train diplomats, but to set up a whole institute. 
The idea was to transfer the IIB’s five-year curriculum to Maputo, in a “de-Europeanized” 
manner.292 The curriculum was sent over by the end of 1984, and in 1985, the Instituto Superior de 
Relações Internacionais (ISRI) was officially opened,293 though it would still need a while to be fully 
staffed and operating. For the IIB researchers, the situation worsened from year to year, as more 
and more Western IR teaching staff would arrive and students were mainly exposed to Western 
sources. Glasnost and Perestroika in the Soviet Union did not help and created much uncertainty 
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amongst the students.294 With the end of the GDR, the East German support to Mozambique in 
the field of international relations would be abruptly interrupted.  
The example of the GDR’s support to Mozambique demonstrates the role of particular 
international relations training in performing a particular role and place in the international alliance 
system.  
Conclusion 
During the Cold War confrontation with the West, the GDR’s system of international relations 
expertise formed a tightly organized, yet multifaceted network of knowledge production, 
circulation and consumption. It was composed of four different nodes of activity. First, the 
generalist elite diplomatic training facility IIB, which was closely affiliated with the MfAA, trained 
experts and produced research for the various ministries involved in international relations as well 
as for the central committee. Second, the research institute dedicated to studying the ‘enemy’, the 
IPW in Berlin, had close ties to the central committee and provided analysis and insight to a 
number of stakeholders. Third, a number of military institutions provided both research and 
training and were connected thematically to the other institutions around issues of war, peace and 
security. Finally, the historians and area studies experts operating at the various universities of the 
GDR also provided teaching and research and were thematically connected to the other 
institutions of international relations knowledge production around issues of development and 
regional expertise. All these various institutions were internally well-organized entities engaging 
with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in manifold ways. With 
regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of closeness or distance to 
political stakeholders, varying levels of engagement and varying levels of diversity in contact 
partners.  
Beyond bounding the GDR’s system of international relations expertise into a stable network of 
knowledge production, consumption and dissemination, the Cold War antagonism also structured 
its content and orientation along a friend/enemy distinction. Researchers and experts had to 
navigate a system that required them to both reproduce and transcend this distinction in order to 
do their work well. This dynamic played a central role in all the different aspects of international 
relations expertise, which this PhD thesis has examined along the three aspects of constitution, 
instrumentality and performance. International relations expertise played a constitutive role in 
forming the GDR’s academic and practical foreign policy experts. Designed to use ‘science as a 
weapon’, they had to learn to simultaneously reproduce and transcend the Marxist/Leninist 
interpretation of international relations propagated by the GDR in order to engage verbally with 
their enemies in diplomatic and academic settings. As such, they needed to acquire a ‘creative’ and 
‘flexible’ handling of the international relations’ Marxist/Leninist interpretive frame. International 
relations expertise also played an instrumental role in providing knowledge and insight about the 
Cold War enemy. Here, the Cold War antagonism led to the valorization of all research providing 
insight and analysis about the West, while devaluating research without practical use in ‘knowing’ 
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the enemy. Through studying and analysing the West closely, researchers were led to the realization 
that ‘the others’ were not so different from oneself. Instead, they behaved like a negative mirror 
image: thinking about the same problems, studying things in similar ways, with similar goals – but 
in a diametrically opposite manner and oriented against the GDR and its socialist alliances. As 
such, the Cold War antagonism led researchers studying the West into the difficult position of 
having to uphold dogma while clearly understanding its limitations and dangers. Finally, 
international relations expertise also played a performative role in enacting the GDR’s alliances 
abroad. Here knowledge production, consumption and dissemination about international relations 
played a role both in presenting the GDR as a serious knowledge producer and as a reliable partner 
in alliance politics. This found an expression in the limitations and restrictions of publication 
freedom in the function of the Soviet Union’s geopolitical interest, but also in the transmission of 
Marxist/Leninist international relations expertise across a wide network of alliances with African 




Revolutionary Upheaval and International Relations 
Expertise in the GDR 1989-1990 
 
 “It was a mass event [...] also attended by the party functionaries of the whole district. 600 people. I was 
standing on stage and my knees went weak: I knew instantly how thin the line was that I was navigating. 
But I went on with it – dead silence. I have never again had such an effect on an audience.” (Interview 
Fischer, 2020: 7) 
“These were tumultuous times. The only constant was change. We were caught in a fever between 
September/October 1989 and German unification in October/November 90. These were incredibly 
intensive times.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4) 
 
In January 1990, captain at sea and philosophy professor Siegfried Fischer signed a petition 
pleading for the complete demilitarization of the GDR Many of his colleagues at the GDR’s 
military academy were not pleased. They had very different views on issues of peace and security. 
They were shocked by his move, and they protested. A few days later Siegfried Fischer got 
disciplined: he received a travel ban, and severe restrictions on his ability to carry out research and 
to speak publicly. Just half a year earlier this would probably have had dramatic consequences for 
his private and professional life, but the time was ripe: the GDR was in the middle of a revolution. 
The oppositional forces in favour of demilitarization co-governed the country and lodged a formal 
protest. On March 12, Siegfried Fischer was released of all sanctions.295 This event is symptomatic 
of the dynamics at play during the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval 1989-90: researchers, academics 
and intellectuals became divided on issues of war, peace and foreign affairs. They had to navigate 
a dramatic political environment split between old powers and oppositional powers and a political 
climate that changed by the day: no-one knew what the outcomes of the process were going to be, 
but no-one, including academia, was left untouched by it.  
This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during these times 
of revolutionary upheaval. It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the 
lens of the ideal-typical relation between revolution and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. As 
laid out there, revolution/knowledge describes how revolutions recast the relevant parameters 
within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, 
publishing and advising about international relations take place. Following the 
revolution/knowledge nexus, this takes place in a three-step process. It describes, first, how 
knowledge-making activities will take place within a polarized space characterized by multiple poles 
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of sovereignty: the previously stable incumbent and the upcoming challenger(s). This is Tilly’s 
‘revolutionary situation’. Second, this also means that knowledge-making activities will take place 
within an unstable space that gradually shifts from the former to the latter pole of authority in an 
uneasy phase of struggle and cohabitation. Knowledge-making activities will be characterized by a 
back and forth between both poles, but also by the fact that the actors, institutions and 
organizations bundling these knowledge-making activities will partly implode, reorganize or 
reorient themselves within this shifting context. This is Tilly’s ‘revolutionary struggle’. The 
networks that they are embedded in will change as well, developing new international alignments, 
connecting to processes of change elsewhere, but also engaging with new counter-revolutionary 
forces, domestic and foreign. Finally, the revolution/knowledge nexus also describes how, once 
the ‘revolutionaries’ take over, knowledge activities will reorganize and reorient, structured by this 
new pole of authority.  
 
Revolution/Knowledge 
Polarization and Split Struggle and Cohabitation Takeover 
   
 
The revolution in the GDR can be analytically and chronologically divided into the three phases 
described above. Everything started with the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union in 1985. 
These triggered a slowly growing division in the GDR between pro-Gorbachev reformers and 
anti-Gorbachev hardliners culminating in the autumn of 1989 with the step down of Erich 
Honecker from the GDR’s leadership. The next half a year was marked by a phase of struggle and 
cohabitation between a communist reformer government and the oppositional forces grouped 
around the round tables co-governing the country. It all came to a conclusion in April 1990 when 
the results of the first free and democratic elections in the GDR were interpreted as a vote to 
dissolve the GDR and unify with West Germany: the ‘pro-unification’ revolutionaries took over. 
This chapter is organized into three parts, reflecting the three steps of revolutionary dynamics in 
the GDR: first, polarization and split; second, struggle and cohabitation and third, takeover by the 
pro-unification revolutionary forces. Each section details how the political dynamics at play impact 
knowledge activities, both by transforming the actors and institutions involved in it and by 
changing the relations and networks between all the relevant actors.  
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The revolutionary situation: polarization and split 
The first phase of the revolutionary dynamics in the GDR lasted until October 1989. This was the 
‘revolutionary situation’ where a unified entity split into different poles of authority, all claiming 
sovereignty over the same territory. This phase was marked by an increasing polarization in the 
GDR and ultimately by a split between the incumbent regime led by Honecker and the 
oppositional movements taking to the streets. This phase ended in October 1989 when Honecker 
stepped down from power and a new ‘reformer’ government under the leadership of Hans 
Modrow subsequently took over.  
Polarization in academia 
The dynamics in this phase were primarily political, but the polarization underwriting it did not 
leave academia untouched. The polarization in the GDR can be dated back to Gorbachev’s ascent 
to power in 1985 and to Honecker’s refusal to follow his internal politics of change. While 
approving of Gorbachev’s international reforms, the GDR leadership disapproved of the internal 
reforms initiated in the Soviet Union, fearing that it would undermine and destroy the system.296 
Gorbachev’s reforms delegitimized Soviet hardliners and undermined the all-powerfulness of the 
SED party. Honecker’s refusal to follow the Soviet line leads to critical distance and doubt not 
only within large sections of the population but also within some of its functional elite.297 Turning 
against the Soviet Union undermined their long-term ideological indoctrination: 
“Since our earliest infanthood we absorbed the following phrase together with the breast milk we were fed: 
‘Learning from the Soviet Union means learning to win.’ And then the party said – concretely this was Kurt 
Hager: ‘No, if my neighbour renovates his house, this does not mean I need to renovate mine.’ That was the 
argument they used. Everyone with some understanding of politics stood aghast at this. That was the moment 
when our internal firmness and conviction started to crumble.” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 11) 
This led to an internal process of change for many and a division between Gorbachev’s supporters 
and his detractors. For many party members or supporters of the regime this was not a radical 
moment of turning against the GDR, but rather the start of a gradual process of change leading 
to a more critical and reflexive attitude: 
“My experience of change began around 1986. It was not a transition from loyal scientist to regime opponent, 
but rather a development towards a more critical approach to the model of socialism practised in the GDR. 
Many sensible ideas that came from Moscow were basically blocked in the GDR. That irritated me and 
made me angry – at least after the Soviet magazine Sputnik was banned in the autumn of 1988. After that 
– when I look back now – a certain process of transformation began in me.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 2) 
One important step in this process was the censoring in 1988 of a small magazine called Sputnik. 
Sputnik had been reporting very openly about the situation in the Soviet Union. The central 
committee shut the magazine down under the charge of defeatism. Unexpected by the leadership, 
this led to an outcry across all intellectual circles of the GDR, including the military intellectual 
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circles. The centre point of outrage is the underlying pronouncement of general suspicion: whether 
one supports the regime or not, whether one supports the Soviet Union or not – suddenly 
everyone, independently of their actual loyalty, was considered suspect. This had a devastating 
effect.298  
Not everyone experienced this polarizing dynamic in the same way, the same intensity or for that 
matter, at the same time. For many, it only became apparent in 1988 or 1989. Amongst those who 
noticed it the earliest were the scholars whose research was impacted by Gorbachev’s domestic 
and international reforms: the researchers studying ‘socialist countries’ and the researchers busy 
with ‘security politics’, i.e. with questions of war and peace, arms race and disarmament.   
At the IIB, the department of ‘socialist countries’ had been for many years a laughing stock for 
their colleagues: these were the ‘weirdos’ claiming to study the socialist brother states, but what 
kind of research can they do? They were not considered real scientists by the other departments. 
For all the derision they faced, they were amongst the first to actually notice glasnost and 
perestroika. Their focus was on Gorbachev’s domestic politics, which they followed closely and 
analyzed intensively299 – albeit secretly, in the form of internal discussions that never left the 
perimeters of the IIB. The department became increasingly divided between ‘reformers’ and 
proponents of a ‘Chinese solution’: 
“There was a sort of group of ‘reformers’ who thought that perestroika was, overall, a good socialist reform 
project, though of course not in every aspect. But the point was to transfer those ideas to the GDR and to 
implement them here. The head of department and a few others, including myself, were part of this group. 
Others supported the ‘Chinese’ solution with the argument that reforms will lead to a loss of power. If reforms 
were to be allowed at all, then slowly, carefully and certainly not bottom-up, but top-down. [...] For that 
group, retaining power was the main factor, for the other group societal change was the important one: how 
can we change this society in such a way that it is acceptable for a majority of people? These were the debates 
behind the scenes.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 4) 
From 1986 onwards, the ‘reformers’ supporting Gorbachev’s politics of perestroika dominated 
the department. Those sceptical of the reforms remained defensive and in the background. But as 
the effects of the reforms became clearer over time, they became more vocal until the rupture 
moment of October/November 1989. After that time, both groups stopped exchanging and 
communicating, even though business as usual continued otherwise for a little longer in the 
department.300  
The other group of scholars concerned with Gorbachev’s reforms were the analysts focusing on 
questions of war and peace, arms race and disarmament. While they had little attention for glasnost 
or perestroika, they did focus on Gorbachev’s international reforms. These reinforced dynamics 
at play in the department since the early 1980s.301 At stake was a change in scholarship from 
thinking security in terms of confrontation to thinking it in terms of cooperation. Such a move 
involved redefining ‘imperialism’ from inherently belligerent to inherently endowed with the 
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capacity for peace, as well as thinking from the end: if everything went wrong and a nuclear war 
became a reality, then both Germanies would be annihilated. Gorbachev’s ascent to power and 
Honecker’s support of Gorbachev’s security politics led to a number of concrete political changes: 
in 1986 the West German socialist party SPD and the East German state party SED met for a 
number of talks and exchanges and published a common position paper. In 1987, the Warsaw pact 
decided on a new military doctrine, which led, in turn, to the GDR deciding on needing one as 
well.302 These political changes triggered two types of changes: first a differentiation between 
military reformers and military hardliners, and second, the reorganization of military reformers 
from different institutions into a new powerhouse.  
Political and military reformers versus military hardliners  
After the 1987/88 Warsaw pact military doctrine renewal, the GDR Politbüro decided that it 
needed one as well. The developments of the last decade in the area of security thinking meant 
that this task was not left to the military alone, but a small group of civilians were included in the 
process. These were recruited from the IIB, the MfAA and the IPW. The group convened in 
Straußberg at the ministry of defence and debates split between military reformers, mainly 
represented by the civilian experts, and military hardliners, mainly represented by the NVA army 
generals: 
“We were sitting there with the NVA generals and fought exactly about this question: what happens if a 
war breaks out and how should we evaluate all the insights that we now have about it? […] At that point 
in time the militaries were no longer able to say: you civilians can think whatever you want, we will just do 
whatever we want. Instead, they had to engage with us. And they could not write position papers on their 
own anymore. As a result, the goal of avoiding war became the conditie sine qua none of this military 
doctrine.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 11) 
The ‘reformers’ endorsed cooperation and disarmament, a political agenda based on reform, and 
focused on the ultimate goal of maintaining peace at all costs. The ‘hardliners’ instead saw war and 
war preparation as a necessary option. The ‘reformers’ were in that case indirectly backed up by 
Honecker’s position on these issues: the GDR leadership had concluded that however much one 
prepares for war, war on German territory will mean its total annihilation. While this analysis is 
not supported by all in the defence ministry, the ‘hardliners’ had to follow official guidelines.303 
And the ‘reformers’, particularly those associated with the IPW, used the leeway in their favour 
and pushed their agenda forward. As Schwarz details, this meant associating a new, perhaps 
provocative idea or suggestion with a Honecker quote to make it bulletproof:  
“Once the secretary-general had come to this opinion and issued some speeches on the topic that offered plenty 
of leeway for interpretation, we were the ones who not only knew how to use this leeway; we were the ones who 
used it to push its boundaries and our agendas forward. Our system worked as follows: if you formulated a 
new interesting idea, all the Cold War hardliners would use any option available to them to shut you down. 
Through internal discussions for instance or by excluding you from publishing. But if you opened your 
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reflections with a public quote from the secretary-general, they stayed put, because this could quickly backfire 
against them. If you had the secretary-general to back your claims, no one tried to argue against you. This is 
how the system worked. Quite undemocratic but also really bizarre. When you had to navigate such a system, 
you had to learn to assess its limits and learn where to push them.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 10) 
All the statements by the secretary-general could be found in Neues Deutschland, which became the 
place to browse and find adequate references and quotes. Quotes such as ‘this infernal stuff needs 
to go’ – in reference to Pershing 2 cruise missiles – were very valuable, and were used extensively 
by the ‘reformers’ to preface their agenda focused on mutual arms reductions and disarmament.304  
A regrouping of reformer split groups 
In addition to pitching military reformers against military hardliners, the polarization process also 
leads to a regrouping of ‘reformer’ split groups from different institutions into a new powerhouse. 
We have already seen how the military doctrine talks bound researchers together from IIB, IPW 
and the MfAA. General institutional connections and exchanges between those organizations 
already existed before, as we have seen in chapter 2. But the polarizing dynamic intensified these 
relations and generated a new type of connection, binding the ‘reformers’ from across these 
institutions closer together.  
Another type of connection soon emerged as well. The philosophers at the military academy had 
quietly been developing critical work in the domain of war, peace and security. They were double 
outsiders in their field, both within the field of defence, where the defence ministry, army 
leadership and the top layers of the military academy did not allow for any deviance or freedom in 
thinking,305 and within the wider field of academia, where no-one wearing a uniform was credited 
with independent or critical thinking.306 They emerged into the polarizing security debate late, 
against the resistance of their own leadership and to the surprise of the researchers from other 
institutions.307  
An explaining factor for this is their lack of publication outlets, since their ideas were not welcome 
in the publication outlets of the defence field: the military had no business studying peace; their 
domain of enquiry had to be war.308 However, this drove the philosophers to build alliances with 
similar-minded analysts from other domains: 
“That is why we had to find allies to fight back against our own narrow-minded military leadership. But we 
had to find the right allies. Peace-oriented church groups that were already under surveillance would not do. 
We had to find respected GDR scientists, even though scientists of course did not have much currency in our 
military circles. Minefields wherever we looked.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 6)  
The idea was to draw on and reference allied publications, in order to strengthen our own ideas, 
give them weight and help disseminate them better. But also to access their platforms and 
publication networks. As such, philosophers at the military academy were very familiar with the 
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researchers at the IPW and the IIB, having scrutinized them extensively, but were largely unknown 
to the latter until they reached out: 
“The moment that we started engaging with the topics of security politics, foreign politics and peace politics, 
we needed to have recourse to different people; to professionals, to specialists. And we found them at the IIB, 
we found them at the IPW. […] And they stood under our special scrutiny. We wanted to know: who is 
who? Does this person only have a big mouth, or are they serious, can we count on them? If this person 
publishes, can we cite them and base ourselves on them in order to strengthen our points and get them across 
better? That is why we knew them much better than they knew us. And that is also why they were surprised 
when we appeared suddenly within a short time frame.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 3-4)  
It all came together in October 1987 when the head of the IPW, Max Schmidt, created the Council 
for Peace Research. There had been earlier formats of course, but this one encompassed all GDR 
research relating to issues of war and peace. And Max Schmidt makes a point of including 
militaries, even though the army as a wider institution has no interest in engaging. The connections 
came about from a match between Max Schmidt’s eagerness to have them on board and the 
individual’s interest to connect into the debates without any backing or awareness of their home 
institutions. This pushed the reform-oriented military analysts onto the international debate.309 The 
Council for Peace Research thus bundled together the ‘reform’ oriented researchers from different 
institutions: universities, amongst which in particular the philosophers from the HU in Berlin; the 
philosophers from the military academy and the researchers from IIB and IPW.310 And as the issue 
of utter nuclear destruction looms large in the last years of the Cold War, the views and ideas of 
this group gained traction. They were invited to speak across society: schools, factories, cultural 
institutions, etc. all want to understand what is going on. Especially in the autumn of 1989, many 
still turned to the old meaning-making elites to shed clarity onto the situation:311   
“After I came back [from Geneva in October 1989], everything was of course very turbulent. We were being 
heavily requested to give lectures with the prompt: “Explain the situation”. We gave lectures in various 
organizations, institutions, in the party, etc. It was not uncomplicated: the type of lecture, the way of presenting 
things ... you had to be careful and look out whether it matched the audience’s horizon.” (Interview 
Kleinwächter, 2019: 3) 
They needed to straddle their own clarity of vision and commitment to reforms with the specific’s 
audience horizon of understanding: what is their grasp on the situation, how far can the speaker 
go? Unlike the researchers focused on socialist states and domestic reforms, those studying issues 
of peace and security had a large outreach and connected with the wider concerns and trends of 
the GDR’s development.  
The first phase of revolutionary dynamics was thus marked by the slow emergence of new actors 
in the existing knowledge networks. These came into existence through a division of researchers 
– but not a splitting of institutions – into reform-oriented and status-quo-oriented researchers. 
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While the status-quo-oriented researchers carried out business as usual within the existing 
structures, the reform-oriented researchers started seeking out connections and formed new 
thematic groups of like-minded researchers. The new groups started existing in parallel to the 
traditional groups and networks, but were also connected by the double affiliations of their 
members.  
Revolutionary struggle and cohabitation 
“It was like a startled flock of chicken. The hierarchies did not work anymore, but there was no clarity about 
the future of the GDR nor about the future of the IIB. Everyone made their own thoughts and plans.” 
(Interview Franzke, 2019: 6) 
The second phase of the revolutionary dynamics in the GDR lasted about five months. It started 
with the takeover of the ‘reformer’ government under Modrow in November 1989 and ended with 
its self-dissolution in favour of the first freely elected government of the GDR in April 1990. This 
was the phase of ‘revolutionary struggle’ which ultimately determined whether a revolutionary 
situation would translate into a revolutionary outcome. This phase in the GDR was marked by 
three different poles of power at play: first, by the old elites remaining in power, despite their 
‘reformer’ branch taking over. Second, by the new government’s close cooperation with the 
oppositional groups and their ‘round tables’ in an effort to reform the GDR. Third, by the 
progressive emergence of the new ‘pro-unification’ force that would ultimately win the democratic 
elections in April and feared that reforms will not be enough to tame the old elites. 
In the field of knowledge production, a number of things happened. Nominally, business as usual 
continued. The institutions associated with knowledge production in the field of international 
relations – the IIB, the IPW, the universities – continued to exist, but in a somewhat changed 
version. Their embeddedness in the wider political and social context loosened up and they started 
to disintegrate from within as expertise becomes personalized and many of the scholars, experts 
and researchers moved between the three poles of power at play. The following sections examine 
the dynamics at hand through the lens of the IIB.  
Disintegration 
While continuing to function nominally, the IIB started to slowly disintegrate. It all started with 
student protests in the autumn. They went on strike in the student halls and refused to leave their 
beds in the morning. Their main objects of protest were the traditional hierarchies at the institute 
and their domination by ‘old’ men: 
“The students at the IIB did not want to continue in the same way that it had always been. They protested 
against the teaching plan and partly also against the teachers. […]. The students did not want the ‘old men’ 
anymore – to say it in a pointed way. The whole domain of foreign policy and diplomacy was (and is) very 
much dominated by men,” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1) 
The leadership at the IIB knew something needed to change. They found a solution in the figure 
of Raimund Krämer, who was about to take on a central position in the changes ahead. Raimund 
Krämer was part of a younger generation of IIB researchers that was academically fully qualified 
but not yet in a position of leadership. A product of the IIB itself, he had been awarded a PhD in 
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1981 on Peru’s foreign policy and a Habil in 1985 on issues of peace and security in Central 
America. He arrived back at the GDR in 1989 after a four-year placement at the GDR embassies 
in Nicaragua and Cuba. Due to a sports injury he was on sick leave until October and came back 
to the IIB in the middle of growing turmoil. After a short stint at his home department, ‘developing 
countries’, he was quickly made deputy head of teaching and tasked with appeasing the student 
protests.312  
This propelled Raimund Krämer into the circle of leadership at the IIB, which consisted most 
prominently of the institute’s director and former ambassador to Mozambique, Prof. Matthes; the 
coordinator for research Prof. Hänisch and the grey eminence responsible for matters of personnel 
and the one pulling the strings behind the scene, Prof. Klett.313 From that moment on, a number 
of dynamics unfolded. First, the old circle of leadership disintegrated. One after the other, the 
professors Matthes, Hänisch and Klett departed on sick leave. Officially and nominally still in 
power, they de facto disappeared one after the other, leaving Raimund Krämer in charge.314 This 
was a wider trend in the GDR, and all across institutions, with higher-ranking functionaries 
stepping down from their positions of leadership315 or retreating as they were overwhelmed by the 
unfolding dynamics. 
As such, in this phase of the revolution, the traditional hierarchies did not work anymore, the old 
model was finished, but no new template had come to replace the old one. The institute resembled 
a “startled flock of chicken”, everyone being busy with themselves and their own future.316 This is 
a second dynamic at play during this period, with the revolution having an individualizing effect: 
“The break [between hardliners and reformers] took place in November 1989. After that time everyone did 
their own thing and tried to defend their professional existence or build a new livelihood. Since December 
1989 I have felt more or less like a lone wolf. I had no group that I felt I belonged to. This would only change 
with the election of Raimund Krämer and the effort to build something new at the IIB.” (Interview Franzke, 
2019: 6)  
The dynamic between content reformers and content hardliners marking the first phase of the 
revolutionary upheaval was over. They had nothing to talk about anymore, they stopped 
exchanging and communicating, and formed no unity anymore – even though business as usual 
otherwise continued for a little longer in the department.317 The differences became more personal 
and moved to a private level, especially as a first wave of colleagues officially left the SED, ripping 
apart earlier collegial or friendly relations: 
“These were fast-paced times. They brought deep changes to our professional lives but also to our personal 
lives. It [Leaving the SED] often meant the end of personal relations. Some would not greet you anymore or 
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become outwardly hostile; this was a very tough time. You had to be a very strong person to make it through; 
it was not as simple as one might imagine.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 5) 
Running parallel to this, a first round of colleagues were leaving the IIB as they were receiving 
other offers or perspectives elsewhere and deemed them to be more future-proof than the 
uncertain pathway at the IIB. A number left to go to the HU or other academic institutions, or 
they made the plunge to West Berlin.318 A number of other colleagues left quietly because they had 
a strong history or deep affiliation with the Stasi and sensed it is better to disappear.319 These were 
around 20 colleagues of a total of around 120 leaving the IIB.320  
Loosening embeddedness  
Underwriting the changes within the IIB was its progressively loosening embeddedness within the 
social and political context. The Cold War dynamics had the IIB firmly settled in a tight network 
of relations. It used to be formally a part of the Academy for Statecraft and Law, but with an 
independent status and a strong connection to the foreign ministry. The recruitment of students, 
the teaching plans, the research needs and so forth were tightly coordinated with the foreign 
ministry, with the departments at the IIB mirroring those at the foreign ministry. It featured regular 
publications in regular journals and book series, along with regular cooperation with other 
institutions both domestic and foreign, while being firmly inscribed in a regular outreach 
programme within GDR society. Above all, it was clear that whatever the IIB published was 
understood to be the official position of the GDR, and publications could not and would not 
contradict political statements. This embeddedness started to loosen up in this phase of the 
revolutionary dynamic until becoming entirely disconnected at the end of it. Jochen Franzke 
remembers the last visit at the IIB by a high-ranking member of the politburo, Werner 
Krolikowski, in late October: 
“This [SED] party congregation was bizarre. Werner Krolikowski was perplexed and overwhelmed, unable 
to answer the simplest questions. His cluelessness about the future direction of the institute was clearly visible.” 
(Interview Franzke, 2019: 4-5) 
Within the politburo, Werner Krolikowski was the one in charge of the Academy for Statecraft 
and Law that the IIB was formally embedded in. Noteworthy here was his inability to give any 
explanation, confirmation or guidance whatsoever. The meeting was symbolic for the beginning 
disconnection between the IIB and the political institutions it was so firmly embedded in 
previously. In December, the SED, the GDR’s formerly all-powerful and all-dominating party, 
decided to give up its leading function in all of the country’s institutions. It chose a new leadership, 
changed its name to PDS and became one party amongst others that competed for power and 
authority in a democratic manner.321 Across all universities in the GDR, the formerly compulsive 
1st and 2nd year courses of scientific Marxism were removed from all curricula, and a wave of 
renewal and reform went through all institutions. The Academy for Statecraft and Law (ASR) 
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formally transformed into a new institution, the College for Law and Administration (HRV).322 
This was a symbolic change from an institution formerly directly dedicated to training the country’s 
bureaucrats for the local and regional political administration to an independent academic college. 
On paper the change is significant, though in practice not much changed at first: most of the same 
staff remained and the curriculum remained largely unchanged. But many trends started that the 
next phase of revolution would then build on. The IIB was reframed as a political science 
institution. It became the black sheep of the HRV,323 an institution mainly composed of lawyers 
who see their claims of being an ‘apolitical’ institution threatened by the IIB’s supposedly stronger 
political affiliation.324 Employee numbers became relevant, since a ‘regular’ college was supposed 
to have a different student/staff ratio and there was no funding to provide for all the former 
employees. The whole institution including the IIB – now called the political science section at the 
HRV – had to half their staff.325 Democratic renewal326 and democratic elections were called for, 
and these took place later in April. In his inauguration speech, the HRV’s new director Steding 
emphasized that a rupture with the past needs to take place.327 The change in politics demanded a 
change in academia: 328  
“We are not standing outside of this process, but in the middle of it and are permeated by it. The extent to 
which we get involved in this process and change with it ourselves is decisive for the role and future of our 
institution.” 329 
In particular, he called for a change in the academic practice to take place: academic disputes 
should be open-ended and not follow a pre-scripted pattern whereby the ‘winner’ of the debate 
has been previously determined and where the older academics’ views trump those of the younger 
even when there are no good arguments for them.330 But he also called for the institution to 
examine its past and take responsibility for it,331 as well as become politically neutral and 
independent so as to be able to exercise scientific enquiry in a critical manner: 332 
“We shall no longer serve a political authority, never again abandon the function of science to be critical of 
politics, not engage in sterile interpretations of ideology, but we shall serve mankind, and true humanism 
shall determine our thoughts and actions. With this in mind, we shall research and teach at this university 
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and initiate today changes with long-term effects. We can only survive in changing circumstances if we ourselves 
change.” 333 
The move from IIB to the political section at the HRV was thus a significant symbolic step in 
detaching it from its previous embeddedness in a social and political system. The process of 
gradual disconnection came to a conclusion in March, when the MfAA informed the IIB (then 
HRV) that they would not be employing their graduates anymore.334 This was a crucial moment 
that finalized the break between the IIB and the MfAA. Training the GDR’s diplomats had been 
the first and foremost task of the institute. In that time, the structures for publication changed as 
well. In January, the editorship of AALA, the GDR’s foremost regional studies journal became 
vacant, as its coordinating political institution ZENTRAAL had been dissolved, and its editor-in-
chief asked to be released of this function.335 In March, Horizont, the main foreign policy journal, 
announced that it will profile itself as an independent institution.336 
Between the tops of the old hierarchies becoming dysfunctional, parts of the regular staff leaving, 
and the formal restructuring of the IIB into a ‘political science’ section along the formula of ‘old 
wine in new bottles’, those who remained did continue with their work, upholding “business as 
usual”.337 The buildings and the material infrastructure, after all, still existed, and students sat in 
the classrooms:  
“At the same time, it was always clear that we had to continue teaching, that we could not leave everything 
to fall apart. We continued to show up to work and the IIB continued to function in principle until German 
unification, despite slowly disintegrating.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4) 
The department continued to plan its research activities, deciding in January on its upcoming 
research programme and on seven top issues for upcoming research: 1/the erosion of bipolarity 
in the world and its consequences for GDR foreign policy, 2/conflict resolution, 3/new 
conception of Europe 4/KSZE II, 5/ disarmament concept of the GDR, 6/ GDR UN Politics, 
7/GDR-FRG confederation and German questions.338 Scientific output along these lines 
continued to emerge from the IIB:   
“Slowly everything was dissolving. But the institute continued to function despite all this. We wrote studies; 
even in June, July we still worked on research outlines. For the round tables, for the ministries. Since all the 
[political] institutions were still functioning. And everyone made sure that things kept going, as we can see 
in hindsight. […] With all the dynamics at play, the GDR still remained highly organized and prudent. 
All the important social forces at play shared an awareness that there should not be any massive collapses. 
One had to keep working, things had to remain in order. Whatever happened, it had to happen without 
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violence, […] without falling into a civil-war-like situation or to mass strikes. No one wanted that.” 
(Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4) 
At the same time contacts to Western institutions multiplied, as the West was courting its Eastern 
counterparts. In January, for instance, the IIB received offers of study spaces for one to two 
employees from the diplomatic academy in Vienna. The West German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
offered to come and give talks, and the Volkswagen-Stiftung offered to cooperate. The IIB was 
asked to make a proposal on the topic of European security politics. The UK embassy signalled 
willingness to cooperate with IIB beyond the usual language training.339 This was a time when 
West Germany invited the GDR scholars to come visit, sought out contacts and showed interest 
in their expertise – much unlike later dynamics: 
“The acting GDR professors would become irrelevant after the March elections. But back then no-one 
expected that to happen. That is why our Rektor accorded them audiences like at a Mogul court, and we 
had regular visits from GDR scholars. But after the March elections, this all stopped – then we’d simply be 
‘too busy’ and not have time. […] We knew they weren’t important anymore, and that they would disappear 
soon.” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 3) 
These dynamics enabled a number of GDR scholars to attend conferences, meetings and 
exchanges in the West, especially around their topics of expertise. Those involved in issues of 
security politics got to attend some of the first inter-German officer exchanges,340 while experts 
on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were invited to the respective West German institutions, 
amongst which were the BioSt in Bonn, the West German MfAA and relevant conferences to talk 
about Russia and the Soviet Union.341 These exchanges required translation skills, as the East 
German actors had to explain not only what East Germans said, but also what they meant.342 
Round tables 
The most important political development of that time, though, was the phenomenon of the 
‘round tables’, the forum where the oppositional movements of the autumn revolution articulated 
their visions for a renewed GDR alongside a number of other social forces and de facto co-
governed the GDR. Misselwitz characterized this phase of the revolution as that of the double 
government Modrow/round tables.343 The issue of that time was that the reform government of 
Modrow lacked democratic legitimacy and that the GDR’s population, including the oppositional 
movements, did not trust the state institutions of the GDR anymore. The round tables offered a 
solution by involving the opposition in government decisions. They included representatives of 
the old and of the new parties, as well as representatives of different newly formed social 
organisations, churches, as well as intellectuals, artists and well-known public figures. None of 
these were elected or had democratic legitimacy, but they functioned as a counter power and 
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controlling force, taking part in legislative and executive tasks.344 Next to a general round table 
involved directly in government, many thematic round tables came into being to deal with 
specialized issues. Relevant for the domain of international relations are the thematic round tables 
on security politics and development politics. Because the round tables were the epicentres of 
political reform and of the efforts to renew the GDR, they drew to them a number of those 
scholars and experts that were previously labelled reform-oriented. The political horizon 
underlying these round tables was a reformed GDR. Egon Bahr visited the IIB in January and 
sketched the goals under review: a confederation, not a unification with West Germany.345  
These round tables were relevant because they engender a further yoking together of reform 
groups from various origins. Let’s take the example of the round table on security politics. Though 
originally started to exercise some form of democratic control over the NVA, the GDR’s army,346 
the military round table’s ultimate concern was to develop a new military doctrine for a reformed 
GDR.347 Participants included army officers (from the military’s political college and the ministry 
of defence, including the defence minister, as well as the head of the newly nominated head of the 
committee to reform the military), the parties and organisations represented in the Volkskammer, 
the GDR’s parliament (SED/PDS, CDU, LDPD, NDPD, DBD, FDJ, FDGB, DFD, VdgB), many 
newly formed  protest movements and organisations (Neues Forum/Deutsche Forumspartei, Demokratie 
Jetzt, Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte, Grüne Partei der DDR, Grüne Liga, Vereinigten Linke, Die 
Nelken/Aktionsbündnis Vereinigte Linke- AVL, Demokratischer Aufbruch), Christian organisations 
(Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR, Berliner Bischofskonfereny, Christlich/Demokratische Jugend / 
CDJ), some traditional  GDR organisations (Friedensrat der DDR, URANIA), organizations 
representing soldiers (Verband der Berufssoldaten der DDR, Gewerkschaft der Armeeangehörigen, 
Soldatensprechen), and lastly the research institutions: IPW, IIB and the HU in the form of the 
Gruppe Friedensforschung and the Unabhängige Initiativgruppe Friedens/ und 
Konfliktforschung, as well as Dr Günter Hillmann, representative of the foreign ministry.348  
Most of the researchers involved in this platform already knew each other closely from their 
cooperation in the Council for Peace Research – a process detailed earlier, whereby the reform-
oriented scholars in the field of security policy had become yoked together in a new institution. In 
the military round table this already formed group then became associated with members of 
oppositional protest and church groups interested in issues of peace and security, as well as with 
those state officials invested in the peace movement. While these three groups had had contact in 
earlier years and were partly familiar, it is the round table that cemented their connection and 
association.349  
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Thematically, this continued and pushed forward the work of the reform-oriented scholars and 
experts from the Peace Council.350 The main lines around which all participants rallied were the 
goal to resolve the military confrontation in Europe and work towards a de-militarization of 
international relations.351 Main lines were the assurance of peace through disarmament and the 
establishment of a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Three elements in particular are 
noteworthy: reformulation of NVA tasks as only oriented towards ensuring external security, a 
move away from limiting the use of nuclear weapons to banning all use of nuclear weapons, and a 
move away from mutual disarmament to the willingness of unilateral disarmament if necessary.352 
These debates were very much also public debates characterized by openness, and all documents 
were made public.353  
This revolutionary phase in the GDR was too short for this new approach to translate into actual 
politics, but it was nonetheless representative of changing modes of thinking in military and 
security circles while at the same time providing a framework and blueprint for the military to 
attach themselves to and identify with.354 With the SED’s self-removal from the NVA, the GDR’s 
army had become free-floating. As we will see later, the round tables were also the places where 
the connections between reform-oriented researchers and opposition groups were forged, alliances 
which will partly carry over in the next phase of the revolution and beyond the dissolution of the 
GDR.  
While the researchers and experts at the round tables partly still represented their home 
institutions, they were also increasingly there as individuals with their own political motivation and 
own political expertise. This is characteristic of this phase of the revolution, where knowledge 
production oscillates between its traditional ‘home’ and the new political venues of reform. The 
resulting tension is exemplified with Thomas Ruttig’s experience at the round table on 
development politics. An expert on Afghanistan, he had studied the country for five years at the 
HU, including becoming fluent in Dari and Pashto, and then worked for the MfAA. During the 
revolutionary phase op upheaval, they sent him back home to do a PhD. Instead he became 
involved with oppositional groups and attended the round table on issues of development politics:  
“Once they noticed that everything was coming to an end, they told me to go write a PhD, which I did. But 
I also became politically involved and sat at the round table on development politics during the transition 
period. There I indirectly contributed to the new draft GDR constitution; we worked on the section on 
development politics for one of the five oppositional movements which I represented. […] At one of these 
sessions they invited representatives to come and attend, and I turned out to sit there representing an 
oppositional movement while at the other side of the table sat the deputy minister of foreign affairs who had 
to report on various issues. He was utterly amazed when he saw me there – he thought I was writing my 
PhD.” (Interview Ruttig, 2019: 8) 
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The in-between phase of revolutionary struggle and cohabitation is marked by a restructuring of 
the actors that emerged in the previous revolutionary phase and by a reshuffling of the relations 
between them. On the one hand we saw the new group of reform-oriented academics merging 
with the peace and security interested members of the oppositional movements and coming to 
power through the round tables. This automatically changed their relations to actors involved. At 
the same time the old structures continued to co-exist and knowledge actors had to manage this 
double structure, either explicitly choosing for one side or straddling the space between the two.  
Revolutionary outcome and takeover 
In the last phase of the revolutionary dynamics, the oppositional movements took over. This was 
the ‘revolutionary outcome’ where power moved from the incumbent to the former contestant. 
For the GDR, this last phase began with the first free and democratic elections in the GDR on 18 
March. The election’s results, though, were surprising.355 The vote did not go in favour of those 
oppositional parties who dominated the autumn protests and sat at the round tables during the 
winter, trying to reform the GDR:356 they “sat too early and too long at the table of power, thereby 
allegedly demonstrating to the wider population their weakness in effectively unhinging the 
system.”357 But the vote also did not go to those in favour of a unification with West Germany 
under equal terms, whereby East and West would craft a new constitution together.358 Instead, the 
votes were in favour of those parties supporting a unification with West Germany under West 
German terms, and the election results were interpreted as a choice for dissolving the GDR.359 
This decision meant that great speed in turning the decision into reality was possible: all the GDR 
needed to do was say “yes”.360 This ultimate giving up of the GDR by the GDR is what Misselwitz 
points out as the dialectic of the revolution: 361 the GDR’s population purposefully and forcefully 
took its sovereignty from the SED regime, only to relinquish it again in favour of a fusion with 
the West. After the elections, the timeline sped up at an increasing rate: what seemed at the 
beginning like a long process of conversion turned out in the end to take only a half year. The 
unification with West Germany on 3 October 1990 ended the revolution.  
In the area of knowledge production, this means that the time of polarization was over. There was 
no more moving back and forth between various parallel competing poles of authority. The focus 
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was set and clear; the GDR was structured by a new political regime that was primarily oriented 
towards West Germany. This trickled down to all levels of knowledge production. In the field of 
international relations, this created a new landscape that we can approach through four different 
angles.  
First, the ‘revolutionaries’ took over the MfAA. In that process they sharply delineated themselves 
from the diplomatic corps that they took leadership over. In relational terms, this meant that a 
previously bounded social entity – the MfAA – split up into two parts with the new leaders and 
the old staff becoming de facto separate entities. They related in new ways as the new leaders 
remained somewhat dependent of the old staff’s expertise, who, in turn, had no other outlet for 
their expertise.  
Second, the relationship between the MfAA and the various institutions surrounding it changed. 
Ties were cut or personalized between the ministry and previously connected GDR institutions, 
while new ties – both institutional and personal ones – were formed between the ministry and 
previously unconnected groups, inside and outside the GDR.  
Third, the ‘revolutionaries’ in the MfAA formed part of the wider ‘revolutionary’ takeover but 
inhabited a marginalized position within this wider movement. They advocated taking time, not 
rushing a union with the West and certainly not doing so on unequal terms. Their independent 
agenda thus had to operate within a new networked structure that worked against them. This 
impacted the effectiveness and possibilities of knowledge production that was channelled through 
the MfAA as it was robbed of its impact.  
Fourth, the GDR institutions previously connected to the MfAA needed to find new ways of 
surviving now that they were cut off from this network. They did so by reforming themselves so 
as to be compatible within a new Western-dominated network of knowledge production. They 
reshaped their institutions according to new standards, becoming ‘more West than the West’. 
The new MfAA 
A biochemist by training, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz lost his academic post at the HU in 1981 for 
political reasons. It had been made clear to him that he had no future at a socialist university. As 
a result, he went to the Kirchliche Hochschule Berlin, the GDR’s ‘church university’, to study theology. 
This was one of the few educational places in the GDR with political freedom. His studies included 
history and philosophy, and he soon became involved in the independent peace movement. 
Despite being under surveillance by the Stasi, he was allowed to go to the United States in 1987 
for a postgraduate study in order to research the relation between politics and religion in the USA. 
The trip – his first experience in the West – sharpened his perception of the GDR’s problems. He 
became fluent in English and discovered how Europe and Germany were being perceived abroad. 
These were skills about to become important: in March 1990 he was elected to the GDR’s 
parliament as part of the SPD, the social-democratic party, and was tasked to become the party’s 
expert in matters of foreign policy. After the social-democratic party SPD became part of the 
coalition government and got the MfAA as part of the coalition agreement, Hans-Jürgen 
Misselwitz became state secretary of foreign affairs. He and the new minister of foreign affairs, 
Markus Meckel, had already known each other for more than a decade through the activist circles 
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they both frequented.362 Becoming responsible for the GDR’s foreign policy in the last half year 
of its existence presented them with two main challenges: the disturbing fact that no-one took the 
GDR seriously anymore, and, the difficult choice between two equally unappealing types of 
advisers for their close teams: drawing on the GDR’s old expert elites or hiring West German 
foreign policy advisors. While they could pick their team, there was one group of experts they 
could not choose for but inherited with the post: the diplomatic corps at the MfAA. 
A common challenge facing all revolutionaries coming to power is finding a balance between the 
old and the new. This includes dealing with key staff, and diplomats certainly count as such. When 
Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz and his team took over the MfAA, they felt like invaders: 
“The situation was of course absolutely unusual and without precedent. At first, we felt that we were occupying 
a foreign institution. Until then, we had simply been politicians sitting in the parliament Volkskammer – 
and no preparatory talks had been held. On the part of the public, the expectation was: you are the new guys, 
you are the good guys, how can you work with ‘them’? There was also an expectation from the West: how 
can you leave ‘them’ in there? But we had to be able to act immediately.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5) 
At first, they tried to work without the old experts. But the 2+4 negotiations were legally complex, 
and they quickly needed to involve some of the old GDR’s diplomatic experts:  
“To give an international frame to the German reunification, the 2+4 negotiations took place with the four 
powers and the two German states. The foreign partners asked [Markus Meckel] why he didn’t bring his 
legal specialists from the MfAA with him. He had previously just refused to take the head of the legal and 
contract department [to the negotiations]. And then, because he had no expertise in this domain, he had to 
bring him along after all.” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 7)  
It is not just that the new team lacked specialized expertise in certain topic areas such as 
international law; they also needed to go through a steep learning curve: what was possible, what 
was doable and what could be achieved in a given situation? They entered office with many ideals 
and expectations, and the experienced diplomats knew what could be rationally achieved: 
“Then I learned more and more that the people in the MfAA had a qualified, rational view of the issues we 
had to deal with. They were often better informed and more rational in their analysis and important for our 
decision-making as political actors. If we said: we want this and that, they slowed us down in our idealism 
and therefore advised us well.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5) 
And so the GDR’s old diplomatic personnel, the practical experts of international relations, ended 
up preparing the technicalities of the 2+4 negotiations. Some experts, some departments – 
depending on the issue at hand – were involved in the new tasks at hand. But what the 
‘revolutionaries’ did not do was include and involve the whole institution of foreign affairs, or 
draw on all the available resources.363 As a result, the foreign policy bureaucracy became divided 
into various discrete circles of expertise:  
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“There were several oddly separate communication circles in the MfAA. There was the established 
bureaucracy, which ultimately prepared the entire two plus four negotiations in a technically very solid manner, 
but had no say in anything else. Then there were the peace researchers who had direct access to the minister, 
but who were ultimately not heard either, because the GDR itself no longer had any political leeway. And 
then there were a couple of advisors like me. It was evidently a classic breakdown situation.” (Interview 
Wallraf, 2019: 12) 
But the old diplomats felt rejected and excluded – despite their loyal support of the GDR’s new 
political course and their clear expertise on the subject matter. Particularly the fact that the 
overwhelming majority were willing to support the new foreign policy goals increased the feeling 
of rejection – as well as the fact that it was not some foreigner, but their very own minister 
marginalizing them:364  
“This is where our marginalization began. Already by our own new minister.” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 6)  
Symbolic for that interaction was the fact that after becoming minister of foreign affairs, Markus 
Meckel did not contact the existing ministry to engage in preliminary talks as other newly appointed 
ministers did. The reason behind this was that he and his newly formed core team of advisors 
needed to clarify their own political line before engaging with the institution they were taking over. 
They needed to figure out their own position, their goals, values and procedures.365 In that process 
they drew on help and advice from some of the IR experts of the IIB young reformers:  
“The fact that there were no preliminary talks with the MfAA staff before the takeover was not 
unprofessional, but fitted the situation. We first had to clarify our political line in a closer circle. We also 
included a number of scientists from the IIB in Potsdam: Raimund Krämer, Jochen Franzke, Wolfram 
Wallraf etc. We already had contact with them in the run-up to the Volkskammer’s election, as from the 
SPD party congress in February, our own structures started developing in different policy areas. They offered 
to act as consultants, but also with the interest to be actively involved. So there was an exchange with younger 
scientists who had studied international relations in the GDR and of whom we had the impression that they 
were also deliberately looking for a new course of policy.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5) 
Underlying this is a virulent public debate about the way in which old GDR officials should be 
treated, whether they should still be involved in politics.366 The diplomats were tainted by their 
service of the old regime and by assumptions about their affiliation with the Stasi.367 Both sides 
didn’t know whether they could trust each other: 
“Of course, there was the issue of loyalty hanging in the air. We didn't know them, we had no experience 
dealing with them. And they had no experience dealing with us either.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5-6)  
When deciding whom to work with and whom to trust in the diplomatic service, Hans-Jürgen 
Misselwitz needed to rely on his gut feeling about people and personality. Ultimately, he drew the 
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line between owning up past responsibility or erasing it: those who claimed to have always been 
against the system as closet oppositionals did not win his trust. But those who owned up their 
support to the past system while convincingly demonstrating commitment and loyalty to the new 
regime won his trust.368  
In this last phase of the revolution, the ‘revolutionaries’ took over the MfAA. In that process they 
sharply delineated themselves from the diplomatic corps over whom they took leadership. In 
relational terms, this meant that a previously bounded social entity – the MfAA – split into two 
parts with the new leaders and the old staff becoming de facto separate entities. They related in 
new ways as the new leaders remained somewhat dependent on the old staff’s expertise, who, in 
turn, had no other outlet for their expertise.  
New knowledge networks 
While the ‘revolutionaries’ in power at the MfAA had to deal with the staff they inherited, they did 
have the power to choose their close team of advisors, as well as their relations with other 
knowledge providers. As such, the relation between the MfAA and the various institutions 
surrounding it changed. Ties were cut or personalized between the ministry and previously 
connected GDR institutions, while new ties – both institutional and personal ones – were formed 
between the ministry and previously unconnected groups, inside and outside the GDR.  
In their choice of advisors, the ‘revolutionaries’ at the MfAA had to decide between East German 
advisers from the old elites that they tried to consciously distance themselves from or West 
German advisers of whom they were suspicious and from whom they tried to remain independent. 
They found a two-way solution. Instead of recruiting West German experts from the political 
establishment, they turned to West German academics: peace researchers who seemed to be 
independent enough from the West German political establishment and the East German 
academics and peace researchers, but who also seemed to fit with the political line of peace, 
disarmament and collective security they tried to put forward.369 To this group they added a few 
hand-picked East German experts chosen on the basis of reform-oriented expertise and a 
personality match. Two of them were from the old GDR international relations institutions: Dr 
Schwarz from the IPW and Dr Wallraf from the IIB. Dr Schwarz, whose former expertise at the 
IPW included monitoring developments at the NATO and being the right hand of the institute’s 
director, had been involved in talks with the Christian peace conference for many years prior to 
the upheavals. He had made a good impression; a week after the March elections, they called him 
to join the team: 
“Eight days after the Volkskammer election I got a call from a young man I knew from the Christian 
Peace Conference – a coalition of left-wing Christians from the GDR – with whom the SED had also been 
in dialogue with. In the previous years I had attended many panel discussions there. These had always been 
relatively free discussions. Someone from this Christian Peace Conference called me and said, ‘I am going to 
become head of foreign and security policy.’ The young man in question was an engineer specialized in water 
management. But he was interested in issues of peace, peace policy, security, disarmament. He said: “Do you 
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want to join?” […] I said: ‘I was at the IPW, I am a party member of the SED’. He said: ‘Everything 
has been discussed with the head of state De Maiziere who said: ‘Just make sure not to get all your experts 
from the SED.’ The point is, if you look at the oppositional civil society movements of that time, many of 
which took over the leading positions: if they really wanted to have competence, then they could either get it 
from the [West German] Federal Republic – and they overpowered us at all levels – or you looked for the 
competence of your own people. The department of foreign and security policy under Thilo Steinbach didn't 
want anyone from the West looking over his shoulder and advising him in what way. [...] That is how I 
became deputy head of the Department for Foreign and Security Policy in the prime minister's office as it was 
then called.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 3)  
The other expert was Dr Wallraf from the IIB. An expert on Japan, he studied international 
relations in Moscow, which made him fluent in Russian and somewhat knowledgeable about the 
Soviet Union. He stumbled into his post by chance: while playing tennis he got in touch with 
someone who had contacts in the newly formed social-democratic party, SPD. Through these 
connections he heard that they were searching for experts on foreign policy and he was able to 
meet Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz.370 Put on board of the 2+4 team, he was tasked with figuring out 
up to what point the Soviet Union would be willing to accept an eastward expansion of NATO. 
He travelled to Moscow, spoke with decision makers and advisers and wrote the GDR’s report on 
the political mood of the Soviet Union relating to NATO’s expansion.371 But the few experts on 
the team recruited from amongst the old elites were quickly pushed to the margins of the decision-
making centre; they were tainted by their previous political affiliation. The West German peace 
researchers called the shots.372 Amongst them was Prof. Ulrich Albrecht from the FU, an expert 
in research on armament, arms limitation and de-armament, who organized the internal circle of 
advisers. The second important figure was Dr Peter Schlotter, an expert from the West German 
Peace Research Institute PRIF in Frankfurt. Others, like West Germany’s famous peace researcher 
Prof. Dieter Senghaas, were invited to come for individual consultations.373 The West German 
peace researchers were also sought after because they could give information about the West 
German political establishment and their views and positions, but without being a part of it 
themselves. Ultimately, the new advisory team around foreign minister Markus Meckel was around 
30 people strong and composed of four different groups. There was a core group of trusted 
political companions,374 a group of West German advisors from academia, peace research and the 
MfAA, and there was a third group recruited from the political environment of GDR oppositionals 
and reformers. The technical personnel were recruited from amongst Markus Meckel’s personal 
acquaintances.375 While all these made up the close team of advisors, another group was also 
relevant: the diplomats and foreign policy experts working at the MfAA headquarters in Berlin. 
 
                                               
370 Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13. 
371 Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2-3; Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13.  
372 Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13.  
373 Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9. 
374 Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz, Carl-Christian von Braunmühl, Helmut Domke, Petra Erler and one or two others.  
375 Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9-10.  
 102 
At the same time, things were moving at the IIB. On 27 April, elections to renew its leadership 
were held. Assuming that he would win, the candidate affiliated with the SPD had already arranged 
his first post-election meeting: a consultation with Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz at the MfAA.376 But 
these were new times and the elections took a surprising turn: with 71 of 93 valid votes, Raimund 
Krämer was elected instead to be the IIB’s new head.377 Having navigated the IIB as acting director 
through its previous phase of upheaval, he did not actually plan on running, but was heavily 
encouraged to do so and joined the list late.378 This was the “small revolution at the IIB.”379 In the 
months running up to the elections, those remaining active at the IIB had been divided: should 
they try to reattach the institute to the changing political infrastructure of the country and be a 
policy advice think tank or should they stay away from politics and become a neutral academic 
institution? Raimund Krämer had been advocating for the IIB to become an academic institution 
detached from politics.380 Despite his doubts about the appointment at the MfAA, he attended the 
scheduled meeting, but quickly realized that the IIB was not welcome anymore.381 This was a 
turning point for Raimund Krämer: the meeting made it clear to him that however much the IIB 
tried to reform itself, whether or not it had competence, expertise or a democratically renewed 
structure, it was perceived and judged by others as a part of the old elites. From then on, the course 
was set. In order to survive, the IIB needed to be an independent institution and work hard on 
becoming a model academic faculty. The goal was to become a political science faculty with a 
specialization in international relations, thereby following the blueprint of Western standards.382  
Regrouping around Raimund Krämer, the mood at the IIB changed. There was purpose and 
direction again at the institute. Careful optimism, even.383 The core group consisted of two 
handfuls of colleagues, all of them in their mid-thirties or early forties. They possessed the 
necessary academic credentials, having been awarded their habil and having had extensive work 
experience at the IIB. Some of them, but not all, were already somewhat more senior, having been 
deputy heads of department or even in one case head of department for a short while before the 
upheavals of 1989 began.384 Those from a younger generation still busy writing their dissertations 
would never finish their PhDs.385 Those of the older generation were mostly either unable to accept 
change, withdrew out of themselves or had been removed. They had been in power too long to 
have credentials in the new world that was being built. Only a few remained and supported the 
effort of renewal.386  
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The relation with the new MfAA became both individualized and irrelevant. Ties to the former 
centre of gravity were effectively cut, despite some low-intensity, irrelevant forms of connection 
remaining: 
“It was now clear that the CDU party was in power and that the CDU was approaching Genscher, or 
rather, West Germany. And this was the end of it. Memos kept being fed into the MfAA, but they played 
no role whatsoever and that is why the connection to the MfAA was loose.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 
8) 
Writing memos and sending them to the MfAA was a central element to previous interactions and 
remains an engrained pattern of habit, despite it having lost any meaning or significance. In 
addition to this shadow of past times, two types of connections remained. The first connection 
was between IIB researchers like Wolfram Wallraf who left their home institution to join the team 
around Markus Meckel and Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz but remained in touch with their former 
colleagues on a personal level. Another type of connection is the one between those IIB 
researchers who stayed at their home institution but maintained their former personal and 
professional connections to the now marginalized diplomats at the MfAA: 
“I myself retained a close relationship with the Foreign Ministry almost until the end. That didn't have much 
to do with our institute anymore, but with the fact that I knew all the people from the UN department, the 
US/Japan department and the policy department from working together previously. I continued going there 
for information and to get materials. I discussed things with them. But that was more on a personal level, the  
professional and the personal were bleeding into each other. In that sense, I still had a connection to the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, as many others with similar connections did too. But many at the IIB also did 
not have these connections, for example my colleague Raimund Krämer, whose main focus was on the IIB. 
But he had also been tied to the IIB from the start. He did have a connection to the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
through the Latin America department via Nicaragua and Cuba and so on, but it was not an intensive 
contact.“ (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 8) 
While the IIB set out on the path of renewal, the IPW was falling apart. From the March elections 
onwards, it stopped playing a role in the GDR’s politics.387 Being first and foremost a research 
think tank geared towards advising and supporting political institutions it had no place in a new 
order of things where the old was consciously rejected and institutions and elites from the past 
order were undesirable. While continuing to exist on paper until the summer, the IPW’s 
researchers started to fall into two camps: those who hung onto the old structures and those who 
had been at odds with them and embraced the new developments. 
“The structures [of the IPW] were literally crumbling. Those who had never been very productive stayed 
longest. Those who had had issues with the structures in place because they could not fully develop or work 
the way they wanted, tried early on to channel their expertise and influence where it was valued and asked 
for.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5-6) 
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The latter group was also the one who enjoyed research and felt invested in their topics of 
expertise. To stay relevant, they followed two strategies: they personalized their expertise and they 
tried – but failed – to reform the IPW.  
The personalization of expertise was a wider trend in those last months of the GDR. Institutions 
like the IIB or IPW or research groups at the universities functioned as part of the ordered 
networks of knowledge production that were relevant pre-revolution. The revolutionary events 
reshuffled these structures, and the old institutions became irrelevant. But the people making up 
these institutions didn’t disappear; they re-aligned and re-clustered in new formats. Following their 
topics of expertise, many researchers and experts flocked around the relevant people and places 
who were in need of their content expertise. Some institutions were more open than others; the 
defence ministry under Eppelmann, for instance, was more open to receive advice than the MfAA 
under Meckel. But overall, these were busy and hectic times, they participated in expert rounds, 
worked for the Volkskammer, the GDR’s parliament, for the new parties that have just formed and 
they advised various MPs:388  
“The IPW actually didn’t play a role anymore after March. That was the time when the new government 
personalized the advisory functions. After 18 March I worked mainly in the Volkskammer. The need for 
advice based on the expertise available at the IPW became personalized. As an organization, the IPW itself 
no longer played a role. And once the process of unification became immediate, Western advisors played a 
bigger role than those from the East.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5)  
The other strategy was to adapt by reforming the institution itself. It is, again, the middle-aged 
generation that took the initiative. Their core idea was to save the IPW by finding a prominent 
Western expert to take over the leadership of the institution. From their previous job they had 
plenty of contact with Western institutions and experts. They had good relations with West 
German social-democrats, with peace researchers, with opposition leaders. They knew who they 
needed for the job, who would have the power to make the IPW a credible institution in these 
new times. Talks took place with a number of candidates: prominent West German newspaper 
correspondents, former IISS directors and professors at the West German university of the armed 
forces.389 But the IPW as an institution was not politically wanted anymore. All the candidates 
declined the offer.390 During the times of the German-German Cold War, the IPW had played an 
important political role. Not just as a research institute, but as a low-key contact point: West 
German politicians wishing to speak with Erich Honecker would often start by giving a talk at the 
IPW. This symbolic meaning of the IPW was probably part of the reason for closing it down.391   
The decision to wind down the IPW was made in the summer of 1990, and its formal closure took 
place in early October just before the German unification:392   
“The IPW had already been dissolved by the last GDR government during the summer. My wife had been 
working there as a research assistant. […] The entire workforce was simply dismissed. Social buffer – that 
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didn’t exist in the GDR. Severance payments were another thing that did not exist in the GDR. so people 
were put on the street with no employment perspective whatsoever. Apart from the one exception that I am 
aware of […] none had a chance to continue with their professional career. The choice was to either retire if 
you were old enough for it or look for something completely different.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 4) 
With the closure of the IPW, 400 employees lost their jobs. This decision was taken by the GDR’s 
government before the unification with West Germany. No rules or regulations were applicable 
for the situation; the researchers’ careers were all ended.393  
This last phase of the revolution, the ‘revolutionary outcome’, completely reconfigured the 
networks of knowledge production surrounding the GDR’s MfAA. Ties between the MfAA and 
the institutions previously connected to it were severed. The IPW was shut down, the IIB was cut 
off and the departments of area studies at the universities became irrelevant. Some of these former 
ties were personalized through the connections between individuals who went to join the 
‘revolutionaries’ at the MfAA or through the connections between IIB researchers staying at their 
home institutions but maintaining their old ties to the now marginalized diplomats at the MfAA. 
At the same time it created a new set of ties with West German advisers who were previously 
disconnected from the GDR’s dominant networks of knowledge production, but did have weak 
sets of ties with the oppositional peace movements. This former boundary between two distinct 
networks of knowledge circulation was partly dissolved as the West German peace researchers 
integrated the advisory team at the GDR’s MfAA.  
In relation to the dynamics of the previous phase of the revolution, this meant that the group of 
reform-oriented peace and security analysts that came together in the first two phases ultimately 
failed to establish themselves in the outcome phase. The previous sections followed how the 
reform-oriented security analysts of various institutions were bound up together under the roof of 
the peace research council during the polarization phase of the revolution and how they in turn 
gained political momentum in the ‘struggle and cohabitation’ phase when they were hooked 
together with the peace and security-oriented individuals from the oppositional movements. In 
the last phase of the revolution this last step reversed as the ‘revolutionaries’ in power preferred 
the association with the West German peace researchers. The group formed in the first phase of 
polarization, though, continued to exist:  
“[T]here was a group called ‘Demilitarization of Security’ which included colleagues from the Babelsberg 
IIB, from the IPW and also from the Dresden Military Academy, who tried to develop a coherent overarching 
concept for security in Central Europe. They saw their work as an alternative to the […] predominantly 
illusory models of the West German peace research that were circulating at that time, and which achieved a 
very strong advisory position for the last GDR government. [...] Because of a lack of resources, it was an 
ultimately foreseeable failed attempt to bring together the intellectual leadership figures in the GDR in the 
field of security-relevant peace research and to develop ideas, unencumbered by the institutional hierarchical 
structures that existed before.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 4-5) 
Having lost political momentum, it ultimately failed to establish itself within the new networks of 
knowledge production that formed and set in the last phase of the revolution. It was the models 
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of the West German peace researchers, not those of the GDR reform-oriented peace and security 
scholars, that became politically dominant. 
The wider context 
Back at the MfAA, newly appointed minister Markus Meckel assumed that the GDR would 
continue to exist for a while. The March elections did mean that the ultimate goal was a unification 
with West German, but at that time most people thought this would take another five years. In 
any case it was long enough to be active in the field of international relations as an independent 
power with an independent agenda.394 Over the course of the following months, it became clearer 
and clearer that this would not be the case. The biggest task ahead were the 2+4 negotiations, and 
Markus Meckel and his team soon realized that one of their big challenges was to deal with the 
fact that no-one in the West took the GDR seriously.  
The Western powers involved in the 2+4 talks had a minimal agenda: all they wanted was to agree 
on when to give up their special rights.395 But the GDR approached the issue from a different 
angle. After its constitution following the March elections, the GDR Volkskammer issued a 
statement about its historical responsibility, which also included an acknowledgement of the 
existing ties to its Eastern Neighbours: 
“If you look at the unanimous statements of the Volkskammer, they stand for an awareness of history that 
is clear about the point that this is not just about a national history, but about a European question. And 
that’s why our former allies and our relationship with them are an important part of what we bring to this 
marriage [with West Germany]. […] From this we derived the foreign policy maxims of the coalition 
agreement and took our first steps. We moved into the Foreign Affairs Ministry on 19 April. The first 
unofficial visit was to [West German] Foreign Affairs Minister Genscher. But for the first official visit we 
went to Warsaw shortly afterwards.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3-4)  
The GDR saw 2+4 primarily as negotiations about the post-Cold War order of Europe, especially 
in relation to questions of military and security. This is the forum where all the powers needed for 
it are assembled and could develop ideas. It should not just be about Germany. Poland especially 
wanted guarantees about the borders with Germany. There were issues around Germany’s military 
status, nuclear weapons, the stationing of foreign troops. All this needed to be addressed and, 
showing solidarity for the concerns of its Eastern neighbours, the GDR pushed for it to happen. 
Together with Poland and Czechoslovakia they proposed to create a ‘European zone of security 
in Europe’ embedded in the CSCE.396 
But Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz and his team quickly realized what the main 
constraint was that was impeding any serious foreign policy: the GDR had become irrelevant; no-
one took them into account anymore:397 
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“I was a member of the negotiation delegation under Foreign Minister Meckel in Moscow, and nobody took 
us seriously.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2-3)  
The unequal position of the GDR in diplomatic negotiations was underscored by its lack of secret 
service support. Because of the revolutionary dismissal of the Stasi, the GDR was the only power 
at the table with no confidential information about the other ones. Yet everyone else was well 
informed about the happenings in the GDR’s new foreign ministry: when Markus Meckel, Hans-
Jürgen Misselwitz and his team moved into the MfAA building they learned that all the lines were 
being tapped by the Soviets:  
“We were faced with the problem of what to do now, since we did have to make telephone calls. A West 
German company offered to set up a completely new telephone network for us. This was then done with the 
active help of the [West German] Federal Chancellery for the entire GDR government. I later heard that 
the person who did this on the part of the Federal Chancellery was also responsible for secret services. As 
such we could count on the [West German secret service] BND being better informed than ourselves about 
what was going on in our house.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 7)  
The last phase of the revolution re-formed and re-set the knowledge networks at play in the GDR. 
It had reshaped the entities involved in it, splitting the MfAA into a revolutionary centre and 
marginalizing diplomatic corps, but also leading to tremendous transformations within institutions 
like the IPW, the universities and, as we will see in the next section, the IIB. But it also changed 
the connections between all these entities in terms of the relations between various institutions 
and actors, but also in terms of the hierarchies between them. In this section we saw how the 
GDR was catapulted into a new international constellation where it was powerless to the point of 
irrelevance, at least to the Western actors who shaped the events. This impacted the knowledge 
networks we have seen so far: while ideas, memos, studies and advice were developed and 
circulated within them, they gained no traction because the GDR ultimately had no independent 
power or impact anymore: 
“The translation of scientific analysis and the drafts developed from it into practical politics was not to be 
achieved with a few people only. It would have required a much broader approach, in terms of personnel, 
politics and media. We didn’t even have time to rebuild the existing diplomatic corps. We had to do everything 
straight away, almost instantly.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9) 
While the West German peace researchers thus had a central influence on the ideas and policies 
of the GDR’s foreign affairs minister Meckel, their ideas never translated into meaningful political 
action. Their timeline was too short, and the political odds were stacked against them: 
“Then there were the peace researchers who had direct access to the minister’s ear, but because the GDR itself 
no longer had any political leverage, they were not heard either. […] Some advisors, such as Ulrich Albrecht, 
a well-known West German peace researcher, had probably hoped that the path to a peaceful German foreign 
policy could be taken with [foreign minister] Meckel.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12) 
While the political weight and leverage of the knowledge networks oriented around the GDR’s 
political institutions diminished its impact and ultimate chance of survival, we see in the next 
section that others like the IIB took on a different strategy. They saw another knowledge network, 
the West German academic political science network, as offering a better chance of survival, and 
 108 
thus worked hard to transform themselves as an entity and to establish ties to integrate in this 
network.   
Reforming the IIB: Western Orientation 
“What sort of East German institution would have simply waited for the Westerners to come and say: ‘Ok, 
we’ll just go away and you come?’” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 11)  
We have seen that GDR institutions like the IPW or the IIB that were previously connected to 
the MfAA had been cut off from these networks. They needed to find a new mode of relevance 
in order to survive. Institutions like the IPW that did not, simply disappeared. But, unlike the IPW, 
the IIB was not just a research and advisory institution attached to the political realm – it was also 
a teaching and training facility. This allowed the IIB to fall back onto a different template, namely 
West German academia, and integrate into the network of knowledge production formed by West 
German academia. Accordingly, the IIB reformed, aiming to become a classical West German 
political science department, perhaps with a retained specialization on international relations. 
Working towards this goal involved carrying out two main types of changes, personnel changes 
and curriculum changes, along with finding access points to the Western academic networks. 
These changes partly started in the previous revolutionary phase, but they took up speed after the 
IIB’s April election. While the team of reformers around Raimund Krämer originally expected a 
timeline of around five years to reform before a unification with West Germany, the timeline 
accelerated and in August 1990 it became finally clear that it would take place within the year, on 
3 October.398  
Sizing down: Cutting the staff in half 
The main challenge in becoming a political science ‘department’ of West German modelling was 
size.399 A West German department of political science typically featured four or five 
professorships, each of which were allocated an average of two to three members of staff of 
various levels of seniority. This made them 12 to 20 people strong. The IIB, however, featured 
around 120 researchers, of which around 40 were senior members and 80 more were junior 
members, as well as around 50 language teachers and 40 ‘technical’ staff members, including 
secretaries, librarians, documentarians and IT experts.400 The first goal, however, was not to reduce 
these numbers to the exact West German standards, but simply to half them, as this was the budget 
that had been made available for the year 1991.401  
By the time Raimund Krämer took over the IIB in April, the total amount of staff on his hands 
was already reduced; he had around 100 members of staff left to handle.402 By turning into the 
political science section of the HRV, the IIB had slimmed down as part of the overall 
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reorganization of its home institution: the IIB’s former department of ‘world economy’ had been 
moved to the HRV’s economists, the IIB’s former areas of international law and media law had 
been moved to the HRV’s jurists, the IIB’s former area of diplomatic practice had been moved to 
HRV‘s philosophers and psychologists, the IIB’s former department of information and 
documentation had been moved to the HRV’s information centre, and finally, the IIB’s former 
department of foreign languages had become its own unit within the HRV that answered directly 
to the director.403 Many of these changes had been desired and pushed for by the respective staff 
members: the international lawyers imagined they had a better chance of surviving the upheavals 
as lawyers, those studying ‚world economy,‘ that they had better chances as economists, etc.404 But 
some colleagues also left silently because of their former strong affiliation with the Stasi405 or 
simply because they saw better opportunities outside of the IIB or wanted to take part in the 
political renewal of their country. Of the latter group many had remained formally at the IIB, 
despite actually being involved in politics. But many of these came back to the IIB in this last phase 
of the revolution, disillusioned about their impact and the possibilities available to them. Clustering 
again around Raimund Krämer, they hoped to channel their expertise at the IIB.  
So by the time Raimund Krämer took over the IIB, his task was to half his staff from 97 to around 
50-60. Ultimately they would succeed, managing to lay off 42 staff members,  and remaining with 
55,406 but it was a rough time with severe conflicts.407 The first ones to go were the very young and 
the very old:  
 “The turnover at the IIB was high at that time – but differentiated according to age groups. The pressure to 
lay off staff increased. Very young colleagues, some of whom wanted to do their PhD with me, hardly had a 
chance or tried to take advantage of other professional opportunities. Then the very old, who either retired or 
were about to retire, were the first to be released from employment.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 6) 
The colleagues close to retirement were the first targets of reduction aims. Not just at the IIB, but 
in the whole of the GDR, pre-retirement rules had been put in place since February: women from 
the age of 55 onwards and men from the age of 60 could and should go into pre-retirement.408 
Over time, the pressure at the IIB and the HRV increased: everyone who could retire or go into 
pre-retirement was urged to voluntarily do so.409 Most of them did not want to, but would 
ultimately have no choice.410 In May, all the staff decisions were finalized and approved by the 
HRV’s scientific council.411 In June they were put into action: the laid-off staff were fired, their last 
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working day set to be 31 August 1990.412 Of the 41 staff members leaving the IIB, 17 went into 
pre-retirement, 14 were fired, five had temporary contract that were not renewed, five left to get 
retrained in a new employment area and one left for medical reasons.413 But not all the remaining 
55 colleagues were equally active. Around 25 to 30 colleagues still showed up,414 while only 10 to 
12 were properly involved and active.415 
Curriculum changes: From IR to political science 
“The great thing about these times compared to today was that you had a very small window of time where 
you were very free. So you could create a curriculum or examination regulations or an institute structure 
within eight weeks. That was really nice.”(Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2) 
“There were memos and memos and memos. I remember, I wrote plenty of them.” (Interview Muszynski, 
2019: 12) 
The other important step in becoming a political science department was to actually reorient the 
content from international relations to political science. In the spring of 1990, in the earlier phase 
of the revolution, the IIB had already reformed its curriculum into a freer version of international 
relations. But these times were over now and once Raimund Krämer came into office, it was clear 
that the focus needed to be political science: 
“In February/March we evaluated foreign policy and diplomacy courses of the kind that existed in England, 
Moscow or the USA and wanted to draw inspiration from them. The focus was on IR. We had hoped to 
develop an original international relations course, because [there was a West-German article arguing] that 
there were no IR curricula in Germany despite them being needed. We saw an opportunity for ourselves! But 
from May onwards it became clear to us that the (long-term) perspective of German unity meant a complete 
reorientation towards (normal) political science.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 5) 
There were two steps in the process: in the spring and early summer of 1990 the IR curriculum 
was toned down and political science components were added to it. At that point German 
unification was still a long-term perspective. The curriculum was officially approved by the GDR 
government later in the summer and became the only officially sanctioned political science 
programme of the GDR, with around 120 students registering to study political science in the 
autumn semester.416 Once it became clear that German unification was not a long-term perspective 
but a very short-term one, the process sped up and a new wave of revisions came into play. In 
September/October a revised curriculum with even less IR and more West-German political 
science was drafted, but not yet implemented, as the unification dynamics would lead the process 
elsewhere.  
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In February, a new curriculum had been developed.417 The degree was called ‘political science with 
special knowledge in the area of international law and international relations.’ Despite the nod to 
political science in the title, it was in essence still an IR curriculum. The goal was to train students 
to work in international organizations in the areas of politics, economics and culture; as scientific 
advisors and analysts in internationally oriented governmental and parliamentary bureaus; experts 
in parties, political movements, foundations, legal cabinets; as media consultants for domestic and 
international processes; as international experts for the industry, commerce, banking and finances 
in national and international contexts; as well as for work in international legal affairs. Half of the 
study would be focused on targeted language training and language acquisition and the other half 
on content coursework. The coursework was divided into six areas: 1/Theory of international 
relations and politics; 2/History (international relations, general and German); 3/ Law and 
international relations (international law, diplomatic and consular law, international economic law, 
state, constitutional and administration law); 4/ World economy and international relations 
(economics, international economic structures and current world economic processes); 5/Regional 
studies (USA and Western Europe; URSSR and Eastern Europe; Asian-pacific region; developing 
countries of Asia, Afrika and Latin America); 6/ Diplomacy and international negotiations.  
In March/April, a new curriculum was developed. It was still heavily oriented around international 
relations, but the pressures to make it more ‘political science’ became visible. In its curriculum 
explanations, the IIB became more defensive, highlighting how essential international relations is 
as a traditional component of political science.418 The main challenge was how to turn a degree and 
a departmental structure based on existing staff with existing expertise into something that it was 
not yet. In March, the solution was found by reorganizing the IIB’s expertise into three domains: 
theory, regional experts, and everyone else. The ‘theory’ part was relabelled ‘general political 
science’; the ‘regional experts’ became ‘domestic politics and comparative political science’ and 
everyone whose expertise could not be switched around was put in the category ‘International 
Relations’. The IIB was thus restructured as follows: the area of ‘general political science’ received 
four chairs (political theory, political sociology, methods in empirical political research and history 
and theory of international politics), the area of domestic politics and comparative studies received 
five chairs (Theory of Political Systems and System Comparison; Politics and Political Systems in 
Germany; Politics and Political Systems of Developed Industrial Countries; Politics and Political 
Systems in Eastern Europe; Chair of Politics and Political Systems in Developing Countries) while 
the area of international politics received six chairs (Global Problems and International Politics; 
International Security and Disarmament; International Organizations and Administration; Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE Process); European Integration Structures; Development 
Policy).419  
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This curriculum proposition met the resistance of the HRV’s director. His handwritten annotation 
on the curriculum plan asked, “Why still focus on IR? Why not real political science?”420 He wanted 
the IIB to be structured around three different areas of focus: political theory, domestic politics 
and IR, including comparative politics. He did not want an expanded IR domain, nor a large quasi-
IR domain of comparative politics.421 Over the next months, the framing of core areas went back 
and forth, but ultimately the core areas were settled around political theories, political sociology, 
comparative political systems, and IR.422 These were not given equal weight, though, as existing 
scholars retained their original expertise, albeit in a somewhat different accentuation. In total, 14 
chairs were agreed upon, and 11 of these were staffed with existing IIB experts. The remaining 
three had to be hired in:423 
1. Political Theories: nk 
2. History of International Relations: Prof. Dr sc. J. Kruger 
3. Theory of International Relations: Prof. Dr sc. M Müller 
4. Theory of Political Systems and System Comparison: nk 
5. Domestic Politics and Political Systems in Germany: nk 
6. Political Systems in Eastern Europe: Dr sc. J. Franzke 
7. Political Systems of Western Industrial Societies: Doz. sc. W. Wallraf 
8. Political Systems of Developing Countries: Prof. Dr sc. W. Hundt 
9. Global Problems and Politics: Prof Dr sc. H. Mardek 
10. International Security Policy and Disarmament: Prof. Dr sc. W. Kubiczek 
11. International Organizations and Administrations: Doz. Dr sc. W. Kötter 
12. Development Politics: Doz. Dr sc. R. Krämer 
13. European Integration and Security Policy: Prof. Dr sc. W. Stock 
14. German Foreign Policy: Prof. Dr sc. K. Montag 
The chairs were not allocated to any one core area, presumably to make the unequal distribution 
less visible. But the blueprint solution underlying the curriculum changes from IR to political 
science revolved primarily around a recycling of area experts into comparatists. In August, all the 
further documents needed for a proper degree were made available, including a detailed course 
syllabus for the autumn and study and examination rules (the Studienordnung and 
Diplomprüfungsordnung).424 Many other universities also tried to develop political science degrees, but 
they did so on the basis of the subject area of Marxism/Leninism. The IIB was the only one to 
develop it from an IR perspective. They were also the only institution whose political science 
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degree was officially recognized by the GDR’s De Maizière government.425 They heavily advertised 
the new degree and got around 120 new students to enrol, among whom were some applicants 
from the FRG and many foreign students from Poland who had previously been in the GDR.426  
 
Accessing Western networks 
Having largely modelled its content and size on the West German standards, the IIB now needed 
to integrate in the relevant academic political science networks of West Germany. It did so in three 
main ways: by hiring West German staff, by seeking out contact with and evaluation from the 
West German political science association, and by developing institutional contacts with other 
political science faculties, in particular with the Otto-Suhr Institute at the FU in Berlin.  
Moving to political science from the discipline of international relations meant that the IIB had 
two main blind spots: they had no credible experts on Western political theory available, nor did 
they have credible experts on the legal constitution of West Germany or West German domestic 
politics. The point about credibility was particularly sensitive when it came to political theory, since 
Western political theory was understood in West Germany to be a discipline critical of power and 
critical of politics. Because of their status as former elite institutions of a system understood to be 
unfree and dictatorial, any GDR expert able to understand and teach political theory would not be 
credible. The solution was to hire West German staff to cover these areas and help them navigate 
the new networks of West German academia.  
At the same time, in West Germany, the academic exchange institution DAAD was setting up an 
exceptional fund to support West German staff wishing to go to the GDR, to assist its academic 
institutions in their reform projects. It was funded by the federal government of the FRG who has 
approved DM 5,2 Mio for the DAAD to support the university cooperation with the GDR. This 
is meant to 1/support scientists from the FRG to teach at GDR universities (4,5 Mio), 2/support 
exchanges of scientists (0,5 Mio), and 3/support GDR members of university to attend summer 
schools and internships in the FRG (0,2Mio). These were meant to be exceptional funds that were 
not to be extended in this form after 1991.427 The goal of the programme was “to compensate for 
ideological, scientific, technical or equipment-related deficits in university education and university 
research in the GDR, as well as to prepare scientists and young academics for the primary tasks 
involved in restructuring the economy and society.”428 Applications worked in three ways. An 
interested West German academic could make a preliminary arrangement with GDR universities, 
then apply to the DAAD. An interested GDR university could ask the DAAD to find them 
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relevant scholars, or an interested West German scholar could ask the DAAD to match them with 
an interested university.429 The application deadline was 31.07.1990 for procedure 1, and is 
30.06.1990 for the other two procedures.430 Economic, IT and social science disciplines were 
favoured and a close match between the scholar’s expertise and the institution’s needs were 
desired.431 But the DAAD was not the only actor at play. All the West German political foundations 
started subsidizing exchange programmes with the East, a lot of money was made available and 
many high-profile West German professors ‘went East’ for a semester or more:  
“There was obviously money available everywhere at the time. And especially for lecturers going to teach in 
the East. Some of them were top-class academics. And Potsdam was considered a good address in the East. 
So Prof. Haftendorn for example from the OSI [at the FU Berlin] was here too. I invited her to give the 
opening speech of the 1990 fall semester.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6) 
At the IIB, Dr Krämer received and shared information about the DAAD offer in June,432 and 
they were urged by the HRV to make use of it,433 which they did. For the academic year 1990/91, 
they were allocated twelve West German guest staff, while the HRV’s legal departments got eleven 
and the HRV’s economists got four:434  
1. Dr Hubertus Buchstein (political theories and sociology) 
2. Prof. Dr Hans Lothar Fischer (market economy, sectoral structure policies) 
3. Prof. Dr Gerhard Göhler (political theories) 
4. Prof. Dr Helga Haftendorn (contemporary methods and theoretical problems in 
international relations, European security and German foreign policy) 
5. Dr Reinhard Hildebrandt (the international relevance of the Berlin problem) 
6. Prof. Dr Christine Kulke (gender relations in politics and society) 
7. Dr Roman Legien (mechanisms of communal politics and democracy within parties) 
8. Prof. Dr HJ Mengel (introduction to the relation between law and politics) 
9. Doz. Dr Bernhard Muszynski (totalitarism) 
10. Dr Hartmut Salzwedel (time and personality, groups and collectives) 
11. Frau Ingeborg Siggelkow (sociological theories and methods) 
12. Alparslan Yenal (social market economy) 
Of particular interest in this process was the figure of Dr Bernhard Muszynski, who did not just 
come for an exchange semester, but insisted on getting formally hired by the IIB in August, while 
the GDR was still in existence. He started in September and was tasked to set up the area of 
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political theory.435 His focus was consciously set on democracy theory, and he aimed at exploring 
all variations and variants of it as well as exploring Marxism in all its breadth, including all the 
versions previously unavailable in the GDR.436 But he was not only there to build a branch of 
enquiry that no one else at the IIB would have the credibility to do; he was also there as someone 
who knows the Western academic system and could help the IIB to navigate it: 
“I was probably a very good buy for them. As a political scientist, I see these things in terms of interests 
anyway, so it was a give and take. I was on the one hand interested in actively participating in this 
transformation and on the other hand, in establishing myself somewhere. Their interest was to reform 
themselves in such a way that they would have a future. I had also told them that I was not inexperienced in 
the Western system.” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 1) 
These ‘first Westerners’ like Bernhard Muszynski quickly became important players as in-between 
figures who translated between East and West. They were usually not established professors, but 
fully qualified academics in search of a permanent post. They knew which institutions in Germany 
had funding available for academic projects and – crucially – how to write a successful project 
proposal. Thanks to them, the IIB was able to attract some funding for short-term projects in the 
months to come and was thus able to provide buffer spaces for many of the colleagues that had 
been laid off:  
“There is also the chapter of the ‘first Westerners’. They weren’t professors, but lecturers. They had extensive 
knowledge of third-party funding opportunities and ABM. At that time there was a lot of money for ABM 
projects at the university for academics, perhaps also to prevent the Eastern intellectuals from starting a 
revolution. But seriously: this meant that many colleagues got paid work again, even if not for a long time. 
We looked at the forms and asked ourselves what to write in there. The ‘first Westerners’ knew it, and we 
received funding.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6) 
Through hiring West German staff, and in particular through those ‘first Westerners’ who came 
and settled in the East, the IIB increased its legitimacy in Western eyes, but also incorporated 
individuals who helped them enter and access the Western system. The IIB also applied this 
strategy to other contacts. There was a flurry of offers and information available: offers for a two-
year study in Essen, invitations and offers from FAO, EG commission, IISS to be in touch and 
attend events, information about recycling professionally through engaging in administrative 
studies, or by integrating the private sectors that were particularly interested in foreign language 
knowledge.437 But the most important institutional contact that the IIB sought out was with the 
political science institute of the FU Berlin:  
“It was during this time that we made our first contact with the Otto Suhr Institute in West Berlin (OSI). 
It started very early. I went there for the first time in the autumn of 1989. At that point something began 
                                               
435 Aktennotiz Dr Krämer, Gespräch mit Herrn Dr Bernhard Muszynski, Potsdam 14.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, 
ASR13457; Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 05.09.90. Potsdam University Archive, 
Karton 176. 
436 Interview Musyznski, 2019: 11-12.  
437 Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 27.09.1990. Potsdam University Archive, 
Karton 176. 
 116 
that would become very important the following year. [The relation with the OSI] was a strategically 
important factor for us: on the one hand, from a content perspective, in relation to teaching programmes; on 
the other hand, in relation to the connection with the colleagues at OSI. A pleasant to friendly relationship.” 
(Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2) 
The political science institute OSI at the FU Berlin was the biggest and closest player in the region 
and would provide important support both in terms of sending out necessary teaching staff, partly 
through the DAAD exchanges, but also in providing content feedback on the reforms and in 
involving the IIB in content debates and discussions.438 Help in crafting the course syllabus for the 
autumn of 1990 was particularly important, and Prof. Büttner, dean of political science at the FU, 
gave input.439 This was important both in terms of ensuring the content was compatible with West 
German standards but also in terms of involving West German actors and increasing their stakes 
in the IIB. The new course syllabus for example was sent to various other stakeholders to inform 
them about the reforms and changes at the IIB and put the IIB on the agenda as an important 
player.440 The IIB also integrated in the group that exchanged and somewhat coordinated political 
science teaching and research in the region of Berlin and Potsdam.441 
The relation with the OSI at the FU was surprising as it was a politically ‘left’ institution. Its 
students and staff were quite radically left:  
“I went to the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University for the first time in the spring of 1990, but I could 
only shake my head: everything was covered with posters about the revolution, many students and many 
professors were still very left to radically left at the time. That was extremely strange to me.” (Interview 
Franzke, 2019: 10) 
As the IIB would soon find out, they were usually faced with rejection from politically left West 
German actors. Conservative academics and other actors in the knowledge field were much more 
cooperative and open for exchange than their leftist colleagues – with the exception of the OSI at 
the FU:442  
“The West German left was not on our side - we had “messed up” the socialism project. Real socialism had 
ruined the idea that they were fighting for. They blamed us for that, and it was noticeable. They didn't want 
anyone from the East.“(Interview Krämer, 2019b: 9) 
Next to hiring staff, receiving content input and support with accessing West German academic 
networks, the IIB also sought out contact with the West German political science association 
DVPW. The DVPW was an important player which we will get to know better in the next chapter 
on colonization/knowledge. They were about to formally evaluate the new political science degree 
put together by the IIB. Unification with West Germany arrived too quickly for it to play a real 
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role in the revolution dynamics as the evaluation took place in October. But the contacts were 
made and the prospect of evaluation was an important one, as the IIB needed to assert itself both 
within the HRV against the jurists who wanted to push them out, and towards the GDR’s 
government, whose endorsement and official authorization they needed.443  
Conclusion 
During the phase of the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval, the East German system of international 
relations knowledge production became severely polarized. Researchers, experts and academics 
had to navigate a field divided between pro-Gorbachev supporters and anti-Gorbachev hardliners. 
In particular, all the fields of international relations knowledge production oriented around 
studying the enemy or touching upon issues of war, peace and security, became divided between 
those upholding the old dogma and those proposing a new reinterpretation of the old frameworks. 
The latter pushed for various degrees of cooperation instead of confrontation and proposed 
redefinitions of the former Marxist/Leninist interpretive frames, such as the conceptual extension 
of ‘imperialism’ to also include the West’s innate ability for peace. Once the situation escalated in 
the autumn of 1989 and the old leadership stepped down, the GDR was governed by the fragile 
alliance between reformer socialist government and oppositional forces gathered around a ‘round 
table’ system. At the same time, as the population’s faith in this double-government waned, the 
GDR’s various political parties were gaining support and increasingly partnered up with their West 
German counterparts, whose power and influence in the process grew accordingly. In this phase, 
the GDR’s experts, researchers and academics had to navigate a highly unstable and explosive 
environment in which they had to straddle and orientate between different stakeholders and 
audiences. The old practices had to be upheld to a certain degree, while the former institutions of 
international relations knowledge production such as the IIB and IPW started to disintegrate from 
within. In short, a process of disaggregation and reaggregation took place in which old institutions 
and entities split and various cross-institutional sub-groups formed into new committees, working 
groups and organizations. For example, the reform-oriented security experts of the IIB, IPW, and 
the military institutions came together to form working groups, which in turn allied with the 
security-interested sub-groups of the oppositional movements.  
Once the revolutionary forces in the form of the Western-oriented political parties won and took 
over the GDR, its international relations researchers, experts and academics had to adapt to a new 
situation in which their expertise was still needed but not politically desired anymore. In choosing 
whom to hire as their new international relations advisors, the revolutionaries now in charge of 
the MfAA were divided between two equally unappealing options: re-hiring their old experts, 
representatives of the old regime, or enlist West German advisors. They found a rather 
unconventional compromise in appointing West German professors, specialists in peace research, 
because they seemed to provide enough distance to both the West German establishment and the 
old East German nomenklatura. The IPW did not survive this hostile last phase of the revolution 
and was closed down, rejected on the basis of its strong affiliation with the old system. The IIB 
survived the changes by radically reforming, detaching itself from the GDR’s political networks 
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and finding legitimacy and status in a re-orientation around Western academic procedures and 
standards.  
In short, during the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval, both the entities involved in knowledge 
production and their regular sets of relations were severely shaken and reconfigured. New avenues 
of research opened up while others closed down. Some academics were crowded out, while others 
were catapulted to power. Some institutions fell apart, some split, some reorganized, and some 
disappeared while the relations between all experts, researchers and academics transformed. 
Previous boundaries such as the division between East and West began to function in new ways, 








Asymmetrical Unification with the West and International 
Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR in 1990, 
Part 1: Winding Down the Old 
 “The core of the GDR’s structure fell out and the connections to [that core] vanished. The [remaining] 
individual elements floated freely and then docked onto the other system’s outer perimeter. Many East 
German institutions were absorbed by the other system when they had connection points to dock onto, which 
doesn't necessarily have to be a bad thing. And that is why there are few institutions that remained genuinely 
East German.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 28) 
“These were times where you had to take your chances. Where you had to reinvent yourself, where you had 
to take a leap of faith. We all had the right age and the necessary verve.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 16) 
 
In early 1991, Wolfgang Schwarz received a phone call: „Do you have a job?” The GDR had 
ceased to exist only a few months earlier and with the dissolution of his home institution, the IPW, 
Wolfgang Schwarz was practically unemployed. “They are retraining NVA army officers for 
business administration and urgently need staff. You should give them a call!” A former NATO 
expert and assistant to the IPW’s director, Wolfgang Schwarz was no stranger to the military sector, 
nor to the administration of a big institution. A few weeks later he had become deputy director of 
the newly set-up business academy dedicated to the re-training of former NVA officers.444 Lutz 
Kleinwächter had a comparable experience. Through connections he had heard about the re-
training of NVA army officers, and that they urgently needed teaching staff. Within five days of 
his first phone call, he was scheduled in to teach. The subject: economics. He had the right 
personality for the job. Not only was he an experienced lecturer, but his previous IIB specialization 
in armament and security issues meant that he had had plenty of experience with officers and other 
stakeholders in the defence sector. He knew how to engage with them. But economics? He took 
out his old IIB course scripts on ‘the political economy of capitalism’ from the shelf. Within a few 
days he would have to refresh the subject, map out some 70 hours of teaching materials, and 
prepare detailed lesson plans. He added a few notes here and there to his old scripts and started 
training former NVA and Stasi army officers in the basics of economics.445 These stories are 
symptomatic for the dynamics at play during the times of German unification post 1990: former 
GDR researchers, academics and intellectuals had to deal with the complete collapse of their 
previous structures and learn fast how to navigate a new environment in which they had become 
less-valued citizens. A willingness to radically change their career and the ability to wittingly use all 
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their available resources allowed most of them to build a new life in the new Germany. But only 
very few of them were able to stay active in their original field of expertise, international relations.  
This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during its 
asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing 
them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched 
out in chapter 1. As laid out there, this does not mean that the process of German unification is a 
colonial one, but rather that the theoretical model of colonization/knowledge is helpful in making 
sense of its core dynamics. Colonization/knowledge describes a process in which an asymmetrical 
situation of takeover recasts the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities 
such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising about international 
relations take place. Following the colonization/knowledge nexus, these knowledge-making 
activities will take place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a formerly independent 
knowledge space becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another knowledge space. 
Activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be 
characterized by a reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the institutions and 
organizations formerly bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, imploding, 
reorganizing or reorienting themselves within the new context. The core logic of 
colonization/knowledge is hierarchical orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the “social 
entities” involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of. 
 
Colonization/Knowledge 
Core: Hierarchical Orientation Asymmetrical Takeover 
  
 
On 2 October 1990, at midnight, the GDR ceased to exist. From then onwards, Germany only 
existed as one unified country. By agreement, the terms of this unification were asymmetrical: the 
GDR dissolved and it integrated the legal, political, economic and social order of the FRG. In 
addition to this explicit asymmetry, the process of unification was also implicitly based on what 
we might call a premise of non-recognition.446 For a long time, this premise had been the official 
structuring principle of the inter-German Cold War, whereby both East and West tried to deny 
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the other’s right to exist. Instead of disappearing at the end of the Cold War confrontation, 
however, the principle of non-recognition was arguably brought into the unification process by 
West Germany. In practice, this involved ignoring the GDR’s existence for the past 40 years and 
acting as if the communist regime had never happened, so as to erase from memory the very fact 
that a separation had ever existed. The use of the premise of non-recognition had three broad 
consequences.447 First, that all the legal rulings made in the GDR had to be reversed, including a 
reversal of all decisions concerning ownership rights and conditions back to the situation pre-
1949. Second, it established that the East had to catch up on 40 years of missed development, the 
blueprint of which was to be found in the West. Third, that the GDR had to start from scratch, 
with 1990 being their year zero. This entailed the de facto devaluation of everything that had been 
made, developed or grown in the GDR. However different the post-unification lives and careers 
of all former GDR citizens were, they all shared one experience: that of a devaluation and 
delegitimization of their biographies, including that of all previously meaningful work 
achievements and life goals. This happened both through the formal dissolution of institutions, 
organizations and structures but also more subtly through the importing of cultural and social 
standards of the West. 448 
On the level of knowledge production, the dissolution of the GDR meant that all its former 
networks and structures stopped working. The “core” that had given meaning and direction to the 
system disappeared. As a result, students, teachers, researchers, institutions, journals, publishing 
processes – in short, all the elements making up the system of knowledge production – were left 
free-floating. They continued to exist but had not, at first, any meaningful new attachments. The 
process of asymmetrical unification with West Germany gradually changed this. All the GDR’s 
remaining free-floating units of knowledge production – i.e. the students, teachers, researchers, 
institutions, journals, publishing processes etc. – were attached to an unchanged West German 
system and went through a process of re-aggregation in which they had to dock onto whichever 
connection points were available to them.449 In some cases this meant that formerly East German 
units such as the IIB had to dissolve, because there was no meaningful place for them in the West 
German system. In these cases, the individuals, venues and objects that had made up the former 
unit were left free-floating and had to find new ways to integrate the West German system. In 
other cases, this meant that formerly East German units such as the Humboldt University in Berlin 
(HU) were able to find a meaningful place in the West German system, in the case of the HU in 
the context of the university system. In cases such as these, however, the unit did not remain as it 
had been previously and was required to go through a process of change so as to function well in 
the new system.  
This part of the PhD thesis examines the processes at play in the field of international relations 
knowledge production during the time of German unification by organizing them into two 
chapters: “winding down the old” and “building the new”. Having one knowledge space being 
taken over by another means that two processes run in parallel: the disappearance of the old space’s 
structures and their replacement by the new space’s structures. As such, this chapter, “Winding 
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down the old”, focuses on the strings of events surrounding the dismantling of the GDR’s 
infrastructure of international relations expertise. Focusing in particular on the IIB, it examines 
the principle of hierarchical orientation as it played out in the process of winding down the East 
German institutions of international relation knowledge production, in particular the IIB. It is 
organized in four parts. Part one, “To keep or to close down?”, explores the first months of 
unification. It looks at the ex-GDR’s institutions’ efforts to adapt to the new system through full 
adaptation as well as at the distribution of decision-making power over the question of whether to 
keep or to close down the GDR’s former institutions. Part two, “Three discourses”, examines the 
emergence of three discursive strands underwriting the closure of the East German system of 
international relations knowledge production. Part three, ”Free-floating elements”, traces what 
happened to the individuals who had been part of the East German system of knowledge 
production once their institution was shut down. Finally, part four, “Can the ‘fallen’ experts 
speak?”, probes their possibilities to still engage with international relations, despite no longer 
forming part of its official networks.  
To keep or to close down? 
“It ended in shock and disillusionment at the end of November 1990, when it was decreed that the IIB 
would be dissolved” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 7) 
Once the GDR dissolved and its former territories integrated the legal, political, economic and 
social order of West Germany on 3 October 1990, the main question became whether to keep or 
to close down its former institutions of international relations expertise. The political and 
geographical de- and re-aggregation of the GDR into federated states meant a division and thus 
diffusion of decision-making power about the future of its institutions. This section focuses on 
the IIB and details how the principle of hierarchical orientation worked in its efforts to adapt to 
its new provincial context by becoming “more Western than the West”.  
Decision-making power 
The geographical and political reorganization of the GDR’s former territories played an important 
role in the disaggregation of its international relations expertise networks. A previously centralized 
country with local administrations, the GDR integrated a political order structured by the principle 
of federalism. What was previously one unit was split into five federated states, with East Berlin 
additionally integrating the already previously existing state of Berlin. Each of these states 
developed their own executive, legislative and judicial capacities, with elections for their new 
government being held on 14 October 1990.450 For the IIB, this meant that it was now allocated 
to the state of Brandenburg, of which Potsdam became the capital, and that it was now dependent 
on Brandenburg’s rules, regulations and decision-making, since matters of education fell within 
the responsibility of the respective German states, not the federation. On 22 November 1990, the 
new government of Brandenburg began its work.451 It was a coalition government between three 
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parties and the liberal party FDP received the ministry of science, research and culture. They 
nominated Hinrich Enderlein as the new minister for this domain, and Hinrich Enderlein thus 
became the politician responsible for deciding which institutions to keep and which to close down 
in the state of Brandenburg, a decision leading to the ultimate closure of the IIB.  
The figure of Hinrich Enderlein illustrates some of the blurring of boundaries characteristic for 
this first phase of unification. Born in “East” Germany during WWII, his family fled from 
Brandenburg to the “West” at the end of the war and he grew up in what soon became West 
Germany. Holding a university degree in history, political science and Slavic history, he spoke 
Russian and spent some time in the Soviet Union as part of a study grant.452 This mixed 
background would later earn him the epithet “Wossi”, a mix between the German colloquial 
expressions “Wessi” (Westerner) and “Ossi” (Easterner).453 Before 1989, his political career took 
place in the West. He was a member of parliament for the liberal party FDP in the state of Baden-
Württemberg for 16 years, with special expertise in higher education. When the turmoil in the 
GDR started, the West German liberal FDP minister of education in Bonn asked him to join the 
team, and Enderlein was tasked to help dissolve the GDR ministry of education. This allowed 
Hinrich Enderlein to gain experience in the field of university politics at the West German federal 
level. When the elections took place in Brandenburg, he became the liberal party’s Western advisor 
tasked with advising them during the coalition talks. All parties had to send in three politicians for 
their coalition talks: the party’s state level leader, one designated party member responsible for the 
coalition negotiations and one member of the “Western” party branch assisting as advisor. The 
Eastern liberal politicians were impressed by his skills and knowledge, and when their party 
received the science, research and culture ministry, they offered him the post.454  
Not only was the GDR’s former territory thus split into various states, each of these also became 
governed by parties and politicians that were only partly “Eastern”. This was the result of the 
unification dynamics whereby the GDR’s parties were merged with their Western counterparts.  
This process led to new ties being formed between East and West and a blurring of former 
boundaries. As part of another unification dynamic, each new “Eastern” state was informally 
partnered up with one “Western” state governed by the same political party. The latter were 
supposed to advise, mentor and support the respective “new” states, giving them both material 
and immaterial support. In the case of Brandenburg, the partner state was Nordrhein-Westphalen 
and their ministry delegated employees to the new Eastern states to help build the ministerial 
bureaucracies. This partnership created a set of individualized ties between East and West, with 
networks that would later partly impact hiring patterns in the Eastern universities.  
Besides the geographical and political reorganization of the GDR, the unification treaty also 
reordered the GDR’s academic landscape in a direct way. Institutions like the military academy 
which formed part of another institution – in this case, the military – were treated as part of that 
overarching institution. But all the other “free-floating” institutions were divided into research and 
teaching institutions, with the responsibility for the former being allocated to the federal level and 
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the responsibility for the latter being allocated to the state level. Research institutions like the 
academy of sciences were thus allocated to the federal level and regulations about what to do with 
them were established in the unification treaty. Institutions like the IIB, which were both research 
and teaching institutions, were assigned to the “teaching” institutions category and thus allocated 
to the state level – in the case of the IIB, Brandenburg. When the unification treaty was crafted, 
the states did not yet exist. Therefore, no detailed regulations were agreed on as how to proceed 
with regard to the “teaching” institutions, beyond the fact the new states would be responsible for 
dealing with them and that they would have until the end of the year to decide whether to keep or 
dissolve the GDR’s old educational facilities.  
Coming into office on 22 November, the new government of Brandenburg had only a few weeks 
before the end of December to decide whether to keep or close down the GDR’s higher education 
institutions. In Brandenburg, there were two of them: The College of Law and Administration 
HRV, which hosted the reformed IIB, and the PH, which was one of the GDR’s top institutions 
for the training of schoolteachers across all disciplines. Ultimately, they would take over both the 
PH and the HRV as institutions, but close down the latter’s economic and political science sections 
– the political science section being the IIB’s official denomination since its reform in early 1990 
during the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval.  
Hierarchical Orientation: Becoming more Western than the West 
Back at the IIB, the “reformers” from the previous chapter on revolution/knowledge now found 
themselves operating under West German rules and regulations, assigned to a provincial federated 
state not interested in anything “international”, and with their fate and future left to the new 
government’s full disposal. In the hope of surviving unification, they reacted to this situation by 
“hierarchical orientation”, i.e. by a full submission to Western standards and full transformation 
into a Western-looking institution. They put intensive effort into turning their already Western-
oriented curriculum into a model political science curriculum “more Western than the West”. In 
response to the panicked atmosphere at the IIB and the feeling of uncertainty about their future, 
they put the implementation of further personnel cuts on hold, and started to promote and defend 
their new degree and curriculum as widely as possible, using all the typical Western tropes.   
The hierarchical orientation of the IIB in these first weeks after unification can be seen with regard 
to its faculty and curriculum design. By the time of the unification with West Germany, the IIB 
already had a Western-oriented political-science curriculum, despite a remaining strong focus on 
international relations. Now the IIB started implementing curriculum changes that turned it into 
a model political science faculty “more Western than the West”.455 
First, it changed its name. Where it was previously called a “political science and international 
relations” section, it now became a “political science” section only.456 Then it adapted the structure 
of both curriculum and faculty to fully reflect the West German “standard” model of splitting 
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political science into political theory, domestic politics, comparative politics and international 
relations. This standard model was based on a memorandum of 1961 and its reformalization in 
1987 by the Kultusministerkonferenz, the West German institution responsible for coordinating 
teaching across all German Länder.457 The IIB implemented the model by merging domestic 
politics and comparative politics into one area of study, leaving it structured around the three areas 
of political theory, comparative political systems and international relations.458 This was a change 
from an essentially IR curriculum with some political science framing attached to it, to an 
essentially political science curriculum with some IR specialization attached to it. The consequence 
of this was that even more IR staff would need to be laid off and that even more new “Western” 
staff would need to be hired to cover the now expanded areas of political theory and domestic 
politics.459  
In a bid for survival in the new system, the IIB also took over all the West German arguments as 
to why a political science degree and faculty were necessary in the Land of Brandenburg. Because 
of the political reorganization of the former GDR territories, the IIB was now set not on a federal 
level but on the provincial level of a federated state. Because the states had no foreign policy 
responsibility, they had no interest in international relations research and teaching – their interest 
was in law and administration.460 A key line of argumentation was the classic post-WWII West 
German trope of political science as a science of democracy. Offering political science curricula 
supposedly would help educating an otherwise undemocratically minded society how to think, act 
and behave “democratically”. Drawing on that trope, the IIB highlighted how, in regard to the 
GDR’s undemocratic past, the development of a political science faculty and degree in 
Brandenburg was crucial in managing its transition to democracy.461 Furthermore, the argument 
highlighted how political science was a natural and obvious part of the West German higher 
education landscape, implying that the degree was needed for Brandenburg to “look” Western. 
The implemented curriculum and faculty changes ensured “a strict orientation to the West German 
standards of the discipline”.462 Additionally, practical elements were highlighted. Even though 
Berlin already had a strong political science faculty at the FU, they didn’t have enough capacity to 
meet the demand, making Potsdam a welcome addition to reduce the pressure on Berlin. 
Brandenburg would also benefit from the degree because the IIB would provide well-educated 
and much needed staff in the domains of public administration, education, political parties, media 
and so forth.463  
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As part of another element of strategy, the IIB also tapped into West German political science 
debates around the unity of the discipline. As we will see later, political science in West Germany 
had had a difficult history of developing and maintaining its identity, struggling in the past with 
member groups wanting to splinter away from the discipline. The IIB used this context to highlight 
how their voluntary implementation of a model political science curriculum would help support 
the unity of the discipline. At the same time, they also weaponized the debate in opposite ways, 
highlighting the individual character of each political science faculty in West Germany and claiming 
the right for an individual flavour in Potsdam.464 
In order to further achieve full adherence to the West German model, further personnel cuts were 
necessary.465 But the uncertainty about the IIB’s future made for a “dramatic” mood at the IIB:466 
would their home institution HRV come up for them or would they throw them under the bus to 
ensure their own survival?467 They decided it was time to lobby for their own survival, getting in 
touch with politicians and the wider media, in order to raise awareness and inform about their 
Westernization and the importance of their survival.468 They also lobbied the HRV’s rector and 
insisted that he represent them fairly and fight for them in the political decision-making process.469 
With regard to personnel questions, it was ultimately decided that everyone should retain their 
posts until a political decision had been made about the future of the IIB: if it was to be shut down, 
then all employees would benefit from the social regulations put in place, but if it survived, then 
the personnel changes would be further implemented.470 
This section aimed to explore one aspect of the “hierarchical ordering” at play during the 
unification dynamics. It has outlined how, after the GDR merged into West Germany, the IIB 
worked hard to transform and adapt so that there would be no need to close them down. In order 
to ensure their survival, they fully oriented around the Western model, only to be shut down 
regardless, as we will see in the next section.  
Closing down IR: three discourses 
“First and foremost, it was a very consciously and very purposefully precipitated change of elites. This was 
the relatively mild punishment that the enemy had to endure. I have no illusions about this. Sometimes we 
discussed this with colleagues or friends after one or two drinks: what would it have been like if our side had 
won? Then the last ones would have come back out of the re-education camp after 10 years. That is at least 
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how it was with the Vietnamese. There have seldom been smart winners in history. It went the way it went, 
and the ones affected had to pay the price” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 22) 
In 1990, most institutions making up the GDR’s infrastructure of international relations expertise 
were dissolved. Those institutions considered the most “political” had already been closed down 
during the times of revolutionary upheaval. This concerned in particular institutions like the Stasi’s 
and the central committee’s training facilities, but, as we have seen in chapter 3 on 
revolution/knowledge, the IPW was also closed and ceased to exist before the two Germanys 
united, with all its staff going straight into unemployment. The next one to be closed down was 
the GDR’s MfAA along with its practical infrastructure of knowledge and expertise in the field of 
international relations. It ceased to exist at the same time as the GDR, and because practically none 
of its diplomats were taken over by the Western diplomatic service, this group of experts also 
entered unemployment on 3 October 1990.471 Unlike the MfAA, the GDR’s military was at first 
taken over by its Western counterpart. After a process of evaluation, a part of its military staff was 
kept, and the other was sent to be retrained and find employment elsewhere. The teaching facilities 
of the military were closed down by the end of the year, and this meant the end of the military 
academy in Dresden and the end of the NVA’s political college in Berlin. The military’s historical 
institute in Potsdam, however, was taken over and continued to exist, though in a changed form. 
Finally, the university structures holding in particular the area studies were dealt with in a 
decentralized form, with each new state making its own decision. Overall, all universities were kept 
as institutions, but their staff were dealt with differently. Either everyone was laid off at first and 
then some of the former staff were rehired after a thorough process of evaluation, or everyone 
was kept at first and then laid off slowly in a grinding process of evaluation. We will look at the 
dynamics in the post-1990 East German universities in part 2 “Building the new”. The IIB, which 
we will turn to in this section, took on a hybrid form: it was closed down as a structure on 31 
December 1990, and all its staff laid off, but some of them were then rehired as part of the newly 
built University of Potsdam.  
Dissolving the IIB 
On 22 November 1990, Brandenburg’s newly appointed minister of education, Hinrich Enderlein, 
stepped into office.472 The state of Brandenburg had been created out of nothing just a few weeks 
earlier and there was no “ministry” yet to speak of. Only one telephone had a connection to the 
West. The team was small: two staff members came with Minister Enderlein from his previous 
post in the West German capital and he had one personal assistant whom he knew from his 
political past in Baden-Württemberg. The partner state of Nordrhein-Westphalen would soon 
send staff from their own ministries, who were all promised a promotion if they served for two 
years in the East.473 Other difficulties arose from the constraints they faced. Much of their leeway 
was restrained by the legal framework imported from the West. Any creativity or novelty was 
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restricted by the tight limits of the West German blueprint.474 Another limiting factor was the now 
all-German Wissenschaftsrat, the science council. Composed of politicians and academics, its task 
was to advise political institutions across all levels of the federation on matters of research and 
science. In the process of unification, it advocated for a total accommodation and adaptation of 
universities to Western standards.475 Where leeway for innovation was found, the West German 
disciplinary associations formed another conservative bulwark against any deviance, with the 
arguments of tradition and preservation of quality.476 In short, the dynamics of unification led to 
the clear expectation that everything in the Eastern territories should be done like in the West, and 
anything that exceeded the model was to be dissolved and liquidated.477 Within this framework, 
Minister Enderlein and his team’s starting tasks were set: they needed to fulfil the stipulations of 
the unification treaty. This meant in particular making a fast decision about the higher education 
institutions falling under their jurisdiction and then drafting a legal framework for higher education 
in Brandenburg.478 Underwriting the decisions they were about to make was their agenda to turn 
Brandenburg into a strong player in the field of science and higher education, partly to compensate 
for the loss of Brandenburg’s industry,479 and partly to retain the young generation by offering 
them attractive possibilities.480  
The decision was quickly made; two staff sessions had to suffice.481 They decided to take over the 
pedagogical “teacher training” university PH, as well as the HRV, but without the IIB, which was 
to be shut down. The decision to shut down the IIB was not a difficult one to make. The IIB in 
many people’s perception was a Kaderschmiede, a forge of elites. It was an institution controlled by 
those in power to reproduce the GDR’s political system and to produce a reliable generation of 
new recruits for the foreign policy establishment.482 It was seen as a political institution, a pillar of 
Stalinism and an instrument of dictatorship.483 There was a general sense and expectation in the 
West that these types of institutions could not be carried over into the new Germany. The decision 
therefore did not require much debate or discussion. There was a sense of obviousness and self-
evidence about the fact that the IIB had to go: the former diplomatic training facility of the GDR 
could not become an institution of the new Germany.484 The radical rupture with the old elites 
symbolized the departure from the GDR’s ideology to the wider public and proved that the old 
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system had been abolished.485 Its function of “elite change” was to build a bridge between the need 
to reject the past and the task of building a future:486 
“This was exactly the object of our efforts. That is why we acted in the way we did, as I said, we tried to 
retain the qualitative changes that had been made […] but at the same time we also had to draw a clear cut 
line with the past, which does mean that there is no perspective for the College [HRV] to continue existing 
as a whole”487 
 
Back at the IIB, the shock and disillusionment were palpable.488 For almost a year they had worked 
tirelessly, completely westernizing their structure, curriculum, research orientation, networks and 
purpose. In a painful process of renewal, they had laid off half of their colleagues. They had 
implemented everything that they had learned or been told about the West German system, 
accepting it and working hard to adhere to all its standards. And yet it was not enough.  
On 12 December, the HRV’s director Rolf Steding came to visit the IIB after a meeting at 
Brandenburg’s ministry of science, research and culture. A decision had been made: the IIB was 
going to be shut down. Rolf Steding’s assessment was that this was a political decision through 
and through and it bore no relation to the quality of the IIB’s renewal efforts.489 A reformer figure 
himself, he had been elected by the HRV during the revolutionary times to democratically 
transform the institution and give it a future. The decision to wind down the IIB went against his 
personal sense of justice and morals, and he refused to execute the political decision of shutting 
down the IIB. Instead of sending out the letters of dismissal, he resigned from his post: 490 
“After my election as director, I started working [..] to renew the HRV. With this goal in mind, I went up 
to and beyond my limits, putting measures in place that profoundly hurt the lives of many employees, and I 
had to put up with lasting personal hurt and trauma myself [...] I ask of you to understand that it is 
unacceptable for me to take up a position of director only in order to end up as a ‘liquidator’. I feel that this 
is a degradation and it offends my dignity. In the name of all the employees for whom I was a director, I 
would like to also express my dissent with the undignified way of their ‘dismissal’ from the university”491 
 
Three discursive strands 
Closing down the IIB needed to be publicly justified. In a mid-January parliamentary question and 
answer session in which Minister Enderlein was tasked to explain the closing of the IIB, we can 
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see the three discursive strands of “quality”, “personal integrity” and “political networks” develop 
that would be of importance all throughout the process of change in the ex-GDR during the 
following months and years. These discursive strands describe how the GDR was perceived, 
approached and filtered in the new all-German space. This included representations by formerly 
‘Western’ actors and individuals as well as representations by many ‘Eastern’ actors and individuals 
– a result of the preceding revolutionary dynamics described in chapter 3. While elements of all of 
three strands could be found across all levels and areas of society, they tended to concentrate in 
certain areas. The sphere of academia approached the GDR primarily through the lens of a 
competence discourse of “quality”, the sphere of society through the lens of a moral discourse of 
“personal integrity” and the sphere of politics through the lens of a winner discourse centred 
around the threat of “political networks”. 
The discursive strand of “quality” referred to the content and form of knowledge production. Its 
implicit standard was the West German model. It applied to individual scholars’ qualitative and 
quantitative publication activities, a faculty or department’s structure and organization, and to 
teaching curricula and teaching contents. This manner of filtering and approaching the GDR was 
most prevalent in academia, where all things GDR were seen through the filter of “quality”. With 
regard to the closure of the IIB, Minister Enderlein argued that the “quality” of their reforms was 
the main reason why the jurists of the HRV were allowed to survive while the IIB had to be shut 
down. The decision to measure and evaluate quality in that case had been delegated to the science 
council Wissenschaftsrat, who evaluated the legal, but not the political, sections of the HRV. Minister 
Enderlein and his team made their decisions on the basis of the information available to them. 
And the available information did not feature the political section.492  
We can see two dynamics at play here. The first one relates to the networks prevalent in 
determining the relevant standards of quality. Unlike the political sections of the HRV, the legal 
sections at the HRV had had the full backing of their West German equivalents and the respective 
professional associations from a much earlier point in time onwards.493 As a result, the 
Wissenschaftsrat in Cologne recommended keeping the legal faculties.494 The second dynamic 
starting to become visible was an individualization of the concept of quality. For Minister 
Enderlein, there was a distinction between the institution HRV and the individual reformers active 
at the IIB. The first one needed to go; the second one had a chance to stay.495 This was very 
different from the reformers’ own views, who worked on changing and modernizing their 
institution and saw their works and efforts as tied into the institution. In their view, closing the 
IIB meant rejecting their efforts and competence.  
The discursive strand of “personal integrity” referred to the degree of closeness with a system 
assessed to be unjust, immoral and dictatorial. While it was acknowledged that every GDR citizen 
had to navigate the coordinates of its social, cultural, economic and political system, it was assumed 
that each and every one of them had choice about the level of support that they gave to the system. 
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Particularly important in this regard was the Stasi, the GDR’s secret service tasked amongst others 
with the surveillance of the population. Here different technical gradations were made with regard 
to affiliation with the Stasi, though ultimately anyone associated with the Stasi ended up being 
tainted.496 This manner of filtering and approaching the GDR was quickly becoming the primary 
mode of interpreting all things GDR across all domains and sectors. However, it was most 
prominent in the media and society more generally, where all things GDR were seen increasingly 
seen through the filter of “personal integrity” and degree of affiliation with the Stasi. With regard 
to the closure of the IIB, Minister Enderlein argued that the new University of Potsdam, which 
was in the process of being set up, would be based not only on the principle of academic quality, 
but also on the principles of personal and political integrity (persönliche politische Integrität) and 
upholding high standards regarding its democratic development.497 
The discursive strand of “political networks” refers to the GDR in terms of its past existence as a 
communist regime and its embeddedness in a communist alliance system. This discursive strand 
which we could also variably term as “old elites” or “former enemy” was very different from the 
“personal integrity” one: it was not focused on individuals, nor was it located on a moral register. 
Instead, it was a mode of seeing that foregrounded the GDR and its former citizens as elite 
networks and cliques threatening to remain in power. This manner of filtering and approaching 
the GDR was most prevalent in the sphere of politics, where the GDR still had a lingering quality 
of former “enemy”. It played a particular role in the dissolution of the GDR’s diplomatic corps 
and MfAA as well as in the refusal to take over any of the former GDR’s diplomats into the new 
all-German diplomatic service.498 Even the revolutionaries who had taken over the MfAA in the 
spring of 1990 were rejected in a consciously chosen break in continuity.499 With regard to the IIB, 
its former connections in the East were disregarded or seen as threatening. In the parliamentary 
question and answer session, Minister Enderlein was asked whether he was aware that the IIB 
used to have excellent relations abroad and, if so, whether he planned on making use of these 
connections. The question was met by the ironical pronouncement of the minister that he was 
“not quite sure whether all these contacts that existed do fit with the future manner of conducting 
research at this university”.500 The university would seek out connections as it saw fit and as served 
the quality purposes of the university. The response was met with applause from all the major 
parties represented in parliament.501 
Free-floating elements 
Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of ideas, thoughts and knowledge. 
What happened to them after the institutions and networks they were formerly part of were 
disbanded? What happened to the IIB staff after their home institution was shut down? 
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The social provisions of the unification treaty meant that they all continued to receive 70% of their 
former salaries for another half year before falling into the regular German unemployment 
scheme.502 By the time of its dissolution, the IIB only counted 55 of its original staff members. 
Initially, 20 of them found temporary re-employment at the newly founded University of Potsdam, 
though the numbers shrank with almost every new term, ultimately leaving only four of the former 
IIB researchers employed permanently at the University of Potsdam. The rest found employment 
elsewhere.  
Staying at the University of Potsdam  
When the decision to wind down the IIB was made, the idea was to find a “solution” with Berlin’s 
political science infrastructure, so that Potsdam’s 141 students would be able to transfer there.503 
This early idea did not go through as it faced resistance from two different sides. On the one hand, 
the FU in Berlin rejected the idea. Their own interest lay in the development of a strong political 
science in Potsdam. A strong political science in Potsdam equalled many new vacant posts in an 
overcrowded German academic landscape. It meant at least five professorships, each of which 
would be endowed with two or three assistant posts.504 This was particularly interesting to the staff 
at the FU, since a job in Potsdam would mean being able to continue living comfortably in Berlin, 
while having an easy commute to the well-kept facilities of Potsdam.505 On the other hand, the 
students protested. They were afraid for their future, disapproved of their institute’s closure and 
wanted to stay in Potsdam. Twenty-two students asked to switch their studies to law, a now safer 
course of study.506 But the rest remained and protested. The minister responded by offering them 
a “study warranty”, the guarantee that they would be able to continue and complete their studies. 
In practical terms this meant that, in opposition to the original plans, political science would need 
to be on offer after all at the newly created University of Potsdam. It also meant that until a full 
political science degree was developed and set in place, the minister would need to rely on the IIB 
study blueprint as well as on its staff to be able to comply with the promise towards the students.507 
This change of plan meant that, ultimately, the difference between closing the political sciences 
and retaining the legal sections did not matter so much on a longer-term practical level, though of 
course its real significance resided on the symbolic level. Ultimately, the legal sections would go 
through further procedures of vetting and evaluation to reduce their staff to a small core, while 
the political science section would go through procedures of vetting and evaluation to rehire a 
small core of staff to further carry the teaching needs ahead.  
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In early 1991, Raimund Krämer was appointed as change manager, both to coordinate the short-
term provision of teaching and to support the establishment of the new political science degree 
with a certain degree of continuity for the students involved.508 Later he would be joined by various 
structure and curriculum commissions, along with the appointed founding dean, Prof. Rohe from 
Nordrhein-Westphalen, whose task it was to set up the University of Potsdam.509 Once the new 
political science faculty would be established and all the posts open for application, the IIB staff 
would be welcome to apply in a procedure strictly following all the West German standards as well 
as a newly introduced emphasis on “quality”. 510 
But as of early 1991 Raimund Krämer was still alone in a leadership position at the now de jure 
dissolved IIB but de facto existing “entity”, aiming to avoid chaos and to provide teaching 
continuity.511 The winter semester syllabus had been set in the autumn and thus only required 
rehiring the relevant staff by putting those necessary for teaching on temporary contracts for the 
remaining few months.512 The next step involved determining which courses would be needed in 
the summer semester and hiring – again on the basis of temporary contracts – the relevant staff 
for that semester.513 While Raimund Krämer was earmarked to lead this, it had to be done with 
close Western cooperation: the (West) German political science association DVPW and the 
political science faculty at the FU in Berlin.514  
Rehiring staff 
For the summer semester of 1991, they decided to rehire relevant IIB staff to teach the bulk of 
courses in international relations and comparative politics, with the addition of one or two 
prominent West German IR or comparative politics professors to teach additional seminars or 
courses.515 The IIB staff had to apply with one or multiple course proposals by mid-February.516 
A commission composed of two delegates from the FU Berlin, Potsdam’s new rector and Raimund 
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Krämer evaluated these proposals517 on the basis of fit with the Potsdam University’s teaching 
needs, quality and personal integrity of the applicants.518 
Next to international relations, which, given the IIB’s expertise continued to be a de facto area of 
specialization,519 explicit attention was given to political science methods and to the “political 
system of Germany”.520 These areas were to be covered by nine guest staff from the FU Berlin, 
who were seen to provide the necessary “high” quality level corresponding to Western political 
science standards in Germany and the equivalence of student performance across Germany.521 
Thirty of the IIB’s 55 remaining members of staff showed interest in remaining in academia and 
submitted course proposals. Seventeen were accepted and hired on a temporary contract with 
hourly paid rates; 13 were rejected.522 Assessment of personal integrity played an obvious role in 
the decision-making, and it correlated with position on the career ladder. The IIB distinguished 
between two categories of seniority: the professors and lecturers on the one hand, and the 
assistants, regular and senior, on the other hand. Position in academic hierarchy became a 
shorthand for personal integrity: 71% of those rehired for the summer semester 1991 were 
assistants, while 77% of those rejected for rehire were from the category professor/lecturer.523 
The same procedure continued for the winter semester 1991/92, where a total of 27 former IIB 
staff members applied and 14 of these were hired, alongside four Western academics. Twelve were 
put on temporary working contracts, and two were paid on the basis of an hourly paid rate.524 
In the meantime, around 40 students left the degree. A group of 80 soldiered through the year 
until the fall, when new applicants were taken in.525 Study conditions were of high quality. The 
staff/student ratio was excellent with three or four students per seminar group and many high-
profile visiting staff, including from the US and England.526 
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Content 
The following 13 courses by former IIB staff were accepted for the transition summer semester 
of 1991: Japan in the system of international relations; transformation processes in Eastern 
Europe; the crisis of perestroika; armament and disarmament since 1945; the EC’s economic 
process of unification; introduction to comparative politics; introduction to international relations; 
core issues in the international economic order; the political parties of France in international 
comparison; gender theories; the East-West conflict in Europe post 1945; conflict regulation in 
international relations; and comparative development strategies.527  
The course contents at that point were very “Western”, in the sense that they followed and 
matched with West German formats, standard formulations and typical course expectations. For 
instance, the course “introduction to comparative politics” presented, analysed and compared the 
different theories and approaches to comparative politics and illustrated these with contemporary 
examples of transformations, including, for instance, the transition from autocratic to democratic 
structures in Latin America.528 The course “comparative development strategies” analysed, 
compared and evaluated the development strategies of Argentina and South Korea, so as to 
construct different models of development with the students. The course “Japan in international 
relations” transmitted knowledge about Japan’s capabilities and positions in world politics, in 
particular in relation to the US, USSR, China and EC states.  
The literature list given out to prepare for the exam Vordiplom in June 1991 features 32 titles, all of 
which were Western books and textbooks.529 Exam questions for the core module “International 
politics” featured the following three prompts: “The principles of collective security and their 
applicability to the prevention and settlement of international conflicts”, “Explain options for 
ensuring security in Europe after the end of the East-West conflict” and “Consequences of global 
problems for world peace and international security – what challenges arise for international 
politics?”530 Exam questions for the course in “comparative politics” (WS91/92) included the 
prompts “Compare the political systems of liberal democracy and real socialism according to their 
institutional structure, functionality and basic values of political culture”, “Compare the 
parliamentary system, the system of institutional separation of powers and plebiscitary democracy 
according to institutional structure, functioning and political culture”, “Name at least 3 criteria to 
categorize government types”, “Name the differences between institutional, social and individual 
power holders” and “Name the differences between dictatorship and democracy.”531 Exam 
questions for the core module International Relations in the WS 1991/92 included the following 
questions: “Identify the essential differences between the schools of ‘political realism’ and 
‘functionalism’ in the theory of international relations. Explain their importance for the analysis 
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and prognosis of international politics”, “Does the end of the Cold War also mean the resolution 
of the East-West conflict; Which opportunities and risks arise from the social upheaval processes 
in Central and Eastern Europe for European peace?” and “Explain the idea, fundamentals and 
functional conditions of collective security and present their practical relevance for the solution of 
conflicts in today’s world.”532 
Leaving international relations 
As we have seen, a small number of IIB researchers found short-term employment in the newly 
set up University of Potsdam. But the majority of the remaining 55 became unemployed, just as 
the IPW’s 400 researchers had before them, as well all of the GDR’s diplomats and all of the 
teachers and researchers at the military academy, and many were about to be at the area studies 
departments across the former GDR universities. What happened to them? 
At the beginning, funding was set into place by the German government to support research 
projects, the two most important being the ABM and WIP projects. ABM projects funded 
concrete research projects for a specific time of two, maybe three years. One had to apply with a 
research proposal and regularly account for its outcomes. Topics were set from general socio-
political areas, such as development cooperation or employment questions. Securing employment 
in one such ABM project was considered a good and safe preliminary outcome, as it secured 
survival over the first couple of years after losing previous GDR employment.533 Though different 
in terms of technicalities, funding details and so forth, the WIP projects worked similarly through 
funding short-term research for the period of one, two, or maybe three years.534 The ABM and 
WIP projects allowed many of these recently unemployed researchers and experts to find 
temporary employment more or less in their former areas of expertise. Crucially, they prevented 
the simultaneous mass unemployment of all East German intellectuals. Because of the small-scale 
nature of the funded projects, and their variable lengths, this also contributed to the general 
individualization and diffusion dynamics of the unification period:535 
“It is important to know that one of the strategies of the West German establishment was to set up a relatively 
large number of programs of different lengths in which those [East Germans who had lost their jobs] could 
take part. As a result, everyone became unemployed at different times. The core element [of this strategy] was 
that [the East Germans taking part in these programs] all tried to find new employment during that time – 
not in their old positions, but somewhere else – and many did find new jobs” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 
8-9) 
   
All of those who did not make it into one of these temporary research projects, or only made it 
for a short period time, had to either retire or retrain.536 Most of those close to their retirement age 
had already been sent to pre-retirement during the cuts and changes of the revolutionary dynamics. 
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Due to a lack of alternatives, anyone left who was eligible for retirement or pre-retirement took 
that path. Except for the few trying to make it in academia, everyone else retrained or branched 
out into entirely new directions, or at the very least had to acquire new credentials and 
qualifications:537 
“In principle, within six months I had to get myself to realize that I had to do something completely different. 
I was 38, 39 at the time. I had to spend another couple of decades working. In principle, the two options 
available were to start your own business – but on what basis? – or, which happened 100 thousand times 
back then, to retrain” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 5) 
While few of the GDR’s former international relations experts stayed in the former field of 
expertise, few fell into unemployment. Most of them spoke many languages, knew much about 
the West and its realities, and their training had fostered analysis and critical thinking skills useful 
in any kind of system.538 Especially those who had studied the West had “mentally” lived in its 
realities for many years.539 
“During the time of the unification, we almost all de facto lost our jobs. But, de facto we also all quickly got 
back on our feet and into employment. There were exceptions, of course, and many negative things happened, 
no question about it. And we were angry about many things” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13) 
 
The adult education sector 
One type of employment that many went to was the wider education sector and the adult education 
sector in particular. With half the GDR having to retrain and requalify, teachers were needed to 
carry out these trainings and qualifications.540 Academics in general had good teaching experience 
and the ability to learn new subjects fast, which made them good candidates for these posts. Two 
of these in particular attracted some of the former IIB staff: the teacher training attached to the 
University of Potsdam and the retraining of ex-NVA army officials in Berlin.  
The teacher training at the University of Potsdam541 was built by Bernhard Muszynski, the West 
German hired by the IIB during the revolutionary times to build the political theory part of their 
newly installed political science curriculum. He was part of the first wave of West Germans going 
East at a time of chaos and insecurity, the wave of the “knights of good fortune”. He and the 
others who had tried to find their luck in the East lost out to the dynamics of unification. As we 
will see in the next section “Building the new”, none of them were able to get any of the good 
professorial posts, who all went to what he termed “the official church”. Despite both being 
Western, the groups distrusted and disliked each other. Like the conquistadores in Latin America 
the posts and privileges of the “new land” went to the second-wave Westerners who came with 
powerful networks behind their backs and crowded out the first-wave Westerners who had come 
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more or less solo to the East as adventurers. Feeling he would get marginalized by the second 
wave of West Germans, Muszynski knew he had to find a new base for survival. Having good 
contacts at the federal centre for political education, he managed to attract very important funding 
for Potsdam to establish a centre for adult education aimed at retraining East German 
schoolteachers.542 In particular the GDR’s old school subject of citizenship education had been 
abolished and instead political education had been introduced. The East German teachers needed 
to receive qualification in this subject. Similarly, the GDR school subject of astronomy had been 
abolished and Russian language training had become obsolete. Now teachers had to know English 
and French.543 The funding that Muszynski attracted was very large and it was the very first round 
of external funding that the young University of Potsdam received, conveying him a certain 
standing and the ability to build the centre relatively independently.544 This programme offered the 
possibility for Eastern academics needing an exit to either retrain and become schoolteachers or 
to get involved in the programme itself as administrators or as teachers. The University of Potsdam 
had too many staff from taking over the PH and the jurists of the HRV. Muszynski’s programme 
was a part solution to this problem: it gave new employment to around 30 people from the 
University of Potsdam as part of the team and retrained some other 50–55 University of Potsdam 
academics as teachers, alongside the 3000 to 4000 from other institutions.545  
The training programme for ex-NVA army officers was set up by the round table on military affairs 
during the GDR’s revolutionary times. Once it had become clear that the GDR’s future was set 
towards a unification with Germany it also soon became clear that not all NVA soldiers would 
have a future in a unified army. The 2+4 treaty stipulated that the new German army could only 
be 340,000 men strong. Both armies combined, however, were around 600,000 men strong. It 
soon became clear that many of these would need to be offered good alternatives and these would 
involve retraining and requalifying to become fit for new jobs.546 It was a matter of high priority 
as it addressed the high problem of potentially dissatisfied soldiers mutinying or revolting. A civil 
war was to be avoided at all costs.547 In order to prevent this, the officers in particular were offered 
a two-year high-quality programme to retrain in economics and business administration so as to 
find good posts in the German economic sector. Over 2000 NVA and Stasi officers were thus 
retrained in Berlin between 1991 and 1995 through a practice-oriented programme featuring 
multiple internship placements as well as the fast-paced acquisition of the basics needed for posts 
in the industry, local and foreign commerce, local and international businesses, banking, finance 
etc. The highly skilled officers were in high demand and around 95–97% found new employment 
instantly upon completing the programme.548 They were disciplined, obedient, often spoke 
multiple languages and had special skills, knew how to fly helicopters, handle large machinery and 
equipment, and were often trained engineers or the like.549 The requirements of the programme 
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meant, in reverse, that teachers and trainers were needed to ensure its success and that much 
funding and financing was available. The programme offered good and lucrative contracts and 
became an interesting option for a number of the GDR’s former academics.550 The programme 
required people who could teach well and, above all else, who had the right personality to engage 
military officers and understand their situation and realities.551 For the hired teachers and trainers 
this meant a fast-paced first couple of years, in which they had to teach themselves the materials 
that they were about to pass on. The challenge did not lie in understanding the materials: they only 
had to teach basics and their training in the GDR had taught them how to learn anything. The 
challenge lay in the short time frame, in having to prepare large amounts of material, develop 
course plans within days, and then acquire the taught materials oneself just before passing them 
on to the officers in training.552 As we saw in the introduction, in this way Lutz Kleinwächter, an 
IIB specialist on armament and disarmament, started teaching economics and European 
integration, recycling, at the beginning, his old IIB course materials.553 The programme had been 
attached to a then small institution, called “bbw Bildungswerk der Wirtschaft in Berlin und Brandenburg”. 
This was structure generated and funded by the association of private sector companies tasked to 
provide specialized training to its personnel. Thanks to the success of the officer training, which 
was completed in 1995, the bbw continued to grow and turned, in the 2000s, into an “applied 
university” (Hochschule) specialized in providing applied trainings for the economic sector. Once 
the programme ended, many of the East German academics who had found employment there as 
a trainer had acquired enough qualifications themselves to continue as lecturers and trainers in the 
field, teaching at the various universities, colleges and universities of applied sciences that Berlin 
and Brandenburg had to offer, including the growing bbw. Ultimately, this enabled some, as Lutz 
Kleinwächter did, to stay in the higher education sector and even become professors by taking the 
detour of retraining and changing specialization.554 
Economy, business and industry 
While the education sector thus offered a number of employment possibilities, most East German 
international relations specialists found new employment in the economic sector, working for 
businesses or in the industry.555 The insurance sector was a popular option,556 but many also went 
into consulting, offering their regional expertise and language skills to the only stakeholders 
interested and able to hire them – foreign companies. Those who had studied in the Soviet Union 
or spoke Russian well were especially able to find employment options in business consulting 
abroad.557 Chance and luck also played a role – one former international relations expert became 
a factory owner after his grandfather’s tobacco company had been returned to him, another 
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became a zoo director in South Africa, because her husband was a zoologist and she lost her post 
at the MfAA, and someone else started advising a Russian oligarch.558  
Overall, the economic sector did not care about political affiliation, nor did it carry ideological 
prejudice.559 In fact, having worked for the GDR government and having been in the SED party 
was seen as a plus: it told future employers that they were reliable, disciplined and punctual – no 
troublemakers. Their “undemocratic” qualifications, often coupled with high skill and 
specializations made them particularly attractive for businesses.560 Even potential Stasi affiliations 
did not carry the same weight as in other domains. One former diplomat hired by a company 
producing sports equipment to liaise with clients from the Middle East was even told that 
experience with secret services was a plus when involved in the Middle East.561 Many also managed 
to work their way up as a result of their East German “political” understanding of society: they 
took on functions that no West German wanted to take on, such as representing their company 
in the trade organizations.562  
State and political functions? 
While the (West) German economic sector did not have much ideological prejudice against the 
East German academics, the reverse was true for the political sphere. This differed of course from 
political space to political space, but the former international relations experts in particular 
experienced the political parties and the MfAA as closed off and deeply hostile environments.563 
They saw and interpreted this as a manifestation of a victor’s mentality still stuck in the Cold War 
friend/enemy logic, enforcing their peace on their former opponents:564  
“At least with regards to the possibility of working in the state-political or in the state-institutional area, 
that is where the exclusion took place. We joined [West Germany] and up until the middle-management 
level, all leadership positions were replaced. There was no room for an ‘Easterner’, that's how we can put it. 
Our pathway was via the economy, via specific economies. The possibilities were generally limited, that had 
nothing to do with [being part of] the army. A higher-level function in the state-political area, including 
higher education and the military, was excluded from the start. And this has remained in principle the case 
to this day” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 9) 
“On the political level, things worked as follows: these two elites had waged war against one another for 40 
years at the most intensive level, up to the degree of personalized hatred and disputes. Looked at from an 
individual perspective, I can understand that they thought of themselves as the winners. Why should they give 
anything to someone who is already on the ground? But in the long run it is a miscalculation and it is 
problematic from the perspective of individual humanity” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 9) 
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In the first years of unification, a few found employment as parliamentary assistants to MPs.565 
These options often came up as a result of previous connections or networks, and it allowed them 
to continue working in their former domain of expertise. Of course, these positions afforded only 
low pay and they were entirely geared towards the needs of the respective MP, not allowing for 
much freedom in research and thinking. Another option lay in becoming a civil servant and 
working in the administration of ministries and other state institutions at a low to intermediate 
level, especially for the federated states.566 Senior positions there remained in general closed off 
for East Germans.567 The states’ central institutions for political education were another option 
for some to find employment.568  
Other options were found by going abroad. Many former East German diplomats were able to 
find employment in temporary projects and missions of the OSCE. By working as election 
observers, they were able to capitalize on the specialist area knowledge acquired in their previous 
careers.569 This was done with part affiliation to the German diplomatic service, whereby they 
remained independent consultants paid for through project budgets. Speaking Russian as well as 
some other local languages, they were sent to Eastern Europe and Central Asia in particular. 570 
The diplomatic service, as we have already seen, remained closed to the former East German 
diplomats, with two very small exceptions. First, the GDR’s diplomats working for the UN in 
New York were able to stay. Had they been dismissed alongside all their other colleagues, then 
Germany would have lost these spots at the UN. They decided to keep them. The other exception 
were those diplomats with rare language skills that Germany happened to need at that time. 
However, only the very young who had freshly started in the GDR diplomatic service were taken 
over.571  
International organizations such as the UN or the EU also proved hard to access institutions, 
partly because the delegation principle went through the respective national states, and thus 
through a hostile German MfAA. But some possibilities remained. In the case of Thomas Ruttig, 
he applied directly to the UN when they needed qualified staff for their UN mission in 
Afghanistan. An accomplished Afghanistan expert speaking Dari and Pashto fluently, Thomas 
Ruttig was hired for the job. Being seen as not having any loyalty to a specific government was an 
asset for the mission. Later, when the mission’s leader was hired as head of the EU mission in 
Afghanistan, he took Thomas Ruttig with him. He enabled Ruttig’s employment with the German 
MfAA, as a dispatchment from an EU state was a requirement for the post. This is how, through 
the detour of the UN and later the EU, a former GDR diplomat was temporarily rehired to the 
German diplomatic corps.572  
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The societal sphere 
In a wider societal sphere, a source of employment for former GDR international relations experts 
was journalism and publishing. Producing content for newspapers, journals or the radio as well as 
organizing and managing their publication was another type of work that capitalized on their 
former writing and thinking skills, and in some cases on their former specializations.573 Wolfgang 
Schwarz, for instance, found employment working for a real estate magazine. Over time, he 
managed to add a foreign policy column to the magazine, publishing interviews with analysts and 
politicians that he knew from his former networks as a security politics expert.574 Some journals 
and magazines, but also some discussion clubs and research circles, were set up initially with the 
direct or indirect help of project money and project funding from the ABM or WIP programmes 
described earlier. Thomas Ruttig, for example, set up a magazine on development politics for an 
NGO network he had met during the round table sessions on development politics, using ABM 
project money.575 This network had been active in the GDR under the protestant church’s cover, 
and the GDR’s revolutionary phase brought Ruttig into contact with them.  Siegfried Fischer, as 
another example, supported the creation of the Berlin Institute for Transatlantic Security, BITS, 
an institute financed through publications and project funding. He also contributed to the 
establishment of a Security Academy financed through ABM project money, which in turn 
indirectly enabled his involvement with BITS.576 
Can the “fallen” experts speak? 
In the previous section we have seen how most of the GDR’s international relations experts lost 
their jobs during the process of unification, but we have also seen how they were able to quickly 
find new employment, though generally not in the field of international relations. To what extent 
were they still able to engage in debates and conversations of their former field of expertise? What 
role were the former international relations experts of the GDR still able to play in discussions 
and debates around foreign policy and international relations?  
To answer this question, it is helpful to borrow from debates around speech act theory and 
distinguish between a speaker and an audience.577 The idea here is that the researchers, academics 
or experts who spoke, wrote and produced output did not do so in a vacuum. They were 
surrounded by various networks of institutions, groups and actors, which they may or may not 
have been connected with. But for their words and writings to carry weight and impact, these 
needed to reach an audience, i.e. enter relevant networks where they would be received and taken 
up accordingly. The distinction between speaker and audience also means that in a first step the 
researchers, academics or experts who analyse international relations needed to produce output 
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and “speak” in some form that was made available to the audience. So, the question about the role 
and impact of the GDR’s former international relations experts in discussions and debates around 
foreign policy and international relations can be separated into two sub-questions: Can the “fallen” 
GDR experts in international relations speak? Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international 
relations be heard?578 
Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international relations speak?  
Interest, identity and means were the three important factors playing a role in the East German 
academics’ continued engagement with international relations. Interest and enjoyment of studying 
international relations played an important role: when the GDR ended, it became apparent that 
many of those who had been researchers or scholars in the field of international relations did not 
necessarily enjoy their profession. Those who had not enjoyed their job as much took the 
opportunity to start something new, especially because no easy or straightforward way existed to 
continue their old profession. Those who had enjoyed their job previously or thought they could 
enjoy it in the new conditions tried longest and hardest to stay engaged, even when their new 
profession took them into new subject areas. Some remained prolific writers and others turned 
away radically from their past lives. In his personal experience, Raimund Krämer thought that 
around 80% of former IIB researchers turned their backs on international relations and around 
20% stayed engaged with the topic area.579 This was partly to do with having an “academic” 
personality and enjoying research or teaching, but partly with a personal need to break with the 
past or remain connected to it, a process everyone experienced differently.580 The breakdown of 
their old lives and the devaluation of their past lives and achievements impacted them all, and for 
some this meant forgetting the past and not looking back. Identity thus played an important role, 
both in terms of identity with their general GDR past and in terms of identity with the role of 
international relations expert. Third, their individual capacity to engage in international relations 
analysis also played an important role. Those few who managed to stay in academia, as we will see 
in the next section “Building the new”, had an easier time engaging with international relations, 
though many of them had to change or modify their areas of expertise and all of them had to 
spend considerable time catching up with Western CV requirements and acquiring the necessary 
social capital for making it in academia. Those who left academia and retrained in a new profession 
were faced with limited capacities to engage. Starting a new job in a new field in a new system 
required all their attention and energy. The new system was not giving them any starting bonus 
and they had to work hard to prove themselves. As a result, the vast majority did not engage with 
international relations any more.581 Those who did were either retired or did it on a voluntary basis 
alongside their day jobs, as a form of intellectual engagement: 
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“That is when we founded WeltTrends - the journal and the publishing company. As a friend of mine once 
put it, we needed an escape from the stupidity of our daily lives. And that is why we did it, but it was self-
exploitation” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13) 
Their continued engagement with international relations took place in the form of unremunerated 
volunteer work,582 revolving around three areas: writing, organizing discussion circles and setting 
up journals or publishing outlets.  
Journal and publication companies 
The most important of these initiatives in the field of international relations is and was the 
international relations journal WeltTrends. In the first years of unification, many of the former IIB 
international relations specialists tried publishing in West German journals, with varying success. 
The West German publication outlets were not particularly welcoming and one journal in 
particular, the left-oriented Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, was difficult to access and 
publish in.583 Partly in reaction to this, they decided to set up their own journal,584 which was set 
up in collaboration with researchers from the Western Institute in Poznań, Poland. From the start, 
the journal was not conceived as a leftist or political venue, but rather as a specialized foreign 
policy journal open to various political positions and aiming at the intelligent debate of current 
issues.585 Many of the key actors behind WeltTrends had experienced the GDR’s restrictions and 
censorship negatively and insisted on designing and enforcing an autonomous publication venue, 
not affiliated with any political institution or actor.586 One of the journal’s biggest achievements 
was to survive the unification years and establish itself, while remaining independent.587 As such 
WeltTrends can be seen as the perhaps most successful of all these platforms.  
Associations of ex-international relations specialists 
Another important form of engaging with international relations was through the creation of 
associations dedicated to providing discussion circles as well as specialized publication 
opportunities for their members. The three most important ones in the field of international 
relations were the one set up by former diplomats (Verband für Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht), 
the one set up by former researchers and academics of the military academy in Dresden (Dresdner 
Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitspolitik), and the one set-up by former IIB members (originally called 
Politischer Club Potsdam and later renamed WeltTrends e.V.), whose main purpose quickly became the 
development and support of the journal WeltTrends.  
The association set up by former GDR diplomats, the Verband für Internationale Politik und 
Völkerrecht, was originally put in place in February 1990 during the last phase of the GDR’s 
existence, once it became apparent that its diplomats might not be taken over by the West German 
MfAA. Its first aim was the creation of an interest group dedicated only and specifically to the 
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interests of diplomats and come up for their interests during the process of unification. Its second 
original aim was to facilitate the GDR’s diplomats’ re-employment in a new field, which they 
thought would be West German companies. They contacted a West German recruiter and first 
trainings on how to apply and succeed at job interviews took place. The West German company 
was very interested: successful scouting and placing of ex-diplomats in West German companies 
would have been lucrative business for them. But, as anecdotal evidence suggests, West German 
foreign affairs minister Genscher intervened and prevented high-ranking takeovers of ex-GDR 
diplomats wherever he could:588  
“Genscher’s decision was a big disappointment for them and they were really upset because Genscher had 
prevented them from making big money with us. The company’s director came to visit us one day and said, 
these are his words: nothing can be done, you guys are screwed” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 13) 
After this episode all the younger diplomats still of working age left the association and Berlin in 
search of a job elsewhere to support themselves and their families. Only the retired GDR 
diplomats remained, and the average age of the association rose considerably within a short 
amount of time. As a result, their aims and activities changed. They reoriented and transformed 
into a platform dedicated to debates, discussions and information about foreign policy in general 
and the foreign policy of the GDR in particular.589 They organized publications and public talks to 
which they invited various speakers, from amongst their own group of ex-diplomats, but also from 
the German MfAA and foreign diplomats.590 Sustained by member contributions and voluntary 
work, the ultimate purpose was perhaps to showcase their expertise591 in a country that had rejected 
and marginalized them. Due to the increasing age and passing away of its members, the association 
was ultimately dissolved, its files transferred to the national archives and the publication rights 
conferred to WeltTrends.592  
The association set up by the reform-oriented researchers and academics of the GDR’s military 
academy, the Dresdner Studienkreis Sicherheitspolitik, DSS, functioned similarly to the one set up by 
the former diplomats. Its focus, however, lay primarily in publishing scientific analyses and studies, 
and less so on organizing evening talks or public talks. The DSS was founded in 1990 as the 
successor organization of an interdisciplinary research group formed during the GDR’s 
revolutionary upheaval. This research group was located at the military academy in Dresden but 
was open to all researchers, lecturers and professors from various institutions and disciplines who 
could come together to explore the possibilities of demilitarizing security. Once the military 
academy was closed, the group reformed into the DSS. DSS’s ultimate aim was to promote a 
peace-oriented approach to security and military affairs and over the years it cooperated with 
various peace-oriented activist groups. Founded in 1990, it dissolved again 25 years later due to 
the advanced age of its members, having published 115 studies. As with the VIP, its files were 
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transferred to the national archives after its dissolution and the publication rights conferred to 
WeltTrends.593 
Rosa-Luxemburg political foundation 
Former GDR international relations experts also partly regrouped around the far-left party’s think 
tank, the Rosa-Luxemburg political foundation, RLS. The RLS attracted in particular those East 
German academics who had been close to the central committee, in particular those coming from 
the military’s political college, or the central committee’s academy for social sciences AfG,594 the 
teacher training facility PH, or the military’s historical research institutions,595 but also gave room 
to a wide array of professors and academics from other institutions or critical persuasion.596 The 
RLS provided, in particular, the possibility to write and publish and to be part of political debates. 
But once the foundation received more funding with the Left Party’s representation in parliament, 
they also needed regular staff to organize and carry out their own research on various topics 
including international relations. After almost a decade still working at the University of Potsdam, 
former IIB Eastern Europe specialist Erhard Crome became the RLS’s head of the international 
peace and security division.597 While regrouping a variety of different leftist positions, the RLS 
remained a political foundation, with all the elements that come with it. This made it a less 
attractive option for some of the former international relations experts who had grown wary of 
power and fixed ideological positionings, preferring a separation between political protest and 
analysis.598 At the RLS, despite all the leftist orientation, East/West differences remained, increased 
over time by the ageing of the ex-GDR members.599 Important positions within the RLS, including 
in particular the foreign representations, were covered by Western members, with Eastern 
members often having fewer chances at good posts in the left Rosa-Luxemburg foundation.600  
Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international relations be heard? 
Through the dynamics of unification, the GDR’s old structures of knowledge production in the 
field of international relations disappeared. With the old structures gone, all knowledge and skills 
acquired in the old system remained attached to the individuals who had been part of the old 
structures. In order to play a role again, these would have to be institutionalized again and set into 
a meaningful new structure. But the new system built up in the East, often under the leadership 
of actors socialized in the West, was not focused on re-institutionalizing the old: 601 
“I believe that these first three, four, five years were very much shaped by ideological disputes, and especially 
in the social science field led to a fundamental distrust or concern in the old Federal Republic and also in 
circles of the political opposition in the GDR, that these structures would be preserved, that the political 
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thinking of the GDR sciences would continue to exist. And this meant that once the structures had been 
destroyed and the people were gone, then they are gone forever. They are then no longer part of the networks, 
they are no longer part of the important discourses, they are no longer part of the institutions. And you can't 
just make up for that” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10–11) 
Because these former experts were not as a whole re-institutionalized in the dominant networks, 
in the dominant discourses, in the dominant institutions, they remained largely without access to 
them. What they said or wrote did not, in general, reach the relevant places and people any more. 
The discussion circles of retired former experts, in particular, remained independent from the 
other circles and networks of discussion connected to politics and mainstream media.602 The few 
individuals who succeeded did so because they managed to reintegrate relevant structures, find 
employment at important institutions and acquire the social capital necessary to address audiences 
in ways relevant to them. Overall, it is helpful to distinguish between those who articulated 
themselves as part of a group identifying in some form with the former GDR (such as the 
associations lined out in the previous section) and those who articulated themselves as individuals, 
on the basis of their knowledge and expertise. Here the latter had much higher chances of being 
heard, while the former were more easily discredited. However, even there, two additional things 
sometimes played a role. First, a mismatch between the views and topics of interest on both sides. 
In short, the message sent out by the speaker was not the message that the audience wanted to 
hear. Second, a disqualification of the speaker’s credentials for being socialized in the East and for 
their past employment, leading to a distortion of their message and the inability of the audience to 
accept their points.  
First, the mismatch between the views and topics of interest on both sides played a role in 
disconnecting the ex-GDR academics and researchers from their respective audiences. Let’s have 
a look at two examples. Before deciding to leave Germany entirely and work as a consultant for 
foreign companies, Siegfried Fischer tried to make it in Germany in his old domain of expertise – 
security politics. He worked as a journalist, was even part of a radio show. It was the time of the 
war in Yugoslavia, but no-one was interested in his points. The “eternal peace” and the “end of 
history” mentality had taken over and audiences were not interested in anyone flagging up potential 
issues and problems or issues relating to security.603 Thomas Ruttig, the Afghanistan expert who 
managed to build a successful second career through the international detours of the UN and EU, 
had similar experiences to those of Siegfried Fischer within the context of Germany. His analysis 
and points about Afghanistan were ignored because they went against the grain of both the 
government’s positions and dominant knowledge producers. Despite being an internationally 
recognized and respected expert speaking fluent Dari and Pashto, Thomas Ruttig was only 
occasionally invited to official discussion rounds or consultancy sessions and rarely to any with 
political weight. Since 2016, his assessments of the situation in Afghanistan in particular went 
against the official knowledge facts underwriting the German immigration and refugee policies.604 
In his case, his (in)ability to connect with the dominant and relevant audiences was less a function 
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of his East German socialization than of his critique of the German military and political 
involvement in Afghanistan.605  
Second, a disqualification of the speaker’s credentials for being socialized in the East led to the 
inability of many audience members to accept their points. The ultimate disqualifier, of course, 
was and still is the Stasi label. Anyone afforded the label Stasi was “burnt”, and their only option 
was to disappear.606 Remaining active in their former areas of work became very difficult as they 
would discredit both themselves and anyone associated with them. But even without that label, 
having worked for a GDR state institution was enough as a disqualifier. For example, whenever 
publishing something or making a point in a discussion, Siegfried Fischer’s past stood in the way. 
As a former NVA army officer and philosophy professor at the GDR’s military college, he was 
immediately disregarded. In the eyes of most, this meant he must be either a “communist 
extremist” or a “military idiot”.607 While not necessarily immediately as obvious as in Siegfried 
Fischer’s case, their past usually meant that what they were saying or writing was already given 
meaning to and interpreted by others, independent of the actual context: 
“Whenever I say something, a judgement is immediately passed: He is the ‘leftist’ one, or he is the ‘red’ one, 
or he is the ‘weird’ one, or he is the ‘radical’ one, he already said the same things 30 years ago. Of course, 
this is not the case! I constantly upset everyone on the left side of the political spectrum, and I constantly upset 
everyone on the right side of the political spectrum. Sometimes twice a day. Early in the morning I’ll go to the 
peace discussion group at the [leftist think tank] RSL. They talk about armament and arms exports and 
the militarization of society. Then I say: What you are talking about - that's not a militarization of society. 
These are not good things, but we should not exaggerate – compared to England, for example, Germany is 
in a completely different position. Then they say: we knew you’d be like that, you are way too soft, etc.! On 
the same day in the evening go to a discussion group at the [conservative think tank] KAS. There they have 
all their NATO experts who say: we didn't make the 2% percent; the Germans are too weak. And then I 
stand up and say: but Germany has already done this, that, that and that. And then their response is: we 
don't need your left opinion! The same day. About the same thing. Some exaggerate in one direction, others 
in the other. If you say something against it, you will be criticized by both sides. It's like this every day” 
(Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 24) 
Conclusion 
During the phase of the GDR’s asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German 
system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. Most of its 
institutions were closed down, the experts and academics formerly operating in it had to find work 
in new domains and all the networks, ties and connections across institutions as well as between 
institutions and political stakeholders were dismantled. The vast majority of the GDR’s former 
experts took on new professions to assure their material survival and stopped engaging with 
international relations. Those who continued engaging with their former area of expertise did so 
                                               
605 Interview Ruttig, 2019: 24.  
606 Interview Schwarz, 2019: 4. 
607 Interview Fischer, 2020: 16-17.  
 149 
in an unequal space in which their words and writings carried little weight, and remained separate 
from the dominant discourses, actors and decision-making processes of the new Germany. 
This chapter has examined the relation between power and knowledge in the former GDR during 
its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It organized the events at hand through the lens 
of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. In 
doing so, it has shown how the principle of hierarchical orientation has played a role in the 
dismantling of the East German international relations infrastructure. In part 1, hierarchical 
orientation shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East German academics trying to adapt to 
the new situation by fully orienting to the Western standards. It shaped the attitudes and 
behaviours of the East and West German actors involved in closing down the Eastern institutions 
and it structured the various discourses of inferiority (incompetence, amorality, danger) used to 
apprehend the East German international relations experts. Finally, it played a role in crowding 
them out of the dominant international relations analysis networks, both the academic and political 
ones, and in displacing them into a subaltern parallel system of knowledge production and 




Asymmetrical Unification with the West and International 
Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR after 1990, 
Part 2: Building the New 
 
“[T]he general dilemma of this new beginning in the new states was: to what extent do you take into 
consideration the individuals and to what extent do you give priority to the quality of the new?” (Interview 
Keck, 2019: 6) 
“Anticommunism merged with Stasi-anxieties, personal gains with arrogance” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 
9) 
In the summer semester of 1993, West German professor Werner Jann started his new post at the 
University of Potsdam as a chairholder for “Administration and Organization”. He was the second 
of the newly hired chairholders to arrive in Potsdam’s newly built political science division. The 
mood was good, there was a sense of excitement in the air: they were building a new university 
from scratch, and this opened up many possibilities and opportunities. Upon arrival, he quickly 
learned that there were still a few academics from the GDR’s former IIB employed on temporary 
contracts. Given that his chair came with funds for two posts, the University of Potsdam soon 
came with a request: “We still have a few ‘leftovers’ from the old academy, they have all been 
evaluated positively […] Have a look at them, we'd be grateful if you could take one of them.” 
And so, Werner Jann proceeded to talk with a couple of those academics “from the old academy” 
to see whether there might be a good match. None of them seemed open to doing something new, 
though, as working for him would require a reorientation into “administration and organization”. 
Until he spoke with Jochen Franzke. The two immediately got on well and Jochen Franzke said, 
“I'll do it!”608 An expert on socialist countries, Jochen Franzke had had enough time since 1990 to 
see that his former area of expertise had become entirely discredited and that a career in 
international relations would be near to impossible in this new Germany. He took his chance when 
offered the possibility to stay in academia, even if this involved having to start from scratch in an 
entirely new domain of expertise. After a series of 17 temporary employment contracts up to 1996 
he received a permanent post,609 and ultimately became a recognized expert in the field of local 
administration, even making it into The Economist in 2019.610 This story highlights a number of the 
dynamics at play in this chapter. After the asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the 
knowledge infrastructure in the former East German territories was entirely reconfigured along 
West German lines and most of the posts filled with academics socialized in the former FRG. In 
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order to stay in academia, the few East German international relations experts still remaining on 
temporary contracts would need to learn and adapt fast, change or tweak their domain of expertise, 
build a model Western curriculum and cope with both precarity and low status.  
Following the lead of chapter 4, this chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge 
in the GDR during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany, but this time focuses on the 
dynamics surrounding the transfer and transplant of Western structures to the East. It makes sense 
of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between 
colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. Colonization/knowledge describes a 
process in which an asymmetrical situation of takeover recasts the relevant parameters within 
which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and 
advising about international relations take place. Following the colonization/knowledge nexus, 
these knowledge-making activities will take place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a 
formerly independent knowledge space becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another 
knowledge space. Activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and 
advising will be characterized by a reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the 
institutions and organizations formerly bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, 
imploding, reorganizing or reorienting themselves within the new context. The core logic of 
colonization/knowledge is hierarchical orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the “social 
entities” involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of. 
Colonization/Knowledge 
Core: Hierarchical Orientation Asymmetrical takeover 
  
 
This chapter, “Building the new”, focuses on the way in which the principle of hierarchical 
orientation played out in the transfer and implementation of a new Western infrastructure of 
knowledge production into the former East German territories. It focuses primarily on the newly 
founded University of Potsdam, which was built and inaugurated post-1990 in Potsdam. It 
examines, first, the transmission of Western structures onto the University of Potsdam and its 
underlying tabula rasa principle. It then turns, second, to the hiring patterns and the restaffing of 
the University of Potsdam’s political science faculty, including the individualization dynamics 
underwriting it. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the patterns and reasons 
accounting for which former GDR academics made it in the new system, and which did not.   
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Transmitting Western Structure 
Post 1990, Western academic structures were transferred and imposed onto the universities 
operating in the ex-GDR space, regardless of whether these were new creations as in Potsdam611 
or had been taken over as, for instance, the Humboldt University in Berlin. Regarding IR, this was 
done in particular by transferring and imposing the structure of West German political science, 
the disciplinary formation holding and encompassing foreign policy analysis and international 
relations.  
The transmission of a West German political science structure to the ‘Eastern’ territories of the 
former GDR was based on the tabula rasa principle.612 Tabula rasa assumed that no equivalent 
structures worth building upon existed in the GDR and that the West German structures could 
simply be exported East. The tabula rasa principle emerged through the combination of two 
elements: the re-spatialization of academic structures and the development of a discourse of 
‘quality’ in academia. The re-spatialization of academic structures through the process of German 
unification regrouped the former East German international relations infrastructure under the 
wing of the closest West German equivalent: the discipline of political science and its gatekeeper, 
the West German political science association DVPW. The discourse of ‘quality’ developed in 
academia as a way of approaching the GDR’s academic space and making sense of it. Based on 
the articulation of the opposition between science and ideology, or rather quality and ideology, it 
assumed, first, that the GDR’s academic production was ideological and, second, that quality and 
ideology were not compatible.  
Re-spatializing the context of international relations expertise 
In the GDR, international relations operated as an independent field. As we have seen in chapter 
2, it was spread across multiple institutions: the IIB, the IPW, the universities and institutions of 
the military being the most prominent centres of international relations expertise. These 
institutions criss-crossed and engaged with one another in various relations of cooperation and 
rivalry, and stood in various relations of distance and proximity to a wide array of political 
stakeholders, ranging from the various members of the central committee’s Politbüro to the 
different ministries, including the tight connections with the MfAA’s practical expertise on 
international relations. 
In West Germany, there was no such free-floating field. Since the end of World War II, 
international relations had been a set component of the discipline of political science. Having had 
to establish itself in a fight against the jurists, sociologists and economists, post-World War II 
political science developed a strong identity as ‘integrative science’. As the sphere of politics could 
not be understood through the lens of one aspect alone, it needed a discipline attuned to all its 
facets. And the analysis of a state’s foreign policy formed one such aspect from the start.613 The 
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discipline’s fragile unity had been questioned for the first time again during the 1968 movement, 
dividing it between a ‘Marxist’ and a ‘bourgeois’ wing. It was questioned again in the 1980s, when 
applied policy research threatened to splinter the discipline’s core into a myriad of expertise 
areas.614 The West German political science association DVPW had internalized this anxiety about 
its identity and, when the moment of German unification arrived, its main goal was to preserve 
the unity of the discipline, both to prevent any potential splintering and to ensure the legitimacy 
of the discipline and its continued survival. At the time of unification, the DVPW counted around 
1,600 members and spanned most of the discipline. The leadership circle counted around 12 active 
members dividing the tasks at hand, and the handling of the disciplinary development in the new 
member states became the particular responsibility of the leadership trio of Beate Kohler-Koch, 
Bernhard Blanke and Gerhard Göhler.615 Their main fear was that each university and institute in 
the GDR would develop their own versions of ‘political science’, with questionable compatibility 
with the West German standard model. All across the former territory of the GDR, political 
science degrees and institutes had been sprouting out of the ground and with the financial support 
of the DAAD and other political foundations, Western professors and academics were offering all 
sorts of courses labelled as ‘political science’. The main problem of this, in the eyes of the DVPW, 
was its unstructured and unregulated format. The DVPW felt mandated to intervene and guide 
the process into a rational and transparent format.616 Given the contested history of the discipline, 
the DVPW feared a loss of reputation, should the GDR institutes not live up to the West German 
standards.617 
In the process of unification, the former Eastern institutions were attached and dissolved into their 
comparable counterparts in the West. Where no direct counterpart could be found, the closest 
equivalent would have to do. In the case of the field of international relations, this meant that it 
docked onto the disciplinary field of political science. Political science acted as an organizational, 
interpretive and normative category.  
Organizational 
Political science acted as an organizational category in the sense that it concretely organized the 
formation of international relations in the GDR’s former Eastern territories. Keeping international 
relations as a separate field wasn’t even thought about, or discussed. The DVPW had neither an 
interest in seeing IR as separate, nor any manner of conceptualizing IR as separate from political 
science.618 This mindset ensured that no independent discipline of international relations could 
emerge, and that international relations was always thought of as a subdiscipline of political 
science. It ensured that the form and content of enquiring into ‘international relations’ would be 
consistent with the form and contents developed in the subdiscipline of ‘international relations,’ 
with its usual fields and issues of enquiry, including a close connection with the study of Germany’s 
foreign policy. 
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Moving international relations into the field of political science was part of a wider process in 
which disciplines and fields of studies were re-organized. For IR, this meant that it found itself put 
into the group of ‘political science’ together with the discipline of Marxism/Leninism. Pre-1990, 
IR had had virtually no connections with Marxism/Leninism beyond the fact that students had to 
take M/L foundational courses in their first two years of study. While IR was thus grouped 
together with Marxism/Leninism, it was separated from the discipline of area studies that it did 
have close connections to pre-1990. Area studies was kept out of political science and treated as a 
separate discipline.  
The discipline of Marxism/Leninism played an important role. We have seen in chapter 2 that 
Marxism/Leninism was a core course for first- and second-year undergraduate students and as 
such also played a role at the IIB. But it remained quite separate from ‘international relations’ and 
was not understood to be part of the same discipline or field of enquiry. Because of 
Marxism/Leninism’s embeddedness in political philosophy, however, its docking point to the 
West German system also became political science. Already during the revolutionary dynamics of 
1989/90, many of the philosophy faculties responsible for the Marxism/Leninism training 
rebranded themselves as political science in an attempt to survive the system change. These 
attempts were received with fear in West German political science circles. In their view, ‘scientific 
communism’ was not a science but a tool of ideological indoctrination. If they labelled themselves 
as ‘political science’ and then integrated the West German field, they had the potential to discredit 
the discipline as a whole:  
“[I saw] how the GDR colleagues marched into the West in the autumn of 1989 and told everyone that 
scientific communism was political science. And the DVPW was terrified that all these East German would-
be political scientists would join [their association] and form a majority.” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 3) 
These developments were particularly threatening for the IIB researchers, who had also re-
oriented into political science. They soon realized how dangerous the claims of the former 
Marxism/Leninism experts were for their own credibility:  
“There were certainly justified fears amongst the Western political scientists which, to be honest, I also shared, 
because we had an incredible number of Marxism-Leninism teachers in the GDR, including at the IIB, at 
the [DASR] academy, and also at the teacher training institute in Potsdam. These ML teachers left their 
previous ML institutes in droves in the autumn of 1989 and tried to get into the newly emerging political 
science institutions. Raimund Krämer had, thank God, opposed these efforts since March 1990, so that only 
very few came to the IIB. That was very dangerous, because most of them had neither the educational nor the 
theoretical-methodological background necessary to engage in political science. But for the short term, they just 
tried to get a new ‘stamp’ so that they no longer had to apply for posts with their old M-L certificates.” 
(Interview Franzke, 2019: 8) 
Because they had both rebranded themselves as political science and were both operating as fields 
with theoretical docking points to political science, ‘international relations’ and ‘scientific 
communism’ became part of the same new field. So the new area of ‘political science’ originating 
from ‘international relations’ and the new area of ‘political science’ originating from scientific 
communism were associated with one another and put in the same category of ‘East German 
would-be political science’. And because ‘political science’ with roots in scientific communism was 
by far numerically dominant, a slippage occurred whereby the category ‘East German would-be 
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political science’ became understood as solely originating in ‘scientific communism’ with the IR 
sub-branch being forgotten.  
While international relations was merged with scientific communism, it also became separated 
from area studies. In the West German understanding, area studies were not ‘political science’ and 
they therefore also did not have a place in the discipline. If a specific location, as for instance the 
university of Leipzig, had both a strong area studies programme and a newly developed political 
science curriculum based on ‘scientific communism’, the two were handled as entirely separate 
disciplines. From the perspective of the DVPW, their concern was to establish a clean political 
science degree consistent across East and West.619 If specific universities wanted to offer a side 
option with specialization in a specific area, that was considered a possible option, but none that 
concerned the DVPW:  
“[Area studies] was a kind of decorative accessory, to put it a little harshly. Following the principle: If you 
want it, you are welcome to do it, but it is not our problem. We believed it was our task to create a structure 
in which, according to our understanding, political science was rationally structured in its core areas.” 
(Interview Göhler, 2019: 6) 
Area studies in the GDR had no formal equivalent in West Germany, no professional association 
or political leverage of the kind that could have taken it under its wing and protection. Despite 
having specialized expertise in many areas where West Germany was lacking, this lack of 
correspondence to a structure it could fall into led to a marginalization of area studies during the 
process of unification and an ultimately much slower process of transition and re-organization.620 
It also did not help that area studies split internally during the process of unification into a wing 
focused on literature and linguistics and a wing focused on socio-political developments. Because 
of its association with the GDR’s political system and ideological structure, the socio-political 
branch of area studies became more problematic, and the discipline also tried to survive by 
recentring around linguistics and literature.621 This also led to a further differentiation and 
distancing from international relations.  
Interpretive  
Beyond its role as an organizational category, ‘political science’ also acted as an interpretive 
category. It led to a situation whereby no academic development in the GDR could be looked at, 
interpreted or evaluated on its own terms. Any consideration, interpretation or evaluation became 
absorbed by the category ‘political science’. This meant that all debates about GDR research and 
teaching revolved around one question: was this political science? Correspondence to political 
science became the only criteria through which international relations, but also ‘scientific 
communism’, could be understood. Underlying the interpretive frame was an equation of ‘political 
science’ with elements such as ‘freedom’, ‘apolitical’, ‘speaking truth to power’, ‘pure science’, 
‘unbiased’, ‘analytical’, ‘open-ended’, and so forth. So if academic performances in the GDR were 
to be considered ‘political science’ they would need to be ‘free’, ‘apolitical’, ‘unbiased’ etc. 
                                               
619 Interview Göhler, 2019: 6. 
620 Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 9-11. 
621 Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 9.  
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Conversely, anything not deemed to be ‘political science’ would then be ‘unfree’, ‘political’, 
‘ideological’, ‘an extension of power and politics’, ‘biased’ and ‘pre-determined’.  
This led to two things: West German actors arguing against the existence of political science in the 
GDR, and GDR actors arguing for the existence of political science in the GDR.   
The West German political scientists involved in the unification dynamics had spent considerable 
time and effort debating whether ‘scientific communism’ was actually a science and whether it was, 
more specifically, political science.622 Their conclusion was that ‘scientific communism’ was not a 
science but in fact an ideology and that therefore no political science had existed in the GDR. By 
extension, this also meant that the form of political science emerging from international relations 
had been ‘ideological’ and not ‘political science’. We can see this same line of argumentation in the 
science council’s evaluation of political science in East Germany. Tasked by the federal 
government to assess the status of all disciplines in the former GDR territories, the science council 
formed working groups that visited different locations,623 though not Potsdam, and took into 
consideration various information materials about the current state in the planning and developing 
of the new universities/subject areas.624 Their assessment is worth quoting: 
“The economic and social sciences are among those subjects in which a fundamental reorientation in terms of 
personnel and content is necessary, because the existing degrees of study were one-sidedly geared towards 
Marxist-Leninist social theory and the centrally administrated state-monopolized economy. The taught 
subjects were largely isolated from the scientific development of the West, restricted in their area of study and 
methodologically narrow. They therefore lack important conditions for scientific performance.”625 
“Political science, as defined by the standards of pluralistic and democratic states, did not exist in the GDR. 
The units that did exist with high levels of staff, namely scientific socialism/communism, served specifically 
the goals of a comprehensive political indoctrination of all university staff in the GDR as well as the self-
justification of the political system and its ideology. It is understandable that political science as a scientific 
subject in the universities of the new states – unlike in sociology – cannot connect to any existing 
structures.”626 
This process of defining East German ‘political science’ as ideological was supported by a system 
of evaluations, whereby the publications of the respective academics were evaluated against West 
German criteria. They were found to be lacking both in terms of quantity and quality, as evaluated 
all across East Germany, focusing primarily on the field of Marxism-Leninism.  
Quantity was determined by the number of published monographs and journal articles. These were 
found to fall short of the West German standards:  
                                               
622 See for example Greven and Koop. 
623 These are: the HU Berlin, the TU Dresden, the University in Hale-Wittenberg, the university in Jena, the university in 
Leipzig, the Handelshochschule in Leipzig, the Hochschule für Ökonomie in Berlin.  
624 Wissenschaftsrat, "Empfehlungen zum Aufbau der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften an den Universitäten / 
Technischen Universitäten in den neuen Bundesländern und im Ostteil von Berlin, März 1991," in Empfehlungen zur 
künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin (Köln 1992). p.58 
625 Ibid. p.58 
626 Ibid. p.61-62.  
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“And then we looked at their publication lists and there was nothing! Of course, one could not publish so 
easily in the GDR. Paper was scarce, we were told. So they could not publish endlessly. Ok, so then we said:  
let's look at the manuscripts in their desk drawer (as we knew from the inner emigration under National 
Socialism). But there weren't any”(Interview Göhler, 2019: 3) 
Quality was determined by the amount and type of citations and overall references. The quality of 
the reviewed work was then deemed to be poor for a lack of citations, or, when citations were 
included for being solely ‘ideological’ citations of Lenin or last party congress: 
“Have a look at the [GDR] publications and see for yourself how they were using footnotes, references and 
other elements of good citation practice. And if there are none or it is limited to a quote from Lenin or from 
the last party congress ... Of course, we knew that in the GDR, [references] like these to be made in the 
introduction and in the conclusion, because everything had to be anchored ideologically. I would accept that 
because I know that this is how things were done. But then I looked at the middle part: What has been 
processed there, what comes out of it?” (Interview Göhler, 2019:13) 
On the other side, this prompted the IIB’s reformers to also engage in the conversation and 
demonstrate that international relations, in the GDR, had in fact been political science.627 Their 
arguments revolved around the distinction between form and essence: while there had not been 
any political science in the form that is usual in West Germany, the essence of political science – 
impartial analysis of socio-political developments across the world – had been a key component 
of research and teaching activities at the IIB and IPW:  
“Political science was never added to [international relations], it was always there. […] Obviously we always 
did political science in the traditional sense at the IIB, even if it wasn't called that in the GDR. If I examine 
the relation between nationalities in the Soviet Union and analyze the problems that arise from it, then this 
is political science. When I write about the leadership styles of the general secretaries of the Communist 
Parties, it is political science, or when a colleague writes about the conflicts in the Balkans between the socialist 
countries there, it is also political science. In the GDR, the state-oriented science of the international relations 
was at its core political science. Denying this served as a defence shield for some West German colleagues in 
order to get rid of us.“ (Interview Franzke, 2019: 8 
Normative 
Political science also became the normative frame to evaluate GDR academic knowledge 
production in the areas of enquiry associated with it. Because political science was associated with 
the ‘science’ side of the ‘science/ideology’ dichotomy, it became good and desirable to be labelled 
as ‘political science’ and a disqualification when labelled not to be. As such, international relations 
became normatively associated with political science in two ways. First, in the sense of whether 
international relations as an independent field of study showed the qualities and attributes 
associated with political science. Second, in the sense of whether an independent discipline of 
international relations was desirable or possible. Here the idea of a loose discipline of international 
relations was threatening, as it needed ‘political theory’ to know what was right and wrong and 
                                               
627 See for example Erhard Crome et al., "Zum neunmonatigen Versuch eines Aufbaus der Politikwissenschaft in Potsdam im 
Jahre 1990," in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome 
(Berlin: WeltTrends, 2009). 
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make good moral judgement. Any efforts to create a separate field of international relations were 
seen as threatening, not just in the organizational sense of splitting up the wider discipline, but also 
in the normative sense of disjoining international relations from political theory.628  
Setting up the new universities in the East 
The tabula rasa principle indicated that no political science equivalent to the West German model 
had existed in the GDR. Because of the organizational, interpretive and normative effects of the 
discursive use of West German political science as a point of reference, it could both be concluded 
that the GDR had no previous traditions of political science that one could build on or take over 
and that the development of political science in the East according to Western standards was 
necessary and desirable.  
The transfer of West German political science to the Eastern territories was conceptually and 
temporally divided into a three-step process: first transfer and establish the structure of political 
science, then set the teaching contents, then decide about whom to hire as academic staff.629 This 
section examines the first two steps of setting up structure and content at the University of 
Potsdam. Four main actors played a role in this process: the West German political science 
association DVPW, Brandenburg’s ministry of education under the lead of minister Hinrich 
Enderlein, the all-German science council Wissenschaftsrat seated in Cologne, and the various 
committees of the University of Potsdam itself tasked with actually setting up the newly founded 
university.  
Political science association DVPW 
As we have seen, the West German political science association DVPW played an important role 
in setting the standards of what political science should look like at its core and ensuring its 
standardization across all locations in the East (“gemeinsame Grundstruktur”).630 Its function was thus 
as standard-setter and coordinator. Later, the ministerial bureaucracies of the respective states took 
over once they had become functional.631  
In the earlier stage of the process, before the East German institutions were dissolved, the DVPW 
had been in direct contact with the respective East German political science departments, advising, 
helping out, sending staff, and coordinating across locations. With the dissolution of the East 
German institutions, its direct power and influence disappeared. Now new structures were going 
to be established, and the committee responsible for this would be appointed by the federal 
ministries of education through a chain of committees. Threatened with losing its grip on the 
process, and facing the heightened power of political actors to make decisions about their 
discipline, the DVPW insisted with the ministries and the new university directors that the political 
science structure committee of each new university would need to feature at least one member of 
                                               
628 Compare with Interview Göhler, 2019: 6, 8-9. 
629 Interview Göhler, 2019:1.  
630 Interview Göhler, 2019:8.  
631 Interview Göhler, 2019:10.  
 159 
the DVPW.632 In Potsdam, Prof. Göhler would become the responsible DVPW contact point633. 
It is in this sense that the DVPW successfully influenced the process: by having a representative 
with voting power sit at the actual committees making the decisions about the structures of the 
degree.634 More subtly, their power also resided in naming and shaming: in that sense no ministry 
or university would have wanted to strongly go against the organization’s explicit 
recommendations.635 Beyond this, the DVPW did not play much of a role going forward, and 
certainly not anymore once all the important professors were hired in the next step.636 
Ministry of education 
The ministries of education of the respective states played another important role in the process. 
In the case of Potsdam, we have already discussed Hinrich Enderlein, Brandenburg’s new minister 
responsible for higher education. He and his team’s role resided in drafting the legal framework 
underwriting higher education, and, importantly, appointing the directors of the newly set-up 
universities as well as, together with the newly appointed directors, setting up a ‘founding senate’ 
(“Gründungssenat”), which is the organ responsible for making all the decisions regarding the 
building and setting up of the new universities.637 In Potsdam, minister Enderlein chose professor 
Rolf Mitzner to be the new director of the University of Potsdam. A GDR professor of chemistry 
at the PH, the GDR’s teacher training facility in Potsdam, Rolf Mitzner is part of the reformer 
movement of his institution. During the revolutionary upheaval of 1989/90 he was elected as the 
PH’s new director to democratize and reform the institution.638 As the new University of Potsdam 
was built on a merger of the old PH and the old legal sections of the HRV, appointing the 
democratically elected reform-director was a no-brainer: Hinrich Enderlein wanted to build the 
academic infrastructure in Potsdam as quickly as possible, director Mitzner was democratically 
elected, seemed competent and the two had a strong personal click from the beginning.639 Together 
with the newly appointed director Rolf Mitzner, they decided on the ‘founding senate’, the organ 
responsible for setting up the new university, trying to achieve a good mix between East and West 
as well as between natural and social sciences/humanities.640 It was, in turn, this founding senate 
that would appoint the specific committee responsible for setting up the structure of the political 
sciences in Potsdam and decide who would sit on that committee.    
                                               
632 Letter from Prof. Dr Beate Kohler-Koch, chairwoman of the DVPW, Betr. Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländern, 
Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914; Prof. Beate Kohler Koch, DVPW Vorsitzende, Zwischenbericht, 
Aufbau der Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländer, Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914. 
633 Prof. Beate Kohler Koch, DVPW Vorsitzende, Zwischenbericht, Aufbau der Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländer, 
Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914.  
634 Interview Göhler, 2019:9. 
635 Email Interview Wewer, 08.05.2020. 
636 Interview Jann, 2019: 8.  
637 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 10.  
638 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 9-10. 
639 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 10. 
640 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 11.  
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The Science Council (“Wissenschaftsrat”) 
Another important actor in this process was the all-German, formerly West-German, science 
council Wissenschaftsrat seated in Cologne. Following article 38.1 of the unification treaty, the 
science council was tasked to evaluate all the newly created universities and issue discipline-specific 
recommendations of how to go forward in the “necessary process of renewal”.641 While not 
binding, its recommendations carried weight: their fulfilment came with financial support. 
Whenever the science council issued a recommendation, it also recommended its financing.642 
While higher education was and still is a matter for the respective federated state, the financing of 
half the costs of setting up a new institution was to be funded by the federal level – granted they 
approved of the project.643 With his ambitions to build three new universities in Brandenburg, 
along with five colleges of applied sciences, this was a lot of money that minister Enderlein could 
not bypass.644 The recommendations of the science council thus carried weight.645   
The science council was composed of three groups: scientists, politicians from the federal level 
and education ministers from the state level. While the scientists had a majority by one vote, 
decision-making typically required a lot of negotiation.646 While the unification dynamics meant an 
expansion of the science council to include the newly elected East German science ministers, not 
many changes were made to the composition of the body of scientists. Not more than a handful 
of East German scientists were included. As a result, the science council’s view and position were 
very ‘Western’.647  
The science council recommended building political science in the former Eastern territories. The 
arguments were the same as the ones used by the IIB in October 1990 to try and assure its survival. 
First, political science was a natural and self-evident component of all democratic-pluralistic 
industrial societies. Second, the radical transformations of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe 
towards pluralistic constitutional political orders would need to be supported by political science 
research. Third, a region such as East Germany where the free scientific analysis and reflection of 
its political order was tabooed, was in particular need of scientific analysis. Political science offered 
the necessary concepts, questions and methods for this research. In this sense, political science 
contributed to the development of a democratic political culture in the new states. Fourth, political 
science provided the technical basis for training teachers, in whose hands the political education 
in schools would reside.648 
                                               
641 Wissenschaftsrat,  in Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil 
von Berlin. p.58 
642 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 5. 
643 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 3. 
644 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 5. 
645 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 3. 
646 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 6.  
647 Interview Enderlein, 2020: 12. 
648 Wissenschaftsrat,  in Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil 
von Berlin. p.73-74. 
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The science council recommended building a political science degree in at least one university of 
each of the new Eastern states, featuring the classical four professorships.649 A particular focus of 
these new political science degrees was to lie in public policy and public administration, since all 
the new Eastern states would need to rebuild their local political administrative structures from 
scratch, and this process would require well-trained personnel.650 
The University of Potsdam 
The fourth important player was the University of Potsdam itself and more specifically the 
committee responsible for building the political sciences at the university. Its main function in the 
process under examination here was to make decisions about the structure of the newly built 
political sciences. This new structure combined both the standard political science layout pushed 
for by the political science association DVPW and the focus on public policy put forward by the 
science council.  
In July 1991, the University of Potsdam set up the ‘structure’ committee responsible for building 
the social sciences in Potsdam.651 It was headed by Prof. Karl Rohe, the appointed ‘founding dean’ 
responsible for setting up the political sciences. Karl Rohe came from Essen in NRW, 
Brandenburg’s partner state. Next to Prof. Rohe, it was composed of two West German professors 
recommended respectively by the political science association DVPW and by the sociology 
association, two other West Germans already teaching in Potsdam, as well as Dr Krämer from the 
former IIB and a student representative. The structure commission was appointed for the whole 
social sciences (political sciences and sociology), whereas the hiring committees would composed 
of two separate committees for political science and the social sciences respectively.652 
This structure committee decided to focus the political sciences on public policy and organizations. 
This decision was based on the science council’s May recommendation to have political science 
not with a social science focus but with a public policy and international institutions focus. They 
also followed the science council’s recommendation not to mix political science and sociology into 
one degree, partly because this was the approach followed by the HU in East Berlin. They chose 
to follow these recommendations, partly because the neighbouring disciplines of law and economy 
were willing to cooperate and because the already existing political science degree seemed like a 
good basis to build on while accentuating the focus on public policy and public administration. In 
comparative terms, this focus also distinguished them from their close competitors in Berlin: the 
FU in West Berlin had a big classical political science while the HU in East Berlin was developing 
a combined social science degree mixing sociology and political science. Developing a political 
science curriculum focused on public administration gave Potsdam an edge and distinctive 
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651 Universität Potsdam, Der Gründungsbeautragte für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Positionspapier zu Aufbau, Lage 
und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft) an der Universität Potsdam. Potsdam 
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652 Universität Potsdam, Der Gründungsbeautragte für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Positionspapier zu Aufbau, Lage 
und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft) an der Universität Potsdam. Potsdam 
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advantage.653 While this thus played a role in setting the tone about the official profile that Potsdam 
should develop – public administration, not IR – its latter role was much less strong than here 
suggested. Public administration was not traditionally a part of political sciences in Germany, and 
many of the hired faculty members followed their own agendas, resisting the pull towards a public 
administration profile.654 
Filling the structure 
Once the Western structures and contents of political science had been transferred East, they 
needed to be filled with relevant staff. These were mostly hired in the West, but partly also re-
hired from the previous Eastern academics. The main logic underwriting this dynamic was that of 
an individualization of competence.  
Individualization of competence 
The dynamic of asymmetrical unification was composed of two elements. On the one hand, the 
old networks and connections that formed the former separate unity fell apart and disaggregated. 
On the other hand, the now free-floating elements of the old system docked onto the networks 
and connections of the new system as best as they could. The previous section examined the latter, 
looking at the connection process whereby East German ‘international relations’ became attached 
to West German ‘political science’. This section looks at the other side of the dynamic, the 
disaggregation of formerly connected elements in the GDR.  
In the first part of this chapter, ‘winding down the old’, we had already looked at the political 
disaggregation of the GDR into federated states. This process meant that universities were not 
coordinated and needed on a national level anymore, but were instead inscribed in a system of 
significance located at the state level. For the IIB, for instance, this means that their international 
relations competence did not stand anymore in relation to nation-level foreign policy decision-
making, but instead in relation to the framework and scale of a state. As the states are lacking in 
foreign policy autonomy and are instead geared towards local administration, this meant that the 
jurists with their focus on public administration had much better chances of survival in this 
framework than an institute oriented towards the analysis of places and processes wholly 
unconnected to the state. It also meant that the re-building of political science described in the 
previous section ‘transmitting Western structure’ would be smoother when oriented along the 
principles of public administration and organization than around the principles of international 
relations.  
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Chaos of disciplines655 
But the process of disaggregation also included other aspects in addition to the political dimension. 
In relation to academia we can see how disciplines started to position themselves against one 
another. We had already seen how, during the revolutionary dynamics and the first phases of 
unification, the lawyers of the HRV worked hard to separate themselves from the international 
relations specialists of the IIB. Their efforts included both a discursive separation between 
international relations and legal specialists, but also a separation in concrete physical terms, in that 
they tried to kick the IIB out of their institution, the HRV. This is what Raimund Krämer terms 
“the internal Eastern quarrels,” a contestation dynamic whereby each remaining ‘Eastern’ group 
or unit claimed for itself distance from the former regime and accused the other groups or units 
instead of closeness to the regime.656 Once it became clear that the pedagogical university in 
Potsdam, the PH, would be merged with the HRV and de facto with the IIB, this dynamic of 
rivalry started to take over the relation between PH and HRV: 
“I know that the problem back then was always the PH. Because the PH was so much bigger in every 
respect. That is the first point. Second, the PH itself was a problem. They had been founded by [Margot 
Honecker] the wife of the chairman of the State Council and were a favourite child of hers, but they enjoyed 
acting as if they were apolitical. Which they definitely were not. The College of Law and Administration 
[HRV], on the other hand, was [portrayed] as the source of evil, there were considerations to disband it 
completely, similarly to the [Stasi] University in Golm. That had to be prevented. [...] The decisive factor 
was that the location [of the IIB/HRV] was maintained and that its basic structure was retained. And 
this was a success, not against the Westerners, but against the PH.” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 12)  
Because two previously independent but peacefully coexisting units were merged into one, and 
because this process of merging was chaotic, not well planned out and threatened the survival of 
each unit and the people attached to it, a process of competition was set in motion. The PH would 
highlight the HRV’s lineage as a place of ‘evil’, the elite institution designed to indoctrinate all of 
the GDR’s bureaucrats, while the HRV would point to the PH’s close affiliation and monitoring 
by Margot Honecker, wife of Erich Honecker and one of the least popular politicians of the GDR.  
This translated more particularly into a rivalry between the sociologists of the PH and the ‘political 
scientists’ from the IIB, once they became merged together, alongside the economists, into a 
faculty for economic and social sciences. This process did not, at first, provide any clarity about 
the status of sociology. It was clear to the economists that they would have to be a part of this, to 
fill the ‘economic’ side of the faculty. But what exactly did ‘social sciences’ mean? Through the 
minister’s ‘study guarantee’ to the political science students, that discipline had already received 
some form of covering and assurance about the future. But sociology’s place in the ‘social sciences’ 
was still to be debated and they also wanted “a piece of the big cake” of which the political sciences 
already had taken a chunk.657 And so the sociologists tried to push out the political scientists, 
arguing that the FU in former West Berlin already featured a massive political science department, 
                                               
655 I borrow the term from Andrew Abbott, Chaos of disciplines (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2001). 
656 Interview Krämer, 2019a: 11.  
657 Interview Krämer, 2019a: 10.  
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while the political scientists argued against a mixing with sociology under the argument that the 
disciplinary standards of political science had to be upheld. 
While the social sciences were splintering up into subgroups trying to push one another out, 
another rivalry developed between the natural and the social sciences. As with the previous one, 
the key of this rivalry lay in the underlying bid for survival all disciplines were thrown into during 
the unification dynamics. It revolved around the question of how ‘a-political’ and therefore more 
scientifically valid they were. The natural scientists had an easier claim there. We can see the effects 
of this in the overall higher numbers of natural scientists retaining a post in academia, despite the 
natural sciences also being very severely affected by cuts and by a devaluation of expertise. It is 
symptomatic for the situation that when choosing the new director for the newly created 
University of Potsdam from amongst Eastern academics, the choice fell onto a chemist.  
Chaos of academics 
While the disciplines started to fight on their own and against one another, the process of 
disaggregation went even further, breaking down the group of East German academics into 
individuals, while regrouping them into new distinctions such as young/old and Stasi/non-Stasi. 
These would play a distinctive role in determining who would get to stay in academia.  
The process of individualization was set in motion by the various evaluations of East German 
academic structures taking place in 1989-90. This process of individualization can be described in 
three, almost dialectical, steps. The first step in this process of disaggregation was to evaluate East 
German political science and find it to be lacking in quality, ultimately judging that there had not 
been any ‘real’ political science in the GDR. We have seen this in the previous section on the 
concept of the tabula rasa. The next step was to determine that East German academics should 
nevertheless be included into West German academia – not on the principle of quality, but on the 
principle of humanity:  
“[T]he general dilemma of this new beginning in the new states was: to what extent do you take into 
consideration the individuals and to what extent do you give priority to the quality of the new?” (Interview 
Keck, 2019: 6) 
A trope of incompatibility between the old and quality was developed. Incorporating old staff 
would thus always mean poorer quality. Nevertheless including them would thus need to be done 
on the basis of something else: humanitarian considerations for the individual, personal fate of the 
respective scholars. Finally, the principle of humanity was translated into a concrete practice of 
picking out those individuals deemed to have been morally worthy and to show the promise of 
future quality. In a synthesis between quality and humanity, these elements were found, 
academically, in scholarship that modified or went against the grain of existing dogma. In short in 
a scholarship that exhibited a ‘critical’ attitude. For example, the GDR’s existing dogma stated that 
imperialist states were intrinsically wired for aggression. If a piece of scholarship instead explored 
the conditions in which imperialist states could be seen to also have an intrinsic desire for peace, 
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then this would be considered as a piece of ‘critical’ scholarship, denoting the intelligence, complex 
thinking and moral integrity of the academic in question.658  
While the group of ‘East German academia’ thus disaggregated both into discrete disciplines as 
well as up to the level of the individual as the unit of evaluation and judgment, new categorizations 
and grouping also emerged, in particular the groups of young versus old and Stasi versus non-
Stasi.  
In chapter 3 on revolution/knowledge, we already saw how the revolutionary dynamics re-
organized academics along generational lines. Then, academics were divided into three groups: the 
young, the old and the middle group. The young academics, meaning PhD students or assistants 
with recent PhDs but no Habils, did not have  enough standing to play a role. The old academics, 
high in the academic hierarchies, were discredited symbolically as they were standing for that which 
the revolution was against. That left a middle generation of academics in their 30s and 40s, fully 
qualified yet not established enough in the higher levels of the hierarchy to take up a vacant 
position in their institutions and assume the role of reformers. With the colonization/knowledge 
dynamics, a similar, yet different situation unfolded. Strong distinctions were made by those in 
hiring commissions and by those evaluating East German academics between the ‘old’ and the 
‘young’:  
“This meant that we didn’t have any big discussions about the older colleagues because there was nothing to 
discuss. In our opinion, we couldn’t let them loose on the students. At least we could expect the younger ones 
to catch up to all that was necessary.” (Interview Göhler, 2019: 13) 
The ‘young’ of this time period corresponded with the younger segment of the ‘middle’ generation 
from the revolutionary period. But the basis of this distinction between generations was now found 
in their future potential. All the academics, irrespective of young or old, are judged to be lacking 
and to be poorly performing according to the West German standards, but they are separated on 
their assumed ability and willingness to learn. This was different from the earlier revolutionary 
dynamics where the generations were mostly separated on the basis of practical capability for 
action and willingness to respond to the situation at hand and takeover. 
Another distinction already present at earlier times, but amplified at this stage of the unification 
process, was the distinction between scholars previously affiliated with the Stasi and scholars that 
were not. The Stasi had played an important role in the revolutionary dynamics as symbol and 
target of the upheaval, but it was not the centre of the dynamics. The revolutionary upheavals had 
been centred around the efforts to renew and reform the GDR, and the Stasi was one such element 
of contention needing to be changed. But during the unification dynamics, the topic of the Stasi 
developed into a full discursive register slowly drawing everything else in.659 In January 1992, the 
Stasi archives were opened. From then onwards the public had access to the files, and the civil 
servants, including academics, could be checked. After 1992, a discursive shift took place. From 
then onwards, everything GDR would be seen under the topic ‘Stasi’. As Misselwitz highlights, 
the paradox, the power and influence of the Stasi, reached its climax after it had disappeared. The 
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opening of the Stasi files marked not the end, but the beginning of an endless story.660 The 
revolutionaries of 1989 morphed from heroes to naïve victims pursued and surveilled even in the 
private sphere of their bedrooms.661 Opening the Stasi files created a division amongst the broad 
alliance of oppositionals that the Stasi had always wanted to achieve, but never managed to. Now 
the former opposition split into various parties and had to decide whether to side with their former 
GDR enemies against the West and the swallowing dynamics of unification, or to side with the 
West and collaborate in the dismantling of their former country.662 One’s relation with the Stasi, 
as documented by the files and folders of the archive, became the first and most powerful criterium 
defining the East Germans in the new unified Germany.663 Up until 1992, the Stasi was one factor 
amongst others. The fact that some East German academics had an affiliation with the Stasi was 
not a widely spread fact or seen as a problem to think about or to solve. It certainly played no role 
in the political science association DVPW’s discussions.664 From 1992 onwards, however, it 
became the only legitimate way to understand the GDR. One after the other, revelations of 
‘uncovered’ former Stasi informants made the news.  
Hiring the new professors 
In building new universities in the former territories of the GDR, West German staff structures 
were imported. The West-German system featured a strong distinction between professorial and 
non-professorial staff (the “Mittelbau” or middle structure). The numerically far superior non-
professorial staff were hierarchically allocated to the professorial staff in a pyramidal structure: 
each professor would form the top of a pyramid, with non-professorial staff allocated to them as 
well as PhD students and student assistants. Because of this hierarchical pyramid structure, the 
few professors were the ones holding power in the faculty of economic and social sciences. 
Differences in status existed amongst the professorships, which were divided into C4 and C3 
professorships, with C4 corresponding to a full professorship and C3 to a type of adjunct 
professorship.665  
As in the other newly built or re-built universities of the East, the University of Potsdam proceeded 
to first hire the flagship C4 professorships, then the C3 professorships and then, in a last step, 
make decisions about the non-professorial staff.666 Hiring professors in the West German 
academic system is and was a long-winded procedure. In order to hire for an advertised 
professorship, a hiring committee needed to be set up. This was to be composed of at least four 
professors, ideally two from the East and two from the West, a representative of the non-
professorial staff and one representative of the students. After the job talks, the hiring commission 
made a shortlist, which ranked the top three candidates. The list first had to go for approval to the 
senate/founding senate, and then to the minister who had the right to choose which of the three 
candidates to approve. If the minister found none of the candidates adequate, he could ask for 
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other names to be proposed, or start the procedure again from scratch. Once the minister made 
his choice, negotiations with the selected candidate would start, and – if successful – this would 
lead to a professorial appointment, with the professor then becoming a civil servant.667 
Hiring committee 
In Potsdam, all the structures necessary for starting the hiring process in political science were 
ready and set in place by early 1992. All professorships in the field of political science were being 
hired, including two professorships for international relations, one C4 full professorship and one 
C3 adjunct professorship. Following the guidelines, the hiring committee for political science was 
composed of seven members, five professors, one non-professorial member and one student.668 
While a balance between Eastern and Western members was meant to be achieved, the founding 
senate struggled to achieve that balance and find enough Eastern candidates deemed acceptable. 
They solved the problem by including an Eastern junior member of staff as the non-professorial 
member, Dr Renate Schmidt from the old IIB, who had finished her PhD just in time while the 
revolutionary events unfolded in the GDR. As for the professors, Prof. Tomala, a professor from 
Poland and expert on Germany, was chosen to represent the East. The justification for choosing 
him was scribbled on the side notes of the hiring commission’s documents: “No comparable 
candidates from the former GDR in this discipline [could be found]. Not only Westerners [should 
be included].”669  
In terms of the balance between political interference and academic autonomy, Brandenburg’s 
minister of education Enderlein did not interfere much in the hiring process, largely leaving the 
university to make its own decisions.670 The hiring committee was thus differently composed than 
the structure committee, in which figures such as Raimund Krämer or Gerhard Göhler still 
participated.671 The dominating figure in this hiring commission was professor Gerhard 
Lehmbruch, by that time president of the West German political science association DVPW.672 
The hiring procedures were carried out under pressure from two sides. First, there was the general 
time pressure of wanting to build the new university as soon as possible, as well as the time pressure 
coming from the fact that students from the previous GDR institutions IIB/HRV were still 
studying political science and that they needed to be offered a proper degree.673 Second, there was 
financial pressure on the university as a whole. Instead of following the model of other states like 
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Sachsen, where all GDR institutions had been dissolved and East German academics only rehired 
where needed and where appropriate, the state of Brandenburg chose to follow the different path 
of keeping most of the previous institutions (the PH and the legal sections of the HRV, but not 
the IIB or the HRV’s economic sections) and then slowly reducing the personnel. This procedure 
was much more costly for the universities than on other states, as they paid much longer for staff 
that would have been laid off in other states.674 Keeping everyone was not an option, since West 
German academic structures typically featured a quarter or a fifth of East German staff.675  
These pressures impacted all decision-making by the new actors at the university trying to build 
the new structures and hiring their new colleagues. Many of their decisions had to be made fast 
and with limited information. They were local decisions, contingent on local situations and local 
considerations. Werner Jann, the West German professor hired in 1992 to fill the chair in political 
science, administration and organisation, described the decision-making process of these first years 
in Potsdam as perfect illustrations of garbage-can theory. All the actors involved had their own 
goals and interests, such as his own interest to strengthen public policy and administration in the 
Fakultät. They carried these into decision-making moments coming up with every new problem at 
hand and under the influence of overall limited but incrementally new information, such as new 
evaluations by the science council or new budget guidelines. As a result, the decisions made as a 
whole did not unfold along centrally pre-planned lines.676  
One of the important decision-making criteria in the process was the goal of making political 
science in Potsdam as strong as it could be. Because the University of Potsdam was now a player 
in the German and in the (Western) international academic market, its benchmark for success lay 
in performing well according to those standards.677 The surest and safest way of doing so lay in 
hiring academic staff well versed in this new system of reference and bringing the social capital 
necessary to succeed in it, including their own connections and networks in it. Re-hiring East 
German staff whose main connections led to the former Eastern networks who had in turn 
become obsolete, did not present itself as a good pathway to lead the newly built University of 
Potsdam to success.678 And with an attractive geographic location near Berlin, which was already 
tipped off to become Germany’s new political capital, the advertised posts attracted the attention 
of many, including many nationally and internationally (in the West) renowned scholars.679  
Mixing the old and the new 
Faced with the question as how to mix old and new staff, the University of Potsdam drafted a 
ratio for all the hires in 1992: out of 89 C4 professorships advertised across the university, 10 had 
to be filled with East German academics (11%), and out of the 70 C3 professorships advertised 
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across the university, 37 ought to be filled with East German academics (53%).680 In the upcoming 
two IR hires, the full professorship C4 would be appointed from the West and the adjunct 
professorship C3 from the East.  
The C4 professorship was meant to be the flagship post for international relations, both with a 
generalist orientation and with the aim to increase the standing of Potsdam. With regard to the C4 
professorship, the decision to advertise for the post was made in January681 and in May, six 
candidates were invited for job talks.682 By June 1992, the job talks for the professorships were 
concluded and the lists of shortlisted candidates were completed.683 The three candidates who 
made the final list were international star professor Friedrich Kratochwil and German IR star 
professor Volker Rittberger, sharing the number one spot; and, on number two, FU professor and 
dean Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen.684  
Why did no-one from the former GDR get offered the job? First of all, six GDR international 
relations experts did apply, and one of them made it to the job talks. Of the five who applied, four 
came from the IIB and one from the former IPW, their areas of specialization being either 
European security politics, or area specialization on Eastern Europe or Third World countries.685 
The listed reason for not inviting them to the job talk was their “too narrow specialization on their 
respective focus areas.”686 As the flagship ‘general IR’ professorship for the University of Potsdam, 
the selection committee preferred candidates able to cover the whole field of international 
relations. The only candidate invited to the job talk, Wolfgang Kubiczek, did not make the final 
list partly for the same doubts about his ability to cover the breadth of the discipline, but partly 
also because of the committee’s assessment that his current work was not up to West German 
standards of research and that he would not be able to catch up fast enough to those standards. 
The committee members also did not like his talk, which they deemed to be based on politically 
founded thesis statements, instead of the necessary ‘theoretical and scientific grounding’.687 
Overall, though, the main reason for not hiring any of the East German candidates lay in the 
strength of their competition. Their competitors brought assets to the table none of them could 
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boast: prestige and respect in West German and international academic circles; connections, power 
and networks in those same circles; as well as research projects and agendas valued by the relevant 
peers in the West, and the ability to attract funding and reputation to the University of Potsdam.688 
The C3 IR professorship did not have to fulfil the status functions of the C4 professorships. It 
was advertised as a post in comparative politics with a focus on East Asia. Here the University of 
Potsdam tried to achieve a balance between old and new staff and mixing the two, and the 
founding senate along with the political science committee chose to fulfil the quota and hire an  
East German academic.689 The content orientation of this professorship was designed specifically 
so as to fit one of the IIB’s experts: Wolfram Wallraf, an expert on Japan and East Asia.690 With 
little time to make decisions, a lot of pressure to build up a good faculty, and some good experts 
at hand, many of the presents thought “why not?” and decided to formally hire East German ex-
IIB Japan expert Wallraf onto the adjunct professor post.691   
The post was advertised one year after the C4s, at the end of January 1993. Nine applications for 
the post were sent in. 692 The hiring committee was the same as for the C4 professorships, with 
the difference that all the newly hired C4 professors had been co-opted to the committee and were 
now part of the decision-making. Because all the professorships except for IR had been hired, this 
meant that the hiring committee for the IR C3 post was composed almost exclusively of non-IR 
political scientists. The committee decided not to request an external evaluation and 
recommendation about the candidates. First, because the situation was deemed to be 
unambiguous/uncontroversial, with Wolfram Wallraf being the only candidate fitting the post. 
Second, because Prof. Wilhelm Bürklin was considered to have enough expertise in the area of 
East Asia and was tasked to write these evaluations himself. The job talks took place in May 1993 
and three candidates were shortlisted, with Wallraf on number one.693  
The arguments named in favour of Wallraf were as follows: his language skills, being fluent in 
Japanese, his stays abroad, his personality type deemed to be that of a scientist ‘only pursuing 
knowledge and insight’, the analysis in his research being rich in primary sources and materials, 
and up to the Western standards. Wallraf was also in the running for other prestigious jobs, was 
renowned in Western circles, had a breadth of knowledge about East Asia in general and was thus 
not narrowly specialized. Since 1990 his expertise had been re-oriented through the lens of 
comparative political science. Also, he only had to marginally change his research programme after 
the system change, which was interpreted as a marker of quality for his work. His listed total 
amount of publications was 31, an acceptable number with regards to Western standards, he could 
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boast 14 years of teaching experience, and he was already filling in as temporary substitute for that 
same C3 professorship.694 
Why was IR hired so late? 
Had the International Relations C4 and C3 hires gone through as planned, then two things would 
have happened in favour of the former IIB staff. First, Wolfram Wallraf, a former IIB expert on 
Japan and East Asia, would have become a professor of International Relations in the new united 
Germany. An adjunct C3 professor with less standing than his C4 colleague, but still with 
autonomy and with the ability to make hiring decisions about the non-professorial staff allocated 
to him. Beyond the fact that with this, a former IIB expert would have become professor and 
accessed an important post, it is also easy to imagine that he would have hired some of his former 
colleagues, thus giving more of the old staff the possibility to remain in academia. Second, had the 
C4 full professorship been filled with one of the top two candidates on the list, the reputation and 
power of the respective candidate could have both stemmed some of the pressures towards public 
administration and helped attract funding and projects. This could have led to the establishment 
of a strong centre of international relations, with the capacity to absorb a few of the former IIB 
staff willing and able to perform in the new system.  
C4 Professorship 
But contingency hit. After a long period of negotiation, the two top-listed candidates for the full 
C4 professorship declined the offer. The third and last candidate on the list, West Berlin professor 
Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, dean of the FU’s prestigious political science institute, had since been 
uncovered as a former Stasi informant.695 Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen had since resigned his post, been 
arrested and put to trial. The University of Potsdam thus had to start the hiring procedure for the 
C4 International Relations professorship again from scratch. In November 1994, almost three 
years after it was first advertised, the University of Potsdam advertised again for the C4 
professorship in International Relations.696 At that point in time, four years after unification, the 
early requirements of mixed committees were not relevant anymore. The hiring committee was 
composed of Western academics,697 and only four of the 49 applications for the post came from 
academics of the former GDR.698 Only top West German candidates made the interview 
shortlist.699 After long periods of failed negotiation with the two top-ranked candidates, both of 
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whom famous West German professors of International Relations, the job was offered to Harald 
Fuhr who successfully took up the post.700 
Following the assessment of the hiring committee, Fuhr combined solid political science 
foundations with the practical experience of having worked at an international organization – the 
World Bank.701 As such, the main argument in favour of Harald Fuhr was his fit with the public 
policy and public administration profile that the political sciences in Potsdam were trying to 
achieve. Harald Fuhr specialized in public administration, had practical experience working at the 
World Bank and thus had extensive knowledge of international public policy, which made him fit 
the profile extremely well.702 The University of Potsdam had been trying to work on a profile 
distinct from that of the FU and HU in Berlin. It did so by setting its focus on the practical training 
and practical knowledge of their students, so they would be attractive candidates on the job market 
outside of academia. In his job talk, Harald Fuhr emphasized this combination of theoretical and 
practical knowledge, and his willingness to play a role in that profile.703 At this stage of the process, 
thus, the two criteria for hiring were the fit with the faculty’s profile and ‘excellence’ within the 
matrix of West German political science standards. 
C3 Professorship 
While the appointment of the originally selected candidates for the C4 professorship did not go 
through, the appointment for the selected C3 candidate did not succeed either. During the hiring 
procedure, it had been uncovered that appointed C3 professor Wolfram Wallraf had had contact 
with the Stasi during his former life at the IIB. As a result of this, he had to leave academia. In 
May 1995, the University of Potsdam offered the post to the scholar placed second on the hiring 
list,704 but the offer came too late and the candidate was not interested anymore. The University 
of Potsdam had to advertise for the position again.  
But this time, the university’s founding senate had finished its work and had become a regular 
university ‘senate’. Allocating professorial posts to East Germans was not on the radar of activity 
anymore. Also, by that time, most East German scholars had found new posts and occupations, 
mainly outside of academia.705 The C3 professorship was renamed to “International Organization 
and international policy research,” and its focus was thus set towards the general public policy 
focus that the Fakultät was trying to achieve. Advertised in July 1995, 28 applications were received. 
The hiring committee was the same as for the second round of C4, and after the job talks, three 
West German candidates were ranked on the final list.706 Ultimately, the C3 post was offered to 
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and accepted by Otto Keck.707 Otto Keck was seen as an internationally demanded expert in the 
field of nuclear politics. He had published in peer-reviewed journals, which were considered to be 
publications that were hard to get into. He was valued by scholars from more than just one school 
of thought. His work on nuclear politics arguing that fast breeder reactors are not economically 
advantageous had been strongly used in the field of politics, influencing decision-making about 
subventions not only in Germany but in other Western European countries as well. His work was 
based on thorough archival research and hitherto unusual materials and statistics from ministries 
as well as on interviews with stakeholders. Methodology wise, he belonged to the group of 
recognized game theorists.708 For all those reasons, Otto Keck was seen as fitting the post. In this 
case, the main rationale for hiring was thus again both an overall fit with the West German political 
science matrix of requirements and a specific fit with the faculty of economic and social sciences’ 
public policy focus: Otto Keck knew one policy area well, namely nuclear politics, and was familiar 
with all the decision-making processes involved there. As such, he was seen as a good fit with the 
existing colleagues.709  
Non-professorial staff 
Two dynamics characterized the treatment of non-professorial staff: their allocation to 
professorships, and their use in supporting the functioning of the faculty until the hiring 
procedures had been completed.  
Partnering up 
Traditionally, in the West German system, non-professorial academics were allocated to 
professorial staff to support them in their teaching needs. This principle was transported to the 
former GDR territories. As a result, non-professorial IIB staff in Potsdam were allocated to 
professorial staff. Instead of being hired on an independent basis, the West German blueprint was 
strictly followed and the non-professorial IIB staff were hierarchically allocated to work under the 
direction of the newly hired professors. Except for the area of international relations, all the other 
professors of political science were hired swiftly. In Potsdam each professor was typically allocated 
the financial means for two members of staff. Upon starting their new position, they were asked 
to choose at least one of their two members of staff from amongst the East German staff.  
“When I arrived as a [newly-hired Western] professor, I was told: we still have a few “leftovers” from the 
old [GDR] academy, they have all been evaluated positively. I have to say that I no longer know who 
evaluated them and how. I was told: have a look at them, we’d be grateful if you could take one of them, but 
you are not obligated to do so. I spoke with a couple of them […] but did not get the impression that they 
were open for something new. Then I spoke with Franzke and we immediately got on well. I told him that 
he would have to do something completely new. He said: I'll do it“ (Interview Jann, 2019: 3) 
                                               
707 Letter from Dekan Prof. Dr Werner Jann to Herr Brandt, Brandenburg ministry of science, research and culture, 
28.02.1997. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431; Interview Keck, 2019: 8.  
708 Berufungkommission Internationale Organisationen und Internationale Politikfeldforschung, Vorlage für die 29. Sitzung 
des Senats der Universität Potsdam 08.02.1996. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431 
709 Interview Jann, 2019: 2-3.  
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As we see from the quote above and the duo Jann/Franzke, partnering up non-professorial IIB 
staff with newly hired Western professors partly also meant having to completely re-orient and 
retrain, a move not everyone was willing to make. In the case of Jochen Franzke, this meant giving 
up being an IR scholar and becoming a specialist in administrative science instead – a switch which 
ultimately allowed him to have a second academic career in the newly united Germany. But 
partnering up hierarchically superior West German professors with hierarchically inferior East 
German non-professorial staff did not always go well. In one case, a great personality match led 
to long-term cooperation. In another, the East German academic left and yet another ended in a 
lawsuit. Part of the problems of the arrangement resulted from the relation of super- and 
subordination, which forced IIB staff to do assistant-type work and restricted their autonomy. 
Parts of the problem resulted from differing views about research quality and others still from 
personality clashes.710  
This partnering up expresses the hierarchical orientation of the unification dynamic. Clustering 
hierarchically superior professors from ‘the West’ with hierarchically inferior academic staff from 
‘the East’, expresses an asymmetrical relation on all levels: personal, symbolic, and material. 
Especially with regards to the content orientation, the IIB staff had been quite free in their teaching 
and research during the first years of the transition, until the professorships were filled.711 And 
while those holding professorships were entirely autonomous and free to teach and research as 
they wish, especially for this first generation of professors in Potsdam,712 this was not the case with 
their non-professorial staff, who were – by the nature of the chair-holder system – partly  
subordinate to their plans and visions.  
Filling in 
In the area of international relations, the professorships remained vacant for many years before 
being filled. As we have seen, between unification in 1990 and the C4 professor in International 
Relations at the University of Potsdam coming into office in 1997, seven years lapsed. Between 
unification in 1990 and the C3 professor in International Relations at the University of Potsdam 
starting his job in 1999, eight and a half years passed. During that time, regularly changing 
substitutes filled in for the vacant professorships and the remaining IIB staff helped relieve the IR 
teaching workload. The work conditions, though, were precarious. After the IIB was closed, they 
were re-hired on the basis of temporary contracts. First a few months to complete the term, then 
about a half-year for the next term, then one-year contracts, then three-year contracts etc:713  
“In the end, I had a total of 17 such employment contracts up to 1996 – which is actually not allowed under 
German law, but of course it can still happen in practice. Until the staff council of the University of Potsdam 
said at the occasion of my 18th employment contract: ‘Are you crazy?’ They ensured that I got permanent 
employment, I think that was in 1996 or 1997. For me personally, this meant that the transition period 
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713 Interview Crome, 2019: 3.  
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from one system to the other was concluded and life became easier. It was quite an exhausting time, because 
for a very long time I was not able to make any plans about the future.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 12) 
The precarity was draining, and many of those involved had families with young children.714 This 
was another expression of the hierarchical ordering prevalent throughout the unification dynamics. 
First, there was a general difference in stability/precarity between professorial and non-
professorial staff, but the East/West difference was mapped onto this distinction. While in 
Germany all non-professorial staff thus had more precarious living conditions than professorial 
staff, the fact that in the formerly Eastern states most ex-GDR academics remaining in academia 
obtained non-professorial posts only led to a de facto hierarchical division. Second, while some of 
the non-professorial staff in the Eastern states were “West German”, their conditions differed 
from those of the East German scholars in that their temporary contracts were usually longer than 
a few months.  
Another expression of hierarchical ordering could be found in the slow crowding out of almost 
all remaining GDR scholars from the faculty of economic and social sciences. As shown in 
Appendix A, a total of 20 IIB staff found employment at the University of Potsdam, though never 
more than 17 at one time. The numbers decreased fast, and within a period of 10 years went down 
from 17 in the summer semester of 1991 to four in the summer semester of 2001.715 Especially in 
the first years, the numbers went down rapidly. In the summer semester of 1991, 17 former IIB 
staff were re-employed; in the following winter term of 1991/92, the numbers went down to 14, 
two years later in the winter semester of 1993/94, 10 had remained; one year later in the winter 
semester of 1994/95, seven; from the winter semester of 1995/96 onwards, the numbers remained 
stable at around six for a while until reaching the final number of four 10 years later in the summer 
semester of 2001. Why did the numbers diminish in this way? One important factor was to be 
found in the precarity of the posts themselves: anyone finding more stable employment elsewhere 
would leave. Another reason for the East German staff to leave resided in the fact that they were 
not necessarily made to feel valued at a university that considered them more of a burden than an 
asset. Being in a hierarchically inferior position to the West German professors, with all the 
limitations this brought, was not necessarily agreeable. Differences also resided in whether or not 
one could see a future perspective in academia. Someone like ex-IIB Jochen Franzke, who had 
had an early personal click with the newly appointed West German professor for public 
administration Werner Jann, was able to retrain from scratch under the mentorship of someone 
willing to support and enable his second career. Not everyone had this willingness or the personal 
click. In other cases personality clashes led to staff leaving or the university simply did not renew 
the contracts.  
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Who makes it in academia? 
 “On the whole, I would say that the word ‘annihilated’ is an adequate one to describe what happened to 
some parts of the GDR sciences. I just can’t claim it for myself. Because, as I said, I was lucky at some 
crucial moments or made the right decision. Or because the education [in the GDR] wasn't bad either? Or 
because the people who had the power to make decisions disregarded any concerns [about me being from the 
GDR]? I don’t know. It is all speculation now. But I would maybe point to the fact that I did not have to 
hide much of what I wrote as a scientist before 1990 and after 1990. In the end, personal integrity was the 
most important thing.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10) 
Who of the former East German experts on international relations made it in academia after 1990? 
What were the reasons behind their success? Which problems did they face? 
The two underlying processes underwriting East German scholars’ integration in the unified 
German academic sector were individualization and diffusion. The logic of individualization 
ensured that they were not treated as a group and that no general agreements or solutions were 
found for them. Instead they were handled on an individual basis. Each and every one was of them 
was assessed along various criteria ranging from qualification to personal integrity. The logic of 
diffusion meant that because all the East German structures disaggregated and all the researchers 
were treated as individuals, they each had to find individual solutions to their problems. Former 
colleagues all made different choices, they lost sight of each other, found temporary employment 
running out at different times, and thus experienced hardships and success at different moments 
and in different places. All the old structures were individualized, diffused, dispersed:  
“The revolutionary theories proved right – everything dispersed. At first everyone received some money and 
from 1996/1997 onwards the [subsidized] projects came to an end. There was no new money, but somehow 
everyone had built up a new life in the meantime. A few went abroad. I know that some got a professorship 
in Austria or Colombia. Apparently, it was easier for East German social scientists there.” (Interview 
Krämer, 2019a: 10) 
Difficulties in the new system 
Many different factors came together as to why so few East Germans made it the new unified 
academic system.  
First, the asymmetrical nature of the unification structurally disadvantaged East Germans, 
independently of the goodwill of many of the involved West German actors.716 The East and the 
West German academic systems simply valued and thus incentivized different forms of 
qualifications and achievements. But because the West German criteria of quality were applied to 
their East German colleagues as part of the decision for an asymmetrical form of unification, this 
meant that however much merit East German achievements or qualifications may or may not have 
had on their own terms, they were always found lacking when compared to the West German 
standards. This played a role in disqualifying the academic CVs of many East German academics. 
Two elements in particular played a role: publication lists and international qualifications. Because 
                                               
716 Interview Franzke, 2019: 13.  
 177 
West German hires were centrally based around publication lists and because publication lists had 
not been part of the academic currency in the GDR or of the East German social capital, the 
mismatch disadvantaged many. Either their publications lists were too short, or too politically 
compromised. At the time of unification, the later successful Jochen Franzke’s publication list was 
composed of four items: his PhD dissertation, his Habilitation, and two commentaries on 
international legal treaties between the GDR and African states. He had no chance whatsoever of 
success in any type of job interview or be on one level with Western colleagues who had been 
assiduously building their publication lists over many years; his past work had been channelled in 
internal papers and studies, political briefings and teaching work.717 A similar issue was that of 
developing ‘Western’ course plans and materials for new topics. While required in application 
processes, the former East German academics still had to get through the materials themselves 
and catch up on the topic areas before being able to boast various lecture series in a job talk.718 
Similarly to publication lists, East German CVs also lacked sufficient ‘international qualifications’ 
to match the West German standards. While GDR academics did go abroad, this was usually for 
their studies or for field research purposes. In the case of the IIB, this could also be for practical 
placements at the respective embassies. However, on average, GDR academics published less in 
international journals, or in journals of other countries, and did not go on frequent research stays 
at other institutions abroad. In short, the structure of the Eastern bloc did not allow for the same 
Western logic of a ‘competition of ideas’ between and within countries. In the West German 
academic job market, however, ‘international qualifications’ were considered an important factor 
of quality, and purely East German CVs, with little to no international qualifications, were seen as 
problematic.719  
Second, and relatedly, the social and cultural capital of GDR scholars differed from that of their 
Western colleagues, and made it much harder for them to navigate the West German academic 
establishment. With regards to the use of scientific language, for example, GDR scholars of 
international relations had no problems using terms like geopolitics or ‘political space’. In the West 
Germany of the early 90s, these were still tabooed terms, however, due to their close association 
with the Nazi area. This disqualified research proposals until they learned not to use these words.720 
Other examples of this included a lack of negotiations skills, as Jochen Franzke found out when 
asked to take on the additional position of dean of studies at the faculty of economic and social 
sciences. His Western colleagues would have negotiated for advantages in return of accepting the 
position, but Jochen Franzke was used to the GDR, where you were expected to simply accept 
whatever post or function was allocated to you:  
 “Nobody wanted to do the job [become dean of studies] because it was clear to everyone that it would mean 
a lot of work and there was no supporting staff [allocated to the post] yet. Nothing, it was a completely new 
post. Then they asked me and in a weak moment I said yes. Again, as someone from the East, I just said 
yes without thinking twice about it, now [in hindsight] I am upset about it. My Western colleagues would 
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have said: I want more money, I want more employees, I want a new office. But that is when my Eastern 
socialization came through; that’s just what you did.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 24) 
But more concretely in terms of specific ‘academic’ skills, Eastern academics did not know how 
to write successful project applications to attract funding, were not up to date on the latest research 
methods considered important for quality research, especially large empirical studies, and, 
importantly, they lacked the networks crucial in West Germany to succeed academically.721  
Third, former involvement with the Stasi disqualified many academics. In Potsdam, all academics 
had to sign a document agreeing that their employment contracts could be ended at any time, if 
evidence was found that they had cooperated with the Stasi. These agreements have remained in 
place up until today.722 West German hires were also wetted for potential Stasi involvement, 
however, this naturally affected East German academics more strongly. This procedure meant that 
many East German scholars who had cooperated with the Stasi silently left of their own accord or 
did not apply for higher positions in order for no further investigations or revelations to take place.  
Finally, a merging of two powerful actors’ interests also contributed to the marginalization of many 
East German academics. On the one hand, students experienced the unification through the lens 
of both material anxieties about their future prospects of employment and immaterial anxieties 
through the experience of the fast devaluation of East German social and cultural capital, including 
their academic degrees. In order to assure a prosperous future, the unification dynamics left them 
with two options: go study in the West to receive Western diplomas, or stay East but demand the 
implementation of degrees recognized as equivalent to the West German ones. The latter involved 
in particular the demand for Western curricula and Western academics and professors:   
“If they had kept the East German colleagues, the East German students would all have left to go West. 
The students would not have stayed in Leipzig if they had received the stamp: ‘studied political economy with 
an ex-GDR Marxist’.” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 17) 
“I then applied for a position in Leipzig in 1993 and although I had good chances to get the job, the students 
there made sure that I did not get the professorship. They said: we want to have a proper Western professor, 
only he can guarantee a good education, who knows what we would be taking on with this strange Easterner 
who was at the IIB for so long? I can understand their attitude, that was the fear of the students at the time: 
that they would somehow get caught up in some dynamics of the reunification that they had nothing to do 
with. They wanted a properly trained Westerner who also had networks and who could help them find a job. 
So they did not act out of bad will, but rather had understandable motivations from a student’s point of 
view.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 13) 
At the same time, the newly elected politicians of the ‘Eastern’ states had an interest both in making 
the universities perform strongly in the new system and to retain as many students as possible so 
as to avoid all the negative effects attached to a brain drain and to the loss of the younger 
generation.723 The students’ interest in survival combined with the ministries’ interests in retaining 
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the students and build thriving universities thus contributed to the marginalization of East German 
academics without this necessarily being their explicit intention.  
Who makes it? 
Given these various difficulties, what were the reasons leading to some East German academics 
making it in academia? 
First, the ability and willingness to start from scratch and go through the exhausting process of 
un-learning and re-learning the trade played a crucial role in being able to stay in academia. An 
important factor with this, of course, was age. The majority of those who did make the jump into 
Western academica were those in the ‘middle’ age range in their thirties and early forties. Their 
younger age meant more enterprising energy, more chances in a process that marginalized the old, 
and a longer timespan until retirement, which forced them to act and ensure their survival.724 
Connected to this point was also a personal question of attitude: those who remained positive, 
daring, adaptive and took their chances had higher chances of succeeding than those who 
complained or stuck with what they knew.725 Un-learning and re-learning the trade included 
learning what to cite and how to cite it,726 for the somewhat younger getting another degree, as for 
example doing a second PhD or going West for a Habilitation,727 but also getting some form of 
foreign or international qualification as guest or research fellows.728 The most important part was 
to publish, and to publish frequently, so as to build a publication list comparable to West German 
standards. Jochen Franzke, for example, who branched out into the field of administration, had 
had the opportunity to collaborate with his allocated West German professor on a number of 
research projects, all of which allowed him to publish. By the end of the 1990s, within a ten-year 
time period since unification, he had built a CV with a publication list acceptable to Western 
standards.729 Those who managed to make it in academia also speedily built new networks and in 
some cases were able to draw on some old connections. Some of the former IPW researchers, for 
instance, had, due to the nature of their previous research on the West, good connections to 
important Western players and politicians who valued their acumen and quality as researchers and 
were able to provide them with contacts and opportunities after 1990.730 But these were 
individualized contacts that few were able to capitalize on. Almost all had to start from scratch, 
and those successful long-term quickly started attending and organizing relevant conferences, 
integrating publication circles, making contacts with relevant researchers abroad and taking on 
roles in research associations and networks.731  
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Second, and relatedly, those who made it in academia all built relevant, sharp research profiles. 
Content wise, three strategies were successful: the ‘native informant’ strategy, the ‘old expertise in 
new packaging strategy’ and the ‘change of specialization strategy’. 
One successful strategy was that of the ‘native informant’. Here the East German academics 
capitalized on their knowledge of the GDR and other ‘Eastern’ states. They took on the role of 
experts explaining to a Western public what was happening in the Soviet Union or in the transition 
of other Eastern states. Siegfried Fischer for example authored and co-authored a few books on 
the military dynamics at play in the Soviet Union (‘The Soviet Union’s military legacy,’ ‘The 
downfall of the Soviet Union’s military power’).732 Hans-Joachim Gießmann used his knowledge 
of and access to the NVA army archives to chronicle the dissolution of the GDR’s entire military 
structure (‘The GDR’s unpleasant legacy’).733 This tactic was particularly effective for those who 
had in-depth expertise of high politics issues, especially in the domain of military or security 
matters.  
Another successful strategy was to repackage old expertise in new frameworks. This particularly 
concerned area specialists who were in some cases able to launch new careers in comparative 
politics.734 This involved both widening the empirical focus to more countries or regions, but also 
acquiring the foundations of comparative politics. In Potsdam, Raimund Krämer and Wolfram 
Wallraf in particular quickly retrained to fill the faculty of economic and social sciences’ teaching 
needs. They developed a lecture series on ‘the analysis and comparison of political systems’ in 
which they presented different political systems and all corresponding explanatory models, 
including all-important thinkers starting from Plato.735 This tactic was particularly effective for 
those whose former domain of expertise was not problematic but simply needed to be made both 
relevant and intelligible for West German academic frameworks. Being a regional expert in Japan 
or Latin America, such as Wallraf’s or Krämer’s specializations, was not a reason to disqualify a 
candidate, nor was it looked down upon, as opposed to those who had for instance been specialists 
in socialist countries.736 
Finally, those whose topic of expertise was not in demand or not respected anymore had to fully 
change their specializations. This also concerned those who saw chances open up elsewhere and 
decided to take them. Changing topic was a safe way to make a new career in academia. We have 
already seen the example of Jochen Franzke who decided to take his chance when an opportunity 
arose to work closely with Prof. Werner Jann to become an expert in public administration.737 
Similarly, Lutz Kleinwächter rebranched into economics and eventually became a professor. This 
worked because he stepped back from the dead end of Potsdam and took a detour through the 
retraining former NVA army officers in economics.738 Both had to work intensively to catch up 
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with the new material, being ahead of their students by only a week of course material at the 
beginning.739  
To conclude, let’s look back to the IIB and the University of Potsdam. We have seen that only 
four of the former 120 IIB international relations experts made it long term at the University of 
Potsdam. How did they manage to stay? Two of them made it through the detour of 
administration. This means that they were put on administrative posts and thus worked primarily 
in the non-academic part of university administration. However, at the same time they continued 
offering a reduced number of courses as a side activity in their respective former area of 
specialization.740 The administrative post brought stability and safe employment and also enabled 
the permanent stay. The other two former IIB members who remained on a long-term basis at the 
University of Potsdam were Raimund Krämer and Jochen Franzke, who remained as full 
academics on permanent posts. Both had branched out into new topics, Raimund Krämer by re-
focusing his expertise on Latin America into comparative politics, and Jochen Franzke by 
becoming a public administration expert. They were also both conferred honorary außerplanmäßige 
or apl professorships, which awarded them some prestige but fell short of the advantages a normal 
professorship would carry. As such they were the only ones from the IIB to receive and keep 
professor titles, even though the honorary professor title was no real ‘professorship’. These were 
conferred to Raimund Krämer as a reward for his role in the transition years and to Jochen Franzke 
for taking on the function of dean of studies over a number of years:741 
“At the time I saw it a little bit as a positive assessment of my work, but now I am not sure whether that 
was really the case. The professorship is not connected to any [material advantage]. It’s just a [sign on a] 
business card; I realize that now when I get my pension notifications. It is just a formal denomination. With 
these honorary professorships, the state of Brandenburg found a cheap way to fill allegedly ‘professorial’ 
positions. In reality, I am on a temporary non-professorial staff position that will disappear once I retire, like 
Raimund Krämer’s. Well, it is a misleading label, but I played along, because the title of professor naturally 
sounded good, and since then I have been able to get an appointment at my hairdresser’s much faster than 
before.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 24) 
While this does not necessarily speak badly of the university of Potsdam – full professorial hires 
of internal candidates were generally frowned upon – it is indicative of the level up to which former 
IIB researchers were able to rise to. On the one hand it shows the possibilities: some made it up 
to an “apl.” professorship level. On the other hand, it shows the limitations: only two did so, of 
which only one with an official focus on IR. Looking at the four who ‘made it’, we can therefore 
interpret this as another expression of the hierarchical ordering characteristic for the unification 
dynamics, with two of them succeeding through taking on non-academic posts, and the other two 
making it up to the level of honorary professorships but not to full professorships.  
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Conclusion  
During the phase of the GDR’s asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German 
system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. In its stead, the 
considerably different West German system of international relations knowledge production was 
established. This new system was confined to the universities without much connection to either 
political stakeholders or other cognate disciplines, especially as diplomats were recruited primarily 
from amongst jurists, not political scientists. International Relations went from being an 
independent field of study in the GDR to a tightly confined sub-category within the organizational, 
interpretive and normative boundaries of ‘political science’. While a number of exceptions did 
make it in the new system, becoming professors or recognized experts in other ways, these were 
exceptions and not the rule.  
This chapter has examined the relation between power and knowledge in the former GDR during 
its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It organized the events at hand through the lens 
of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. In 
doing so, it has shown how the principle of hierarchical orientation has played a role in the 
rebuilding of an international relations infrastructure in the formerly Eastern federated states of 
Germany. In part 2, hierarchical orientation played a role in defining West German political science 
as the organizational, interpretive and moral point of reference according to which IR needed to 
be measured, and it played a role in legitimizing the transfer of the West German academic 
structures onto the East. Hierarchical orientation also shaped to a large extent the hiring 
procedures of the new or reformed universities in the East. These hiring procedures privileged 
academics with West German social and cultural capital, as well as typical West German CVs and 
Western networks, thus marginalizing the East German candidates. Underlying these hiring 
procedures, hierarchical orientation also played a central role in the evaluation procedures which 
measured East German research quality according to West German standards and individualized 
competence in a way that reduced the quality of scholars to their ability or inability of catching up 






Expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by events, commanded by them at least as 
much as it is in command of them. By looking at the system of international relations knowledge 
production in the GDR through times of war, revolution and quasi-colonial takeover we have seen 
that each of these situations impacted the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking, writing, 
publishing and teaching. The Cold War oriented thinking, research and teaching around an 
antagonistic friend/enemy division that researchers, experts and academics had to reproduce yet 
simultaneously also transcend. The revolutionary dynamics polarized political and academic 
positions. They reformed and reshaped the networks of knowledge production that the 
researchers, experts and academics needed to adapt to in order to stay relevant. The asymmetrical 
unification with West Germany dismantled the GDR’s former system of international relations 
expertise, marginalizing its experts and expertise.  
During the Cold War confrontation with the West, the GDR’s system of international relations 
expertise formed a tightly organized, yet multifaceted network of knowledge production, 
circulation and consumption. It was composed of four different nodes of activity. First, the 
generalist elite diplomatic training facility IIB, which was closely affiliated with the MfAA, trained 
experts and produced research for the various ministries involved in international relations as well 
as for the central committee. Second, the research institute dedicated to studying the ‘enemy’, the 
IPW in Berlin, had close ties to the central committee and provided analysis and insight to a 
number of stakeholders. Third, a number of military institutions provided both research and 
training and were connected thematically to the other institutions around issues of war, peace and 
security. Finally, the historians and area studies experts operating at the various universities of the 
GDR also provided teaching and research and were thematically connected to the other 
institutions of international relations knowledge production around issues of development and 
regional expertise. All these various institutions were internally well-organized entities engaging 
with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in manifold ways. With 
regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of closeness or distance to 
political stakeholders, varying levels of engagement and varying levels of diversity in contact 
partners. Beyond bounding the GDR’s system of international relations expertise into a stable 
network of knowledge production, consumption and dissemination, the Cold War antagonism 
also structured its content and orientation along a friend/enemy distinction. Researchers and 
experts had to navigate a system which required them to both reproduce and transcend this 
distinction in order to do their work well. This dynamic played a central role in all the different 
aspects of international relations expertise, which this PhD thesis has examined along the three 
aspects of constitution, instrumentality and performance. International relations expertise played 
a constitutive role in forming the GDR’s academic and practical foreign policy experts. Designed 
to use ‘science as a weapon’, they had to learn to simultaneously reproduce and transcend the 
Marxist/Leninist interpretation of international relations propagated by the GDR in order to 
engage verbally with their enemies in diplomatic and academic settings. As such, they needed to 
acquire a ‘creative’ and ‘flexible’ handling of their international relations’ Marxist/Leninist 
interpretive frame. International relations expertise also played an instrumental role in providing 
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knowledge and insight about the Cold War enemy. Here, the Cold War antagonism led to the 
valorization of all research providing insight and analysis about the West, while devaluating 
research without practical use in ‘knowing’ the enemy. Through studying and analyzing the West 
closely, researchers were led to the realization that ‘the others’ were not so different from oneself. 
Instead, they behaved like a negative mirror image: thinking about the same problems, studying 
things in similar ways, with similar goals – but in a diametrically opposite manner and oriented 
against the GDR and its socialist alliances. As such, the Cold War antagonism led researchers 
studying the West into the difficult position of having to uphold dogma while clearly 
understanding its limitations and dangers. Finally, international relations expertise also played a 
performative role in enacting the GDR’s alliances abroad. Here knowledge production, 
consumption and dissemination about international relations played a role both in presenting the 
GDR as a serious knowledge producer and as a reliable partner in alliance politics. This found an 
expression in the limitations and restrictions of publication freedom in function of the Soviet 
Union’s geopolitical interest, but also in the transmission of Marxist/Leninist international 
relations expertise across a wide network of alliances with African and Asian socialist states.  
During the phase of the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval, the East German system of international 
relations knowledge production became strongly polarized. Researchers, experts and academics 
had to navigate a field divided between pro-Gorbachev supporters and anti-Gorbachev hardliners. 
In particular, all the fields of international relations knowledge production oriented around 
studying the enemy or touching upon issues of war, peace and security, became divided between 
those upholding the old dogma and those proposing a new reinterpretation of the old frameworks. 
The latter pushed for various degrees of cooperation instead of confrontation and proposed 
redefinitions of the former Marxist/Leninist interpretive frames, such as the conceptual extension 
of ‘imperialism’ to also include the West’s innate ability for peace. Once the situation escalated in 
the autumn of 1989 and the old leadership stepped down, the GDR was governed by the fragile 
alliance between reformer socialist government and oppositional forces gathered around a ‘round 
table’ system. At the same time, as the population’s faith in this double-government waned, the 
GDR’s various political parties were gaining support and increasingly partnered up with their West 
German counterparts, whose power and influence in the process grew accordingly. In this phase, 
the GDR’s experts, researchers and academics had to navigate a highly unstable and explosive 
environment in which they had to straddle and orientate between different stakeholders and 
audiences. The old practices had to be upheld to a certain degree, while the former institutions of 
international relations knowledge production such as the IIB and IPW started to disintegrate from 
within. In short, a process of disaggregation and reaggregation took place in which old institutions 
and entities split and various cross-institutional sub-groups formed into new committees, working 
groups and organizations. For example, the reform-oriented security experts of the IIB, IPW, and 
the military institutions came together to form working groups, which, in turn allied with the 
security-interested sub-groups of the oppositional movements. Once the revolutionary forces in 
the form of the Western-oriented political parties won and took over the GDR, its international 
relations researchers, experts and academics had to adapt to a new situation in which their expertise 
was still needed but not politically desired anymore. In choosing whom to hire as their new 
international relations advisors, the revolutionaries now in charge of the MfAA were divided 
between two equally unappealing options: re-hiring their old experts, representatives of the old 
regime, or enlist West German advisors. They found a rather unconventional compromise in 
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appointing West German professors, specialists in peace research, because they seemed to provide 
enough distance to both the West German establishment and the old East German nomenklatura. 
The IPW did not survive this hostile last phase of the revolution and was closed down, rejected 
on the basis of its strong affiliation with the old system. The IIB survived the changes by radically 
reforming, detaching itself from the GDR’s political networks and finding legitimacy and status in 
a re-orientation around Western academic procedures and standards. In short, during the GDR’s 
revolutionary upheaval, both the entities involved in knowledge production and their regular sets 
of relations were severely shaken and reconfigured. New avenues of research opened up while 
others closed down. Some academics were crowded out, while others were catapulted to power. 
Some institutions fell apart, some split, some reorganized, and some disappeared while the 
relations between all experts, researchers and academics transformed. Previous boundaries such 
as the division between East and West began to function in new ways, while new boundaries, such 
as the one between reformers and hardliners, emerged.  
During the phase of the GDR’s asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German 
system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. Most of its 
institutions were closed down, the experts and academics formerly operating in it had to find work 
in new domains and all the networks, ties and connections across institutions as well as between 
institutions and political stakeholders were dismantled. In its stead, the considerably different West 
German system of international relations knowledge production was established. This new system 
was confined to the universities without much connection to either political stakeholders or other 
cognate disciplines, especially as diplomats were recruited primarily from amongst jurists, not 
political scientists.  International relations went from being an independent field of study in the 
GDR to a tightly confined sub-category within the organizational, interpretive and normative 
boundaries of ‘political science’. While a number of exceptions did make it in the new system, 
becoming professors or recognized experts in other ways, these were exceptions and not the rule. 
The vast majority of the GDR’s former experts took on new professions to ensure their material 
survival and stopped engaging with international relations. Those who continued engaging with 
their former area of expertise, did so in an unequal space in which their words and writings carried 
little weight, and remained separate from the dominant discourses, actors and decision-making 
processes of the new Germany. Throughout this process, the principle of hierarchical orientation 
played a structuring role, both in ‘winding down the old’ and in ‘building the new’. It shaped the 
attitudes and behaviours of the East German academics trying to adapt to the new situation by 
fully orienting to the Western standards. It shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East and 
West German actors involved in closing down the Eastern institutions, and it structured the 
various discourses of inferiority (incompetence, amorality, danger) used to apprehend the East 
German international relations experts. Finally, it played a role in crowding them out of the 
dominant international relations analysis networks, both the academic and political ones, and in 
displacing them into a subaltern parallel system of knowledge production and dissemination 
disconnected from its dominant counterparts. Hierarchical orientation also played a role in 
defining West German political science as the organizational, interpretive and moral point of 
reference according to which East German international relations expertise needed to be measured 
up and it played a role it legitimizing the transfer of the West German academic structures onto 
the East. Hierarchical orientation also shaped to a large extent the hiring procedures of the new 
or reformed universities in the East. These hiring procedures privileged academics with West 
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German social and cultural capital, as well as typical West German CVs and Western networks, 
thus marginalizing the East German candidates. Underlying these hiring procedures, hierarchical 
orientation also played a central role in the evaluation procedures which measured East German 
research quality according to West German norms and individualized competence in a way that 
reduced the quality of scholars to their ability or inability of catching up to these norms.  
This analysis of the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge 
processes at play in the evolution of GDR international relations expertise between 1970 and 2000 
is meant to showcase a relational approach to the analysis of knowledge systems. By focusing on 
the aggregation and disaggregation of people and processes into units of knowledge production, 
consumption and distribution as well as by highlighting the formation and dissolution of 
knowledge networks throughout war, revolution and ‘colonization’, this PhD thesis has aimed at 
showing the highly contextual and changing nature of knowledge networks. Because a relational 
approach is necessarily also ‘international’/‘global’/‘intersocietal’, the analysis of the last chapters 
also showcased the importance of not taking any boundaries as essential or given. As laid out in 
chapter 1, this thesis has put forward a re-reading of power/knowledge from an international 
perspective, not through an understanding of the international as either an extended scale of 
analysis, a global power structure or an imagined horizon. Instead, it has offered a reading from 
the perspective of the ‘international’ as a relational category, i.e. from the perspective of the 
‘international’ as a type of force that makes and unmakes social orders. The ‘global geopolitics of 
knowledge’ put forward here describes three ways in which a specific type of context – determined 
by war, revolution and colonization respectively – configures and sets the parameters for 
knowledge production. War/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are 
meant to work as conceptual frameworks through which concrete historical situations can be 
interpreted and compared. This is the theoretical contribution of my PhD thesis. The ‘global 
geopolitics of knowledge’ I put forward is a collection of ideal-typical situations through which to 
understand the way in which ‘the international’ impacts knowledge production by setting and 
reshaping its parameters and orientation.  
 
Thinking through GDR power/knowledge relations with the help of the three ideal-types of 
war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge has proven highly useful in 
making sense of the complex and multifaceted reality and changing nature of its international 
relations expertise system. However, as with all models, it also comes with limitations. Some of 
them are due to the nature of the model, others to the time constraints faced in developing it. I 
identify the following six points of reflection and also touch upon avenues for further research.   
Reflection 1. The model I put forward is dynamic in the sense that it depicts a moment of re-
spatialization, which is a moment of change. With change being an inherently temporal category, 
the model includes a temporal dimension. Yet it depicts only one moment in time – a moment of 
change. It does not delineate how we transition out of it and what happens next. In other words, 
its temporal dimension is not fully fleshed out. This is important because the significance of the 
model hinges partly on its relevance beyond the events themselves. We might term this issue the 
‘order of peace’ problem. Barkawi and Brighton use the term to describe the way in which war 
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imprints its “order of battle” to the subsequent time of peace.742 The point is that war, and for that 
matter revolution and colonization too, unmake and then remake societies. They restructure social 
order, leaving solid traces and imprints long after the events themselves took place. But how 
exactly they leave traces across time and remain relevant in the subsequent ‘order of peace’, the 
model so far does not address.  
Less important, but perhaps similarly vague is the depiction of the process leading to the re-
spatialization captured by the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and 
colonization/knowledge nexuses. I have established the core logic of each as consisting of enemy 
formation, polarization and hierarchical outlook. Ontologically speaking, each of these begin 
before war, revolution and colonization and bleed into them. Heuristically speaking, 
war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge do not have to overlap with 
a formal war, revolution or colonization setting, but they do not start either with some antagonism, 
polarization or hierarchy. They come into play once the situation described is sufficiently 
antagonistic, polarized or hierarchized. But when is of point of sufficiency reached? 
Reflection 2. Do the ideal-types need to be refined into sub-types? Do we need a 
decolonization/knowledge nexus to complement the colonization/knowledge nexus and if so how 
does it differ conceptually from revolution/knowledge? And what about the link between 
victory/knowledge and defeat/knowledge as subtypes to war/knowledge? This question partly 
links with the issue of temporality and thus needs to be worked out more fully. What are the 
outcomes of, for instance, the war/knowledge dynamic, once the conflict is over? It seems that 
victory will be more likely to present a knowledge situation that irreflexively transfers the order of 
battle to the order of peace, because it is not recognized as such. In opposition to this, defeat is 
likely to trigger a wider variety of knowledge reactions because it is more confronting. Defeat 
might prolong the antagonistic war dynamics, but it might also trigger new forms of positive 
orientation towards the victor. We might term this the ‘sub-type’ problem.  
Reflection 3. It is almost too banal to note that war, revolution and colonization are not discrete 
social processes but instead frequently overlap or cause one another. Revolution can lead to war, 
war can lead to colonization, colonization can lead to revolution, just as processes of war, 
revolution and colonization are frequently simultaneously taking place. Yet it does not suffice to 
point out that the distinction between war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and 
colonization/knowledge is a heuristic, not an ontological separation between the three. Because 
the distinction is conceptual does not mean that war, revolution and colonization cannot bleed 
into one another conceptually. Revolution/knowledge describes a temporal sequence that 
combines elements of war/knowledge and then colonization/knowledge. But the problem here 
links more fundamentally with the already noted issue of temporality. The outcome of war might 
just reinscribe the ‘order of battle’ into the ‘order of peace’, but it might also – through defeat – 
lead to modified dynamics of positive reorientation along the lines of the former enemy. How 
different is this from the colonization/knowledge nexus? We might term this the ‘conceptual 
distinction’ problem. 
                                               
742 Barkawi and Brighton,  139. 
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Reflection 4. Power and knowledge are co-constitutive; knowledge claims are deeply entangled with 
the social and political reality they are embedded in. This is essentially a two-way story. Yet the 
story behind the ideal-types presented here is a one-way story from power to knowledge. It depicts 
how social processes of change re-structure and re-shape the context within which knowledge 
production and knowledge dissemination takes place. This ignores the manyfold flows of 
interaction taking the reverse route from knowledge to power. Knowledge claims often underwrite 
the processes of enemy formation, polarization and hierarchical ordering residing at the core of 
war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. We might term this the ‘co-
constitution’ problem.  
Reflection 5. War/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are heuristic 
devices narrowing down the complex and manyfold connections between war and knowledge, 
revolution and knowledge, and colonization and knowledge to one type of connection only. This 
is a reductive move with the problematic effect of occluding other types of constitutive relations. 
While the impact of war, revolution and colonization on knowledge formation exceeds the one 
put forward in the geopolitics of knowledge model, the reverse is also true. More ‘international’ 
moments than just war, revolution and colonization impact knowledge formation. As Owens has 
shown,743 general social disorder, strikes, suicides and insurgencies are important moments in 
pushing the development of the social sciences forward. Social thought reacts to these moments 
of unrest in an effort to re-establish the disturbed order. This deeply impacts the content of ideas: 
“[c]oncepts like community, authority and alienation appear as basic sociological categories, but 
they reflect a desire for integration and order in the face of the social upheaval generated by 
capitalism and empire.”744 We might term this issue the ‘reduction’ problem.  
Reflection 6. Finally, we can raise the determinism question: what is the relation between contingency 
and determinism in the geopolitics/knowledge model I propose? The model firmly establishes 
three different ways in which the context of knowledge production is structured by war, revolution 
or colonization. But how strongly does the specific structure and orientation of a knowledge 
context impact the knowledge content? The geopolitics of knowledge model establishes some 
general connections: war/knowledge means that the knowledge content is determined by the 
antagonistic orientation against the ‘enemy’ knowledge formation, colonization/knowledge means 
that the knowledge content is determined by its orientation towards the metropole, while 
revolution/knowledge means that knowledge content is determined by a deep polarization and 
split within a previously homogenous knowledge context. Beyond these general points of 
structure, knowledge context and knowledge content evolve in ways that are often contingent and 
more often than not non-rational. Actors have individual agendas, limited insight and serious time 
constraints. If we take the example of the establishment of the University of Potsdam post-1990, 
the general colonization/knowledge pattern structured the establishment of the new post-
unification knowledge infrastructure of the former GDR. It determined the orientation of that 
process along West German lines. But the actual details of the process took place in contingent 
ways. 
                                               
743 Owens, Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the Social. 
744 Tarak Barkawi, "The social in thought and practice," Security Dialogue 47, no. 3 (2016): 188. 
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To conclude, let’s turn our attention to the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ model’s wider applicability.  
In this thesis it has been used in the context of the GDR’s system of international relations 
expertise. How applicable or useful would it be in other contexts? Further research is needed, and 
a synchronic, diachronic and contrapuntal expansion of this study could present an interesting 
next step. A synchronic expansion could involve the study of the same processes in Eastern 
European states, perhaps Poland or Czechoslovakia. How did war and revolution impact the 
organization of their system of international relations expertise? A diachronic expansion could 
involve looking at Germany at the critical historical juncture of losing WWI and WWII. How did 
war, revolution and defeat impact international relations knowledge production in post-WWI 
Germany and how did war, defeat and occupation impact international relations knowledge 
production in post-WWII Germany? A contrapuntal expansion could involve looking at the 
history of Mozambique during the same time frame. As we have seen, the GDR was involved in 
training Mozambican diplomats and establishing a diplomatic training facility in Maputo after 
Mozambique gained independence from Portugal. How did colonization, revolution and war 
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Die Militärakademie in der demokratischen Revolution 1989/90. Aufbruch und Ende. 
Vol. 114, DSS-Arbeitspapiere. Dresden: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft 
SICHERHEITSPOLITIK e. V., 2015. 
 
Schleicher, Ilona. "Das Solidaritätskomitee der DDR und Mosambik: Unterstützung des 
Befreieungskampfes und Entwicklungshilfe." In Die DDR und Afrika. Zwischen Klassenkampf 
und neuem Denken. , edited by Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg 
Schleicher, 192-208. Hamburg: Lit, 1993. 
 
Schmidt, Brian C. "Epilogue." In International Relations in Europe. Traditions, perspectives and destinations, 
edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, 253-69. London: Routledge, 
2006. 
 
Schreiber, Wilfried. "Von einer Militärdoktrin der Abschreckung zu Leitsätzen entmilitarisierter 
Sicherheit (1987-1990). Ein Zeitzeugenbericht." DSS-Arbeitspapiere 86 (2007). 
 
Schwarz, Wolfgang. "Neues Sicherheitspolitisches Denken in der DDR (1980-1990). Das Institut 
für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft." In Neues Denken in der DDR, edited by Erhard 
Crome and Lutz Kleinwächter. Potsdam WeltTrends, 2014. 
 
Schwerin, Kerrin Gräfin. "Die Südasienwissenschaften in der DDR – Eine Bilanz." In Wissenschaft 
und Wiedervereinigung, Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften im Umbruch, edited by Wolf Hagen-
Krauth and Ralf Wolz, 307-61. Berlin, 1998. 
 
Seifert, Arne C., ed. DDR-Diplomaten und die deutsche Einheit. 25 Jahre VIP. Vol. 52: Verband für 
Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht, 2015. 
 
Selbin, Eric. "Stories of Revolution in the Periphery." In Revolution in the Making of the Modern World, 
edited by John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic. London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
Smith, Steve. "The Discipline of International Relations: Still An American Social Science." British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 374-402. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Can the Subaltern Speak? Marxism and Interpretation of Culture, edited 
by C Nelson and L Grossberg. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 
 
Stein, Mathias. Der Konflikt um die Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: Die Deutsch-deutschen 
Beziehungen zu den Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2011. 
 
Steinmetz, George. "Social fields, subfields and social spaces at the scale of empires: explaining 
the colonial state and colonial sociology." The Sociological Review Monographs 64, no. 2 (2016): 
98-123. 
 
Tickner, Arlene. "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World." Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295-324. 
 199 
 
Tickner, Arlene and Ole Waever. International Relations Scholarship around the World: Worlding Beyond 
the West. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Tilly, Charles. European Revolutions 1492-1992. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
 
Tilly, Charles. "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise." In Security Communities, edited 
by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 397-412. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Vitalis, Robert. "The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in 
American International Relations." Millennium - Journal of International Studies 29, no. 2 
(2000): 331-56. 
 
Vitalis, Robert. "The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and its Laws of Race 
Development." Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 4 (2010): 909-38. 
 
Vitalis, Robert. White World Order, Black Power Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
 
Waever, Ole. "The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European 
developments in International Relations." International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687-
727. 
 
Wagoner, Phillip. "Precolonial Intellectuals and the Production of Colonial Knowledge." 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 4 (2003): 783-814. 
 
Wentker, Hermann. Aussenpolitik in engen Grenzen: die DDR im internationalen System, 1949-1989. 
München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007. 
 
Wenzke, Rüdiger, ed. Staatsfeinde in Uniform?: widerständiges Verhalten und politische Verfolgung in der 
NVA. Berlin: CH Links Verlag, 2005. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Wissenschaftsrat. "Empfehlungen zum Aufbau der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften an den 
Universitäten / Technischen Universitäten in den neuen Bundesländern und im Ostteil 
von Berlin, März 1991." In Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den 
neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin, vol 1. Köln 1992. 
 
Wünsche, Renate. "Das IIB und der ZENTRAAL." In Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut 
für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, edited by Erhard Crome, 181-85. Potsdam 
WeltTrends, 2009. 
 
Zhao, Tingyang. "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tian-xia)." 





Sources: List of Interviewees 
 
 Name Date Length Socialization Work 
1 Bernhard Myszynski 18.02.2019 1h42 West HRV/UP 
2 Erhard Crome 19.02.2019 1h13 East/IIB IIB 
3a Raimund Krämer  05.06.2019 1h52 East/IIB IIB 
3b Raimund Krämer 18.11.2019 1h49 East/IIB IIB 
4 Lutz Kleinwächter 18.06.2019 2h58 East/IIB IIB 
5 Wolfram Wallraf 20.06.2019 2h37 East/IMEMO IIB 
6 Jochen Franzke 01.07.2019 2h07 East/IIB IIB 
7 Gerhard Göhler 01.07.2019 1h46 West FU 
8 Thomas Ruttig 21.08.2019 2h16 East/HU MfAA 
9 Hartmut Elsenhans 22.08.2019 2h38 West Uni Leipzig 
10 Otto Keck 22.10.2019 2h42 West UP 
11 Otto Pfeiffer 25.10.2019 4h16 East/IIB MfAA 
12 Wolfgang Schwarz 18.11.2019 2h42 East/IIB IPW 
13 Harald Fuhr 20.11.2019 1h15 West  UP 
14 Werner Jann 22.11.2019 1h31 West UP 
15 Wilhelm Ersil 22.11.2019 2h48 East/HU IIB 
16 Hans-Joachim 
Gießmann 
09.01.2020 1h25 East/HU IPW 
17 Siegfried Fischer 24.02.2020 3h38 East/ 
Militärakademie 
Militärakademie 
18 Uwe Halbach 24.02.2020 1h07 West BiOst/SWP 
19 Hinrich Enderlein 25.02.2020 2h23 West Minister 




21 Ulrich van der Heyden 26.02.2020 2h13 East/HU HU 
22 Wilhelm Bürklin 26.02.2020 01h50 West UP 




24 Gert-Joachim Gläßner 28.02.2020 1h48 West  FU/HU 




IIB staff evolution at the University of Potsdam from the summer semester of 1991 to 2001:745 
 















1 Renate Schmidt      X X X X X X 
2 Wolfgang Kötter X X X X X X X X X X X 
3 Raimund Krämer X X X X X X  X X X X 
4 Jochen Franzke X X X X X X X X X X X 
5 Erhard Crome X X X X X X X X X X  
6 Sergej Henke X X X X X X X X X   
7 Wolfram Wallraf X X X X X X X X    
8 Wolfgang Kubiczek X X X X X X X     
9 Lutz Schrader X X X X X X      
10 Lutz Kleinwächter  X X X X X X      
11 Raina Zimmering X X  X X       
12 Claus Montag     X X       
13 Walter Stock X X X X X       
14 Dieter Thielemann X  X X        
15 Brigitte Schwope X X X X        
16 Hans-J. Bethke X X          
17 Klaus-Uwe Gunold  X          
18 Frank Talkenberg X           
19 Klaus Schmidt X           
20 Dietrich Kleitke X           
  17 14 12 14 12 10 7 7 6 5 4 
 
                                               
745 The numbers are combined and compiled from the following sources: Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Potsdam 
SS1992 bis SS2001; Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Kommission zur Festlegung des Sommersemesters, Studiengang 
Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28.02.1991, Anlage 1, Lehrveranstaltungen auf Honorarbasis im 
Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292; Kommission zur Festlegung des Wintersemesters 1991/92 
im Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 18.6.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292. 
